HANDBOOKS · FOR · THE · CLERGY

EDITED · BY · A · W · ROBINSON · B · D



BR 45 .H362 v.13
Strong, Thomas B. 1861-1944.
Authority in the church

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2019 with funding from
Princeton Theological Seminary Library

https://archive.org/details/authorityinchurc00stro

Handbooks for the Clergy

EDITED BY

ARTHUR W. ROBINSON, B.D.

VICAR OF ALLHALLOWS BARKING
BY THE TOWER

AUTHORITY IN THE CHURCH

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

CHRISTIAN ETHICS: Being the Bampton Lectures for 1895. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

GOD AND THE INDIVIDUAL. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. net.

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

LONDON, NEW YORK, AND BOMBAY

AUTHORITY IN THE CHURCH

BY

THOMAS B. STRONG, D.D.
DEAN OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
NEW YORK AND BOMBAY
1903

All rights reserved

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

Authority in General, and in the State

PAGES

Object of the book. Various instances of the exercise of authority in civil life. Discussion of the basis of authority. Authority a necessary result of the social nature of man. Certain consequences from this doctrine. (1) Morality and the authority of the State are closely allied, and should be positive rather than negative. (2) State-authority is a kind of embodied conscience. Hence (3) the individual is rarely justified in opposing it. The personal element in authority . . . 1–17

CHAPTER II

Authority and Reason

Authority in education, partly based on moral conditions, partly on superior knowledge. 1. Utility of such educative authority. 2. Conflict of authority and reason: really a conflict of temperaments not of principles. The conflict unjustifiable (1) because reason deals with matter authoritatively given; (2) because the two methods of authority and reason are adapted to different subject-

PAGE

matters. Place of authority in historical investigation. The presence of the social element in it. Conclusion . . . 18–36

CHAPTER III

The Church in the Gospels and Acts

The authority of the Church social like that of the State, but with the special character belonging to a spiritual society. The first question to be asked in regard to it : What does the New Testament tell us? I. The foundation of the Church is based on the act of God, foreshadowed in prophecy, carried out by the mission of the Son, and intended to be final. II. The Church immediately took the form of a disciplined organization, of which the policy was determined by authorities, acting within the limits assigned to them. This principle illustrated by the case of Ananias and Sapphira, the appointment of the Seven, the acts of Philip in Samaria, the mission of Paul and Barnabas, the establishment of elders in each Church, the condition of the church at Ephesus. They show the Church conscious that there is assigned to it the task of witnessing to the Lord's Resurrection, throughout the whole world 37–56

CHAPTER IV

The Church in the Epistles

Two types of Church officers; Apostles appointed directly by God ; elders appointed through the mediation of the Church. Insistence of

PAGES

S. Paul on Apostolic authority. Action of Apostles in organizing churches. Emphasis on moral requirements of Church-life. Slight attention to outward customs. Emphatic insistence on doctrinal conditions of membership. Rapid growth of outward organization. Comparison of Church and State . . 57–77

CHAPTER V

Authority and Outward Order

Authority based on discipleship, and representative in character. Effect of the spread of Christianity on the position of representatives. In what sense the development may be said to be Divinely ordered. Gradual differentiation among representatives, still under the guidance of the Spirit. The history shows (1) the very great importance of polity in the Church; (2) the cogency of the authority of the Church 78–96

CHAPTER VI

Authority and the Creed

The contact of the Church with philosophical thought, with which it had no original association, leads to question, and the assertion in terms of philosophy of the content of the Church's witness. The definition of the New Testament Canon, and the formulation of the Creeds. Hence, the authority of the Church, as witness, profoundly involved in regard to the primary facts concerning our Lord; and the view resulting from them as to the nature

PAGES

of God and man, and the union of man with God through the Church which is the Body of Christ. Such authority partly educational, but open to indirect verification in practical life. Development of dogma, true and false, illustrated by the doctrines of our Lord's Natures, and of Transubstantiation. Limits of authority in point of doctrine. Authority and Science conflict usually in matters of theory. Careful conduct of controversy required. Importance of exact knowledge of Scripture. Value of careful statement. Close relation of doctrine and life . . . 97–132

CHAPTER VII

AUTHORITY AND CUSTOM

Varying importance of outward practices. The two Sacraments of universal obligation, as instituted by Christ. Tests of validity necessary. Limited freedom allowed in sacramental ritual. Great freedom in the development of custom. Things naturally indifferent cannot acquire universal authority. The custom of Invocation of Saints, not really authoritative. Character of the Fourth Century. Discipline and ecclesiastical censure. Relation of local churches to so-called 'Catholic' custom. Papal basis of Canon Law. Limits of authority. Church and State. National Christianity. Conflict of Church and State rises out of certain permanent differences of attitude, but need not become acute. Importance of the use of authority in the present day. Summary 133–173

CHAPTER I

AUTHORITY IN GENERAL, AND IN THE STATE

THE present work is an attempt to consider some of the questions necessarily arising in connexion with the claim of the Church to exercise authority. It is intended to discuss the meaning of the expression authority, and to inquire into the grounds and limits of its exercise. We shall have to look at various instances in which authority is exercised elsewhere, and compare these with similar processes in the Church. In some form or another questions of this sort are continually with us: they are involved directly or indirectly in all the ecclesiastical controversies with which we are unhappily familiar. The more attractive and interesting way of dealing with these controversies conceals from view the questions of principle which underlie them; and one of the reasons why the controversies offer so little hope of solution is that their fundamental grounds are so rarely displayed. No apology is made, therefore, for the extent of space which is here given to theoretical discussion; for it is contended that it is in this direction

that discussion is likely to be best worth while.

The first question before us, then, is the nature of authority in general. There is no factor in the life of men which is easier to describe. Any person who gives a command and meets with obedience exercises authority. A master has and exercises authority over his servants; an officer over his men; the Speaker of the House of Commons over the other members of Parliament; a judge over a prisoner; the King over all causes, ecclesiastical and civil. But it is obvious from these instances that there is a wide variety of forms which the authority may take, and an apparent variety in the sanctions upon which it rests. At times, and in certain conditions, it seems to be but a veiled expression of force; at times, and in other conditions, it appears to rest on the character and special gifts of the person exercising it. It would be easier, for instance, for a weak and capricious judge to make his will effectual upon those who were brought before him, than for an incompetent Speaker to manage the House of Commons. Yet in both cases there would be an appeal to force in case of a dispute. A recalcitrant member of Parliament would be carried out of the House by the police; but if the Speaker had made a serious blunder in condemning him, if there was serious reason to

doubt his intelligence or impartiality, his successful appeal to force would impair rather than extend his authority, and the whole order of the place would become precarious.

These patent facts make it clear that authority, as we know it, is much more than the power or privilege of giving commands; it requires the existence of conditions such as are likely to lead to the realization of the intentions of the party, as the phrase is, *in* authority. It is, therefore, from the first a social relation involving the cooperation of several wills. And therefore, also, we require some wider principle than *force majeure* for the sanction of authority. The appeal to force is not like overcoming physical resistance by violence; such use of force has place only in dealing with inanimate things; the right to use force in the particular connexion seems to arise from the relation in which all the parties are. Thus the Speaker of the House of Commons has no right to compel the will of any one except in connexion with his work as Speaker: he cannot give the orders or enforce the sanctions which an officer can deliver to his men. And the officer, absolute in his own sphere, is a cipher in the House of Commons. Hence one is tempted to suggest that there is something of a contractual nature about the relation; certain men have agreed to submit to certain

orders, or in the alternative to submit to forcible compulsion. It is true that the force is not, as a rule, sufficient, as force, to compel obedience. The person who rebels does not usually fight to the last gasp: he submits before he is actually overpowered: he has made his protest and given his submission under some form of violent compulsion. That is, he admits the right of the authority in the same breath with his defiance of it: there is clearly an element of consent in it.

Yet the question of individual feeling is entirely irrelevant. Those who are in the subordinate relation have, strictly speaking, no right to resist on the ground that they do not personally like the orders given. The claim on them for obedience is independent of this. Indeed, they may go further than this and think the orders positively mischievous, and still have no just ground for resistance. A manufacturer, for instance, may think Parliament extremely ill-advised in passing Factory Acts. He may hold that such methods of protecting people produce more loss than gain, not only to him but to the people themselves: that the abstention from dangerous employment, or the prohibition of children from engaging in such employment at too early a date, would come better from the parents than from a parental Government. But this, we should all agree, has nothing to do with the

question: when the Act is passed, the obedience is claimed as of right. Hence, though the exercise of authority in certain circumstances and within certain areas may seem to have the nature of an agreement — an agreement by which one party agrees to take and the other to give directions, as a sort of labour-saving process—this explanation will not cover all cases. The authority of the Czar in Russia, for instance, or of Parliament in England, claims to do more than anticipate desires which are already implicitly formed: it claims to override personal wishes, and, in any case where these develope open resistance, to use compulsion to enforce its provisions.

In this rapid glance over various forms in which authority is exercised one point comes out clearly. There is required a consentience of will, in order to produce the situation in which the exercise of authority is possible: the two parties must be in some way connected, and the authority will ultimately rest upon their connexion. It is on the whole the varying nature of the connexion which produces varying types of authority. In some cases, *e.g.* in the relation of master and servant, the relation seems to be one of contract: it is a bargain, in which the servant covenants to perform certain more or less defined functions for a certain consideration. At times the real basis of the connexion seems to be the common pur-

suit of a particular end; *e.g.* the captain of a football team exercises authority with a view to an end which both parties desire in common, and his sphere of influence is strictly limited by this. The chairman of a meeting — possibly even the Speaker himself—have in their authority an element of this voluntary agreement for a particular end. But as the end served by Parliament is wider than that of any private voluntary association, the sanctions surrounding its authority partake of the grandeur of those by which the interests of the State are preserved. Parliament is not merely a voluntary society for debate; it is the organ of the will of a nation, and therefore the public resources are at its disposal within its own jurisdiction.

This brings us to the really central question touching authority of a political sort, and marks a really specific distinction between authorities of different types. Voluntary, casual, private associations display the action of authority; but they are easily dissoluble, and their authority is therefore precarious, and depends largely on the particular person exercising it. But in other cases, the whole meaning of the life of the State is involved: the particular association, however free in its choice of rulers, and adoption of rules, is taken into the control of the State, and the order voluntarily adopted by the associates is enforced

by the powers which the State uses for State purposes. Here, as we have already noticed, the claim is made to use coercion independently of the avowed wishes of persons resisting: their private judgments are ignored, and the State claims that it is justified in thus ignoring them. Perhaps we may say that we have now reached the most fundamental form of authority of the political sort; and we must now turn our attention to it, and inquire on what it rests.

There is an aspect of the State according to which it closely resembles a voluntary association for some definite end, like a company or club. From this point of view, it seems that men combine for purposes of protection against one another, and in order to secure, for each individual, freedom as nearly unrestricted as possible. The authority will then represent the practical attempt to secure this end. As the authority of the Speaker secures equal rights to each individual member of Parliament to express his views, so the elaborate machinery by which the political idea is realized has a similar practical end in view. The authority on this principle will leave men alone as far as it can: it will interfere when there seems a likelihood of injustice, but it will not put forward any positive and definite policy by which the State as a whole is to be guided. In other words, on this view the authority of the

State rests entirely upon its utility in producing the particular condition which men find convenient and just. If such a state of things could conceivably arise that the existing machinery ceased to satisfy this requirement, its authority would be gone: it exists because and so long as it is useful.

It is, doubtless, true that these things may all be said of political authority: it does make individual life and freedom possible; and if it be admitted that the State has no public end beyond the satisfaction of individual desires, we may grant that this is an adequate account of its authority. A revolt against authority would then be condemned and punished in order to avoid anarchy, or conditions that might lead to anarchy: it would seem better, on the whole, that individual liberty should be restricted a little beyond what would be antecedently desirable, than that the State should incur the perils of anarchy. But it may be questioned whether this permissive and indifferent attitude towards the various interests and purposes of individuals is all that can be said of the State. It has or ought to have a positive and constructive purpose which is carried out through the individual lives, and, if so, its authority will tend to take on a more commanding aspect.

We cannot but admit that this positive purpose is not always easy to see. The separateness of

individual lives is so marked and so obvious that it is more natural to think of them as entirely independent than as necessarily combined. The full explanation of this difficulty would require a complete discussion of the problem of Individuality, for which we have not the space here. The following considerations, however, will probably be sufficient to make our point plain for the present purpose. There is no question that, from the ethical point of view, men are related not only as independent rivals, but as friends. They have intercourse one with another in which their purposes are at one: they unite for various ends: they cannot, indeed, exist without combination. The individual, as Aristotle said, is not *αὐτάρκης*: *αὐτάρκεια*, so far as that is ever achieved, comes by combination. Moreover, as life developes and becomes fuller, it appears that all the higher possibilities of man's existence emerge through his social character. Even conscience itself could never attain any very lofty result or occupy any very wide range of man's life except through the enlightenment which comes to it through the experience of social evolution. Every step in the direction of higher morality depends on surmounting some previous stage, finding out its inadequacy, and resisting the temptation to be satisfied with it. But this is only another way of saying that just in so far as man is really

intended by nature to be moral, so far he must express himself in social forms. That is, society is not merely an accidental co-partnership between a number of individuals who have separate lives and purposes: it is the necessary atmosphere of moral life. People are not moral in separation first and then combined in society: the impulse to morality is indistinguishable from the impulse to social combination. The one will not exist without the other.

Several points may be noted if this political doctrine be valid; and it is almost impossible to deny that it is valid.

1. Morality is more than a code of negations and prohibitions. There are certainly many things which morality necessarily forbids, such as intrusions upon the rights and the freedom of other men. But it is only the most elementary condition of things in which this is an adequate description of what morality requires of a man. In anything like a civilized order he is expected to give positive help to his neighbours, to be ready to forward their interests; under the law of Christ, he should love them as himself. It is plain then that if it be true that morality is made possible by the social conditions, if it is exactly in the same sense true to say that man is naturally moral and naturally social, it follows that the negative conception of the functions of the State

must be wholly inadequate to the facts. It cannot be an exhaustive account of the purpose of the State to say that it exists only to keep the peace between rivals. It exists in order to the evolution of a moral ideal: it is more than an accidental aggregate of individuals voluntarily combined for mutual protection: it is a moral organism—the form in which man's true nature is clearly expressed. When, therefore, we look to see the nature and grounds of the compulsion which the State exercises on the individuals composing it, it is plain that we must refer for the interpretation of the State-order not merely to its negative power of keeping individuals apart, but to its positive purpose of combining them into a single moral organism.

2. This leads on to the second point arising out of our present position. It is this: that on ordinary occasions, and in normal circumstances, the authority of the State is a kind of embodied conscience. The voice in which the moral law addresses man is the voice of Conscience. Conscience judges actions when completed, distinguishes between rival courses of action, and commends or condemns plans of action. Its development has come, as we have seen, through social life. Men have gradually found out that acts which at one time they may have approved, are after all not worthy of

approval. Other lines of action which perhaps were not present to them in earlier days become natural and obvious. And this course of change is made possible by experience in society. It is by intercourse, by comparison of different ideals and modes of action, by reflexion upon personal experiences, by sympathy with sorrow, caused by injustice but done under the ægis of law and custom, that the evolution is made possible at all. Of course, the stages of the evolution require the action of some enlightened individual. The progress is not mechanical and blind. The reformer has to read the signs of the times, and note the conditions and occasions which suggest improvement. At times this will, of course, bring him into conflict with the reigning customs of his time; and the fact that this is so tends to make the State-conscience look retrograde and unenlightened; but it remains that the prevalent view of right and wrong at any given time represents the average attainment of society up to that date; and that though there is not the smallest reason to regard its utterance at any stage as final, yet it is important not to mistake its real character. The claim of the State to respect is one that is binding on *conscience;* and the authority of the State is, after all, a kind of embodied conscience. To resist it, in normal conditions, is to resist the force that is carrying man forward towards the

ideal conception of society, which is the heart of political life and progress. The authority of the State, by requiring certain observances and forbidding certain forms of selfishness, sustains a level of general morality which prevents degradation. The rule of any fairly civilized State is impartial and free from passion; and if justice is well administered the whole order of things works smoothly and moves, though perhaps not very fast, continually in the direction of higher civilization, more articulate and comprehensive moral ideas.

3. These results lead on to the third of the points referred to above. It is not wise to trust too implicitly and unquestioningly to the utterances of the individual conscience when it conflicts with the authority of the State. This is, of course, a point round which an almost endless web of casuistry may be spun: we shall have to return to some points connected with it later on. Here we need only remark that there is a very fair presumption as a rule in favour of the State as against the individual. The State moves slowly, of course: it is probably always considerably behind the intuitions of the loftiest minds in it at any given time. And the intuitions of the far-sighted will no doubt come in time to remodel and correct the more stationary ideas of the average man. But those who have visions of advancement in practice are comparatively few,

and their visions rarely take exactly the shape in which they have been conceived. In the minds of their originators, they are apt to have the one-sidedness which almost inevitably results from the individual point of view; and there is a tendency in people who strive for reform to lay emphasis on the least valuable elements in their own work —the parts which are least fitted to become Law Universal. And all the while, the State in its laws represents a real tested achievement on the line of human progress, and is a real concrete embodiment of the conscience of mankind.

If we now look back upon the instances of the exercise of authority with which we started, we may fairly claim that the principle here enunciated explains them all more completely and comprehensively than any other. Some of the simpler forms of authority may seem to require no such profound basis as that of conscience. It may seem a caricature to speak of the tie which unites the football captain and his team as resting upon conscience. And it is perhaps more natural to use some lower term for such a slight and temporary relation. Again, the authority of the chairman in an ordinary meeting is obviously and readily explained by the principle of utility, and it seems unnecessary to go farther. The relation between the officer and his men again depends partly on the necessities of the

situation (*i.e.* upon utility), partly upon voluntary contract between the soldier and the King. But the reason why these principles are not quite adequate to the explanation even of these simple cases is that the capacity to contract, the capacity to surrender voluntarily private and personal desires to the general utility, depends upon the possession of the moral faculties. The social order of mankind, the fact that at every level man is social, is not an accident; it is, as we have seen, the expression of his moral being. Because he is a moral being, capable of guiding his impulses and desires in relation to an end, he enters into social relations of various sorts. Even the football team would be an impossible ideal to persons without moral capacities. Still more is this true in the wider relations of life. Hence it is not without reason that we see in the authority of the State the most impressive form that can be given to these moral powers. The opposition between authority and conscience is an accidental one. Conscience and authority must always command; and in proper conditions their commands are coincident. The individual surrenders his wishes, possibly also, at times, his ideals, at the command of the authority of his State, not because he is overpowered by numbers or the fear of force, but because he is at heart on the side of authority, and expects to hear in

its utterances that which his own conscience will confirm. Authority can only be exercised over wills; and they recognize their kinship with it, when it speaks.

There is one other point upon which a word may be said here. We noted at the outset that there is often a personal element in authority. An incompetent person who delivers the decisions of authority is apt to produce a disastrous effect. He is obeyed, if at all, grudgingly; and there is always more than a possibility of rebellion against him. And as authority is the most venerable of all human institutions when it succeeds, so it is apt to be the most ludicrous of all human things when it fails. The contrast between what it claims and what it achieves makes it absurd. Of course, where the exercise of authority is capricious and wrong-headed, or positively unjust, we have the conditions which lead to revolution, and the consideration of these would properly belong to the casuistry of the question. The case to which attention is now drawn is different, that in which the authoritative person lacks the air of command and fails to carry conviction by what he does. And the question is, How is such failure within the principle that the real source of authority is ethical? It cannot, perhaps, be denied that in theory the right of authority to prevail is

independent of the person who exercises it. The fact that he does not, as we say, look the part, is self-conscious and petty in character, does not affect the fact that he speaks in a greater name than his own. And it is probable that the real centre of the distrust which he inspires lies in the feeling of insecurity. A weak or petty character is not fit to act in the name of the State or of any serious and solemn association. He will be liable to mistake the real drift of things, from his very incapacity and lightness of soul. If he is at all of the nature of a Jack-in-office, he will magnify not his office, but himself; and then we shall have a purely selfish and self-centred person, speaking in the name of that which is the negation of all selfishness—the moral instinct of mankind. This is surely not an unnatural insecurity; and it is consistent with our theory of the nature of authority that such a person should meet with a hesitating and suspicious obedience, that only waits for a positive mistake to break out into rebellion. That similar hesitation and insecurity should characterize people's attitude to a person who has none of these moral failings, but lacks some physical characteristics associated with authority, may be in accordance with some of the less worthy elements of our human nature, and explicable on that ground, but it cannot claim any higher sanction.

CHAPTER II

AUTHORITY AND REASON

So far we have thought of authority as it operates within the State, where the form which it naturally takes is that of command. The authority delivers orders, the subject obeys. But this is not the only possible association with the word. By a kind of transference of association the expression is used also in connexion with intellectual activities. The man of science speaks with authority; the physician gives authoritative directions for the treatment of a patient; and the validity of the authority in such cases depends not mainly upon the social relation in which the parties are united, but upon a presumed superior knowledge in the authority. Doubtless, the patient would not submit to the physician's directions if he had any reason to suspect him of animosity; and so far the obedience, when it is vouchsafed, assumes friendly social relations. But this is by no means the mainspring of this particular obedience; for that we have to take into account the presumed superiority of knowledge.

Again, there is another set of cases which belong to this order of ideas. A child is instructed in a variety of subjects by his parents. They make assertions which they do not attempt to prove, and the child is called upon to accept them as true; probably in most cases he does. So again, any teacher presents his pupil with a number of results which the pupil cannot, at the time, criticize or explain. If he is a good teacher he will so do this as to arouse in the mind a spirit of inquiry; but it remains that much of the content of his teaching must consist of results rather than processes.

In these cases also the moral element is present. A child is an acute critic, and the character of the parent may have decisive influence in determining the child's mind to the acceptance or rejection of the views commended to it. Home influences lead to reaction as well as to submission; and though the process may not be, logically, free from objection, it is too natural and inevitable to be ignored. But here again, the ground for accepting the assertions made is the presumption in the parent or instructor of superior knowledge. We may even notice that it is in the region of knowledge rather than that of practice that such authoritative utterances are likely to be accepted. The child, who is told by parent or teacher that he will be sorry in the

future for having wasted his time in the present, probably does not believe it, however deeply he may respect the persons who say it. His experience of pleasure in the present is too direct and certain to enable him to estimate the dimly conceived future pain; and the experience which lies behind what his elders say is, of course, out of his ken altogether. On the other hand, if he is told some fact of history or science in such a form as interests him, he will probably accept it readily. In other words, the acceptance is due not mainly to the moral relation between the two parties, but to the presumed superiority of knowledge on the part of the elder. The child readily believes that there are things he does not know, less readily that he is not competent to manage his own affairs. Our present task is to consider and place this use of authority in intellectual matters.

1. There is no doubt of the necessity and utility of this use of authority: it is one of the most obvious ways in which the intellectual progress of the race is carried forward. If each generation had to begin where the earliest generations began, there is no reason to suppose that they would acquire truth with any greater rapidity, and advance in knowledge would be restricted to what can be attained within the compass of a single human life. It is one of the advantages

which belong to the possession of a human mind that the advance made in knowledge in any one generation can be stored up, as it were, in shorthand and made available for subsequent thinkers. When this is done, the new generation receives the labours of the old on authority: it does not think itself bound on every occasion to review the whole process by which the knowledge was acquired. It accepts the result, and assumes confidence in the process, which, of course, it can always verify at will. From another point of sight we might consider this acceptance as an embodiment of the principle of the division of labour, and in this light the principle operates not only as between one generation and another, but also as between independent workers in the same generation. As a child would lose all chance of ever knowing much if he insisted on examining fundamentally everything told him on authority, so a man wastes time if he will trust no one but himself, if he will not accept results from any workers, however competent. The time he spends in going again over ground which others have already covered might have been better used in advancing knowledge in the line for which his own special gifts adapt him. To reject authority in this way is usually the reverse of reasonable.

2. There is thus an obvious and necessary use

for the principle of authority in the advance of knowledge, and the education both of the individual and of the race. To ignore it would be to retard the whole process. It remains, however, that there seems to be a natural conflict between the principle of authority and reason; and we must give some consideration to the question here. The discussion of it will throw additional light on the nature and basis of authority.

It must be freely admitted that authority speaks in very different tones from those of reason: it declares results, and does not reveal the process by which they are attained. To use Aristotelian language, we have in authority a *συλλογισμός τοῦ ὅτι* and not *τοῦ διότι*. We learn facts, and do not immediately see how they must be articulated in a system and explained. The boy who is taught the law of gravity by his parent or teacher may be said to begin where Newton left off: he has Newton's result without the labour of acquiring it. For practical purposes, a knowledge of the facts may be all that he will ever need; and if that is so, he is, of course, never in a strictly rational position as regards them; he has the *ὅτι*, but not the *διότι*. This is no doubt an inferior position; but it is one which most of us must occupy all our lives in regard to much of our experience. So far there is no particular reason why any conflict

should arise. When conflict does arise, it seems to come in two ways: first, from the misuse of authority, by the assertion of extravagant claims and the disallowance of rational criticism; with this we have nothing to do at present; and, secondly, from the suspicion arising between the types of mind to which the two methods most naturally appeal. This which is a justifiable or, at least, an inevitable cause of conflict may be considered shortly here.

There is an unmistakable difference between the two types of mind. One man is mainly interested in practical applications, and does not care so much for the reasons on which they are based. He does not interest himself in inquiry for its own sake, he undertakes only *fructifera experimenta*. He is thus entirely contented with his principles, provided they will work: it does not matter to him how he comes by them. If he has found by experience that some idea which he has never investigated fundamentally is successful in practice, he is apt to be annoyed with any one who undertakes to show the poverty of his rational grounds for trusting it: he will tend to be rather narrowly conservative, disliking everything that may be stigmatized as new-fangled. On the other hand, there are men who find it very hard to accept anything which they cannot explain: their disposition is critical and

analytical: it is no consolation to them that a principle works well, if they cannot say why: they are not satisfied to go on with existing methods, if by undertaking new inquiries there is a chance of finding out new truth or placing old truth in new lights. There is, therefore, every reason why these two types of people should fail to understand one another. Their differences are more than merely psychological: they represent the two different ways of dealing with experience carried to an extreme, and embodied concretely in different types of character. Reason is for ever trying to overtake experience with the forms of thought: it continually restates and reorganizes its data, in the endless endeavour to reach some finally satisfactory statement of it all. The successive discoveries of scientific thought have to be placed in due order and explained: new principles of arrangement arise and necessitate the reopening of many discussions long thought to be closed. Thus the world presents a perpetual problem to reason, because it is never satisfied with its own formulations of what has been observed, and is always being obliged to make room for new facts.

To rely on authority is to pursue a diametrically opposite method to this: to use it as the basis of teaching may be, and often is, to discourage the methods of reason. Yet, strictly speaking, there

is not sufficient justification for a violent antagonism. And this for two reasons. (1) Reason itself is always dealing with material that is given. In this connexion, this is a fact of considerable importance. In order to see this more clearly, it will be necessary to recur to a point already mentioned. Leaving aside the more abstruse metaphysical difficulties, it is matter of common knowledge that experience from the side of the mind consists of a fabric of thoughts erected on a basis of sense-reports. What gives man his control over the world he lives in is the fact that he is able to treat these sense-reports from the universal point of view, combine them in classes, and treat them by a kind of intellectual shorthand or symbolism. Ideas formed by various processes out of the utterances of the senses are used as counters, standing for actual experiences, and always capable of being verified by reference to them. The whole work of reason consists in the application of this universalizing power with various degrees of minuteness or comprehension. The discovery of certain laws enables us to anticipate nature, and determine not only the present condition of the world, but also affirm quite beyond any reasonable possibility of error what will come to pass. Reflexion upon experience makes possible the use of the imagination and the construction of ideals which never have, and

perhaps never will be, verified. But in each case, and throughout its whole work, reason is always working upon materials which it does not create; for these it always has to trust ultimately to the senses as they are affected from without. It is not merely passive, but it cannot work without materials, and for these it is dependent. Further, within the various provinces into which experience is divided, for convenience, the principles are always assumed: Arithmetic assumes numbers, and so on; in Aristotle's phrase, 'no science proves its own first principles.' And even more conspicuously, when reason sets to work to criticize and test the validity of its own methods, it cannot avoid assuming their validity at every point in the process. It is, in other words, a false abstraction by which it is made to appear that reason is purely critical and has nothing to do with unproved hypotheses, or data reaching it from without. There is no part of the mental furniture of man which reason cannot test and examine and analyze: that is true; but wherever it comes into operation it works upon materials given it from without, and with assumptions which, however liable to analysis upon other occasions, must be taken for granted at the time. On this ground, therefore, we ventured to say above that the conflict of authority and reason (except in cases where one or other is misused) arises from the

conflict of types of character rather than a conflict of principles. The educative use of authority, dependence on unproved hypotheses and provisional assumptions, are characteristic of reason in all its operations. But men, who are mainly accustomed to one part or aspect of the rational process, and not another, test everything by reference to that part which is most familiar. The man who does not care about first principles, but is accustomed to look to practical experience for verification of the hypotheses he has assumed or received by teaching, looks upon the relentless analysis of the other as unnecessary and disturbing. The other, who never accepts anything without criticism, looks upon the man of authority as hardly using his mind at all. Each tends to denounce the method of the other, because he has little experience of it and is shy of it; yet the real conflict is not between methods, but between temperaments trained in a particular way. Both processes are rational; both involve truths accepted upon something less than demonstrative evidence, that is, upon something of the nature of authority.

(2) The second reason why the conflict is unnecessary lies in the fact that the two methods, if we may so speak of authority and reason, are suitable to different subjects. The analytical methods of reason are most free and successful

where there is the least room for contingency: where detail and contingency have large place, reason becomes more and more dependent upon data from without, and therefore is less free. A few illustrations will make this point clearer. In ordinary geometry, reason has to do with concepts, defined by itself as a result of a process of abstraction, which for our purpose may be ignored; and it draws inferences and makes practical applications from this basis. It is most free and most successful in this region, because it can more completely control its subject-matter. The lines and figures under discussion, though they never occur as such in nature, have their approximations in nature. Reason deals with the abstractions, and of set purpose ignores all that makes its ideal concepts inadequate to the actual facts. Its whole system of thoughts has come ultimately from nature, but it is able to abstract from all this and deal with its concepts as if they were in the strictest sense valid of the natural world. When we turn to the metaphysical or scientific co-ordination of phenomena we find ourselves in a very different atmosphere. Within certain regions certainty is possible; in others the results are highly precarious. And the decisive difference between these various districts of thought turns on the number of relations which have to be taken into account. The science which con-

cerns itself with the simplest aspects of the material world, its mass and its velocity, comes nearest the unqualified certainty of geometry. In this science we look away from all the additional attributes which make the concreteness of our impressions of things, and deal, by abstraction, with one or more aspects only. In like manner, in the region of thought, it is the somewhat arid field of formal logic where quasi-geometrical certainty is attained. When we come to deal with the living world and construe it in terms of cause and effect, the certainty attainable diminishes rapidly. For these conceptions though complicated are always liable to fail when applied in nature because their abstractness, necessary for them as ideas, ignores too many of the elements which go to constitute an event in nature. New facts come and science changes so as to include them; scientific theory follows suit. There is no finality about the utterances of the philosophic reason, because they are never adequate to the facts. But the most serious limitations upon the freedom of rational construction are found in history and in the whole world of human activity.

In dealing with history and human life we certainly notice uniformities and formulate general laws, but they never reach any very high pitch of certainty. In the matter of prediction, for

instance, we can reach an average formed by a fairly wide review of particular events. We may know on the faith of statistics that a certain average of misdirected letters are posted every year, that a certain average number of people commit suicide every year, that a man at a given age has a certain average expectation of life. And these averages are worked out on the basis of actual facts. Using them as a basis it is easy to give some general account of what is likely to happen. So again a wide study of history leads to certain general positions from which it is possible to anticipate up to a certain point what is likely to happen. A certain type of character, so to say, usually marks a democracy, and we may within limits arrive at the idea of the sort of policy a democracy is likely to pursue. We may reach the conclusion from investigation of the past that the power over the sea is the most potent of all factors in supremacy, and guide our own policy accordingly. Or again, after an event, we can look back and see how inevitable it was and how naturally it arose out of the previous condition of the country and people to whom it occurred. But in no case is it possible to predict details, or indeed (and this is the same thing in another form) to explain them fully. The astronomer can state the moment at which an eclipse will begin: the philosophical historian

can talk of tendencies and probabilities, but he can never give beforehand any precise and detailed account of the most ordinary events. The variety of causes and the incalculable nature of human wills make absolute certainty impossible.

These facts have an important meaning in connexion with our present question. They mean that the philosophical historian, however comprehensive his generalizations, depends in a very marked way upon authority for his facts. And this is more conspicuously true of the historian than of any other philosophical or scientific worker. As we have seen, reason always requires data from without as the basis for its operations; but these are often susceptible of proof or criticism in their own way. The facts with which the historian deals, however, come to him on the evidence of the assertions of men, *i.e.* on authority. In most cases, the historian has to deal with facts which did not fall within his own experience. He has certain principles to guide him; certain *a priori* conceptions of what is probable or the reverse; but in the end he has to take what he is told as the basis of his story. The machinery of criticism and investigation of probabilities lies round the question: Can I or can I not accept the authority of this witness as true? The detailed presentation of the fact rests on this authority.

It is manifest, then, that here and in other regions of serious scientific investigation the principle of acceptance of authority works easily with the critical and analytic process of reason. Both are methods of attaining truth.

It will be worth while to inquire here a little more closely into the nature of the authority recognized in historical evidence, in order to clear up a little further the general question before us. Why do we believe on the authority of others that things occurred which we did not see? Of course, we weigh first the *a priori* elements in the question—the general probabilities and the like, and find, let us presume, no *a priori* objections against the allegation. Then when it comes to be a question of accepting or rejecting the authority, what is our ground? It is, surely, trust in the character of the witness. We think that he is unlikely to deceive us and had sufficient knowledge of the matter not to be himself deceived. In other words, our confidence depends for its basis on the honesty and intelligence of our witness. If he has lied or been deceived himself the best investigations will prove but an imperfect protection against error. More generally we may say that our acceptance of the accounts of past things which form history is based on a confidence in human nature. The evidence of endless witnesses goes to make up what is asserted of the

past; and, on the whole, though we know that they vary both in character and capacity, we trust the human race. We are all of one kin, and we do not generally wish to deceive, nor have we reason to suppose that the desire to do so is common in others. The real basis of our acceptance of historical authority is our sense of racial unity: in S. Paul's words, we expect men to speak truth with their neighbours, because we are members one of another. To deceive is an act of hostility not to be readily admitted.

By way of contrast to the method of historical evidence described above, we may briefly look at the process of acceptance in one rather curious special case. When people are confronted with alleged spiritualistic phenomena, a very remarkable logical situation often arises. The events alleged are often of the most trivial kind: their peculiarity is that they are ascribed to the agency of disembodied spirits. There is, as a rule, very little difficulty in believing that certain noises or movements have occurred: the difficulty begins when they are ascribed to spiritual agency, and interpreted in some particular way. Even this is a fairly intelligible hypothesis. But when it comes to basing action on the statements and reports from 'the other world,' it becomes plain at once that we have no means of estimating the likelihood of deceit.

Spiritualists themselves admit that not all the 'spirits' are trustworthy, but it is apparently hopeless to test their accuracy except when they make statements about the world of sense which are capable of verification. There is no kinship or common understanding between the parties sufficient to enable us to make out the general limits of reliance upon them. The evidence becomes valueless, except so far as it might be verified by the ordinary methods of experience.

We started the present investigation by considering certain cases in which a statement was accepted on the basis of the superior knowledge of the speaker: and we laid emphasis on the fact that the ground of the acceptance is intellectual, that is to say, it rests on the belief in this superior knowledge. We said that such a confidence in superior knowledge is necessary if the experience of one generation is to be made available for the next, and is essential to the successful prosecution of education. We have now discovered a somewhat similar situation in the region of historical evidence. But there is a slight difference which is worth noting. In the educative acceptance of authority, there is usually an expectation that at some period it will be possible to tread for oneself the road by which others have reached their conclusion, and so hold the truth not merely in confidence on our authority, but by the light of

our own reason. Strictly speaking, in historical matters, we must always depend finally on the authority of the witnesses; we cannot hope to do more than produce by argument and application of principles a reasonable probability in favour of what they say. The final act of assent depends, as we have seen, on our confidence in a sense of unity with them.

This result is, we venture to think, of some importance. In the last chapter we traced the foundation of the authority of the State to the social element in man's nature. He combines with his fellows into a state because that is the true sphere of his evolution, the condition in which he attains the purpose which is possible to him. The form which authority takes in the State is that of positive command or prevailing custom no less powerful than positive command. We now find that a similar social element underlies the intellectual acceptance of historical data: we believe men's evidence because we recognize our kinship with them. We may, perhaps, say, therefore, that we have found ourselves in the presence of commanding authority in three different ways: we accept the authority of the State; after due investigation we accept the authority of men whom we have never seen or known in matters of history; we accept authority provisionally as a means of education, or

division of labour. In all these cases there is present the feeling of social unity: though perhaps this is weakest in those cases where we give only provisional assent, or accept the results of others mainly on the strength of their intellectual capacity: there is less sense here of the character of the witness. Throughout the whole discussion we have kept strictly within the limits of ordinary civil experience: the question whether the peculiar character of the Church raises new difficulties or modifies our present conclusions must be discussed in subsequent chapters. So far we may say that authority is one outward form which the claim of the race upon the individual may take: it is a function of the social nature of man.

CHAPTER III

THE CHURCH IN THE GOSPELS AND ACTS

We have examined with some care the nature of the facts concerning the authority exercised in the State; and we have also considered its use in education and history. We see how closely it is allied with the social instincts and characteristics of man, and hence how reverend its claim really is. We may point out here that the claim involved in the exercise of authority such as we find it in the State is strengthened rather than weakened by this recognition of the unity of all mankind. To claim authority, for instance, in right of birth is, strictly, to rest the claim on the wrong grounds; or, at least, upon grounds which are not fundamental. Because the presence and operation of authority is necessary to the social welfare of the race, therefore it is possible for a given people to make this the test of persons in whom authority is to be vested. And there are many practical reasons, which we need not discuss, why this particular method of determination should be selected. But there is no rational account of divine right, whether of king or people,

which does not ultimately rest on the unity and social character of mankind as a whole.

Starting from this view of civil authority we must now pass on to consider the authority of the Church. It is obvious that here we shall meet with some new conditions, and have to relate our conception of authority to new circumstances and ideas. Our question will be, what difference, if any, must be made in our view of authority in consideration of these special circumstances and ideas?

We may admit, at once, that so far as the Church is rightly conceived as a voluntary association of persons combined for certain ends, we should expect to find in it the usual phenomena noticeable in such cases. We should look for officials, exercising the functions of the whole on behalf of the whole body, and responsible to it. We should expect to find the idea of commission as an essential element in the idea of office, whether the fact of commission was to be certified by popular voice, or by the vote of delegates. The more stable the association was likely to be, the more permanent we should expect to find its arrangements, the more efficient its division of functions.

But it needs no elaborate discussion to show that this account of things would not adequately meet the question. The Church, on any showing,

is more than a voluntary association for certain purposes like a club or temperance society. It claims to be a spiritual society. The purposes for which it is formed transcend the limits of this world; and, as all societies must regulate themselves by the purpose for which they are formed, if they are to have rational existence, it is necessary to take into consideration these wider thoughts. We must therefore restate our question more precisely, and inquire, what differences, if any, must be made in our view of authority in consideration of the spiritual purposes and constitution of the Church? And, as we started in our previous inquiry by noting certain of the phenomena of the subject, so we will begin by asking what signs are there in Holy Scripture of the exercise of authority in the Church, and what rights did the Church as such conceive itself to possess? The question is complicated and will require careful consideration.

I. The first and most conspicuous character ascribed to the Church by the Apostles was that it represented a definite act or commission from God. This is really another way of saying that it arose out of Judaism. For the religion of the Jews assumed as its fundamental conception the Sovereignty of God: Jehovah ruled Israel as a King. If, in earliest days, He had appeared in the guise of a tribal deity, the peculiar friend

and protector of the children of Israel, the development of the Jewish religious conceptions, especially in the hands of the prophets, had led to the idea of a Supreme God, Who created and governs the whole world, and Who stands in special and peculiar relations, by His own act and choice, with the people of Israel. He had chosen them out of all the nations of the earth, and Jerusalem was the place in which He placed His Name.

The growth of opinion among the Jews led them to regard this choice as depending on physical descent from Abraham, and concealed from them the truth that they were merely trustees of spiritual privileges for the world. When, therefore, Christ assailed some of their most cherished convictions and set up against them His own sense of Mission, it was not surprising that their wrath was roused to the highest possible pitch. It is plain, however, that the Apostles saw in the Mission of Christ and the results arising out of it, another act of deliberate choice on the part of God. Christ Himself had maintained in the strongest way that He was *sent* and was not performing a self-chosen task in His work among the Jews; so that rejection of Him was rejection of the Father who sent Him. (S. Matt. x. 40; S. Mark ix. 37; S. Luke ix. 48. *Cf.* S. Luke iv. 43, and the Parable of the Hus-

bandmen. Still more strongly S. John v. 43, vi. 44, xvii. 4, &c.) The whole series of events which passed during His life was foreordained: even it might be said that He must needs have suffered (S. Luke xxiv. 26). Hence it is in strict accordance with this teaching that S. Peter in his first speeches after Pentecost is represented as referring continually to the counsels of God in his account of Christ. Jesus is the Nazarene, a man marked out by God by powers and wonders and signs (Acts ii. 22); it was by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God that He was delivered, and crucified by the hands of wicked men (*ib.* 23). There was a new act on the part of God, continuous organically with what had gone before in the experience of the Jewish race, and therefore not naturally unintelligible to the Jewish people and the rulers. The appeal is made to them on the ground of the consistency of the new teaching with their previous history. Christ had a mission from God, like David, like a prophet; but was clearly shown to be more than these by the fact of His resurrection and exaltation. Death had come upon David, but Christ could not be holden of it.

The dispensation, whatever it was, that depended on the Mission of Christ was thus an expression, or an extension, of the Sovereignty of God, which He had exercised over the Jewish

people: it came in the course of God's providential ordering of the world. Great as was the part of Christ in the whole process, He acted as under authority: He was sent, and certain powers and signs were manifested through Him; the final initiation came from the Father.

S. Peter does not offer any explanation of the choice of God: he refers to it as a fact, and shows how it is consonant with prophecy. But there is a view expressed in the writings of S. Paul and the Epistle to the Hebrews which takes the work of Christ on to a new level. The first hint of this fuller teaching comes in a discourse of our Lord Himself, as it is reported in S. John's Gospel. In chapter v. our Lord explains to the Jews the real significance of His Sonship. They had accused Him of blasphemy because He made God His own Father (*πατέρα ἴδιον*), making Himself equal with God (v. 18). He sets aside their charge, after His manner, not by a defence directly aimed at it, but by setting forth the actual relations subsisting between the Father and Himself. In this exposition He claims to have been entrusted with two conspicuously Divine powers—the possession of life in Himself, and the right to do judgment (vv. 26, 27). To this last He adds a reason: He (*i.e.* the Father) gave Him authority to do judgment, because He is Son of Man. This prerogative of judgment, of course, is

exercised upon men ; and it is important to notice that the possession of it is thus connected with His human nature.

A somewhat similar meaning is probably carried by the phrase used in the report of S. Paul's speech at Athens (Acts xvii.). We read there that God having passed by the times of ignorance, now calls on all men everywhere to repent, as He has fixed a day in which He is about to judge the inhabited world in righteousness, in or by the man whom He determined (*ib.* 30, 31). And the doctrine of the Second Adam (Rom. v.; 1 Cor. xv.) lies not very far from this thought. But its fuller development is to be found in S. Paul's Epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians, and in the Epistle to the Hebrews. In the Colossians, the work of Christ, as described by S. Paul, is closely connected with His functions in creation. He is the first-born of all creation: in Him were created all things in the heavens and upon the earth: all things have been created through Him and unto Him: He is before all things, and in Him all things have their system, and He is the head of the body, the Church (i. 15–18). The rest of the chapter amplifies this view. In like manner in the Epistle to the Ephesians, S. Paul emphasizes the function of Christ as the predestined bearer of God's Purpose. God intended to recapitulate, or bring to a head, all things in

Christ (i. 10): He subdued all things under His feet, and set Him as head over all things for the Church, which is His Body (*ib.* 22). So again God intends to make known to principalities and authorities by means of the Church, the manifold wisdom of God, according to the purpose of the ages which He made in Christ Jesus our Lord (iii. 9–11). The former passages look rather at the cosmic functions of the Son of God; the latter lay stress upon Him in His incarnate life as bearing the purpose of God in the world; but both alike attribute His position and prerogatives in regard to the Church to His own eternal nature coupled with His entry upon the human scene.

The position is clearer still in the Epistle to the Hebrews. The author aims at showing the finality and perfection of the new order, as opposed to the transience and imperfections of the old. And he begins by contrasting the revelation in many parts, and many fashions which was before with the revelation in a Son, Who was the effulgence of the Father's Glory and the express Image of His Person. Thus the fitness of the Son on the Divine side depends on His Nature: His unique nearness to the Father.[1] But on the human side the fitness of the Son as an interpreter of the thought of God, depends on His sharing

[1] *Cf.* S. John i. 14.

our human nature, not omitting its weaknesses. "It became Him for Whom are all things and through Whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the author (or captain) of their salvation perfect through sufferings. For both He that sanctifieth and they that are sanctified are all of one. . . . Since therefore the children are sharers in blood and flesh, He also Himself in like manner partook of the same, that through death He might bring to nought him that had the power of death, that is, the devil, and might deliver all them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage" (ii. 10, 11, 14, 15): and again, "for wherein He Himself hath suffered being tempted, He is able to succour them that are tempted" (*ib.* 18).

These passages are not isolated: they are representative of a doctrine which prevails through the New Testament. And they are important, as bearing on the authority of the Church. From the point of view which they represent the Church is a divinely ordered institution, similar, in its relation to the Purpose of God, to the elect nation of old; but taken up more completely and definitely into the designs of the Father for the whole world, by reason of the Divine and Human relations of its Founder. Because the Son is the Image of the Father and the instrument of Creation, as well as having been subjected to the

conditions of human flesh, He is the Person through Whom the reconciliation with God may be achieved. He dominates the whole society, but He is not ashamed to call us brethren: it is necessarily a spiritual society into which a Person such as Christ can enter; and through Christ the Will of the Father for the whole world is expressed. He rules over it; not as a remote King over alien subjects, but as a Father over men who through absorption in the Eternal Sonship of Jesus Christ have been adopted as sons.

II. These being the ideas which are associated in the New Testament with the Church of Christ, it will be necessary to inquire next how they were put into practice in the world. What evidence have we in Apostolic times that the Church conceived itself as a society with definite aims and rights? What measures were taken for the expression of the will of the community?

At the beginning of the Acts we find the Apostles definitely taking the lead under the guidance of S. Peter. They apparently conceive their office as sufficiently definite in character to justify the election of Matthias. And we inquire what signs there are in the Gospel-story of teaching that would lead to this. It is beyond doubt that there is no indisputable passage in the Gospels as they stand which will explain their

action. The most probable inference from the story of their relation with the Lord, is that He definitely expected them to act as leaders, but there is no positive command to continue the Apostolic order, or to constitute new ones. The ground for expecting a properly organized Church lies partly in the conception of the Kingdom, partly in the teaching as to the work of the Holy Spirit. The parables of the Kingdom, while we cannot press their details, do still imply the conception of an ordered society, with differentiation of function. But the teaching on the work of the Holy Spirit, which is mainly to be found in the Last discourses, certainly implies that the future will be largely left to the disciples acting under the guidance of the Spirit. That the future Society will need organization and government; that it will have to adapt itself to a variety of new circumstances, is certain; but the instructions for the purpose are not precise. That our Lord may have given more precise instructions during the Forty Days, when He spoke to them the things concerning the Kingdom of God, is more than probable; but there is no positive affirmation that He did so. We return therefore to the story in the Acts, and examine the record to see, if possible, how far the actual history reveals the conception the Apostles had of their work and of the Church.

The Descent of the Holy Ghost at Pentecost led to manifestations which, however explained, were remarkable enough to attract public attention. S. Peter when called upon to account for them, deals only with the facts as they stand, and relates them to the prophecy of Joel. He says nothing of a new society, nor does he exhort the people to become members of a Kingdom: he tells them to 'repent and be baptized each one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for remission of your sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost' (Acts ii. 38). Yet those who surrender to his appeal are afterwards described as continuing in the doctrine of the Apostles and the fellowship, in the breaking of bread, and the prayers. Their subsequent arrangements about their property show them as a marked and separate community existing within the Jewish people.

The events related in the Acts are set before us almost entirely as history: there is little or no comment or explanation. It therefore falls upon the readers to determine as best they may what sort of society is implied, and what general principles of action and administration were at work. For our present purpose we may say that the events of importance are the following: the case of Ananias and Sapphira: the appointment of the Seven: the proceedings of Philip in

Samaria: the dismissal of Paul and Barnabas on their first journey: their establishment of elders in each Church (xiv. 23): and the condition of the Church at Ephesus. It is difficult to maintain that these events taken together do not imply the existence of a body conscious of itself and acting for its own ends by regular officials. The case of Ananias, as it stands, implies a strong sense of the spiritual character of the community, and the direct relation in which it stood to the Holy Spirit. The history is not without considerable difficulties, but there can hardly be a doubt that S. Peter's action in the matter implies a claim to exercise discipline in the name of the society. When we come to the appointment of the Seven we find a practice in operation to which no allusion has been made before: S. Luke mentions it as a thing which his readers would have known to exist, and which needed no explanation. This is a daily distribution to widows (vi. 1). Till the time at which it is mentioned the Apostles themselves had apparently administered it: for the future, this is to cease; there are to be special officers for the purpose, and the functions of the Apostles are to be confined to prayer and the ministry of the word (vi. 4). After the death of Stephen, there follows a great persecution and a dispersion of the members of the

Church throughout Palestine. It would appear that all who went abroad spread the word (viii. 16): at least there was nothing to prevent their doing so. Then comes the story of Philip—one of the Seven. He preaches, makes converts, and administers baptism (viii. 13); but does not possess, and is recognized at Jerusalem as not possessing, the power of laying-on of hands (viii. 14–17). In chap. xi. we have what are apparently temporary and special commissions to Barnabas (xi. 22, 23) and Saul (xi. 30). But in chap. xiii., in some way under the instruction of prophets, Barnabas and Saul are separated for work to which the Holy Ghost has called them, and receive the rite of laying-on of hands. It would appear that this commission was not temporary. Barnabas disappears from the story after his dispute with Paul (xv. 39), like so many other Apostles, but S. Paul's missionary work is thenceforward continuous.

Again, the procedure of Paul and Barnabas on their first missionary journey is significant. They teach, they make disciples; and then, when they have to depart, they provide an organization for the Churches which they have founded. They elected elders in every Church. Nothing is said of functions to be assigned to the elders: this was a point on which S. Luke's contemporaries needed no instruction. Incidentally, we find

that at Ephesus, elders, probably of a similar sort, were established and were taken to represent the Church. S. Paul in his speech alludes to their position as overseers, and finds its authority in the act of the Holy Spirit. He himself had been set apart by a definite command of the Holy Spirit, and the work to which he was called was mission work. They are set by the Holy Spirit as overseers over the flock, not apparently with a view to mission work, but to shepherd the Church of God, which He purchased by means of His own Blood. And among the dangers against which they will have to be on their guard is that of false doctrine: men will speak perverted things to draw the disciples after them; against this they must set their own teaching, remembering how S. Paul himself had perseveringly instructed them for three whole years. In this scene at Ephesus, we have probably a glimpse of the way in which S. Paul first organized a Church for its continuous work in the world. He is already alive to a danger which may beset permanent officials, the danger of covetousness, and he warns them against it, again citing as example his own practice.

These passages *taken together* are surely of considerable importance and significance. Taken in isolation, no one of them, perhaps, carries us very far; but regarded as a series they point

to the existence of a society with ideas and principles of self-government, having a definite purpose, and taking definite means to carry it out. They give us very few details, though it would seem from the manner in which new points are introduced that the historian counted on the intelligence of his readers to supply what was wanted. The events are not a list of isolated accidents with no connexion and no continuity of policy: the key to the history lies in their relation to a society which was living and endeavouring to fulfil its mission. But we do not get our curiosity satisfied in some very important particulars. It is not plain what was the position of the prophets, nor how they certified their prophetic inspiration to themselves and others. They are among the features of the Church's constitution which S. Luke mentions without explanation: he expects that those who read his book will, of course, understand. There seems no doubt that their inspiration was direct: they prophesied in the narrower sense of prediction (Acts xi. 28, xxi. 10); and in later references they are said to have spoken for the edification of the Church, their gift being therefore a loftier and more valuable gift than that of tongues (1 Cor. xiv. 4). It is probable that this represented their proper sphere of work; but how great or how small a part they played in the whole order of

the Church does not appear from the Acts. We shall return to the consideration of their work later on.

Before leaving the Acts of the Apostles we must endeavour to make clear what the Apostles and the Christians of their day regarded as the function of the Church. We have already seen that S. Peter exercised discipline in the matter of Ananias: in like manner he denounces with the utmost severity the proposals of Simon Magus. That is, Christianity was expected to carry with it certain effects in the region of moral and spiritual life. But apart from these passages it is surprising how little is said of the ethical side of the Church's life. S. Peter exhorts the Jews to repent, and be baptized for remission of sins, and Ananias does the same to Saul. The Christians are said to be bound together by a wonderful mutual love; but there is no contrast drawn between Pagan and Christian life; no description, for instance, in the account of S. Paul's work at Corinth, of the condition of the city, or of its moral perils, of which we see glimpses in the First Epistle to the Corinthians. The Council at Jerusalem warns the faithful to abstain from things sacrificed to idols, from blood, from things strangled, and from fornication. While we cannot doubt that the new faith exercised a strong moral influence upon those who

accepted it in these early days, it is clear that this is not the point on which S. Luke thinks that the main stress should be laid.

There is, however, another aspect of the work of the Apostles in regard to which S. Luke represents them as having precise views: they are witnesses of Christ's Resurrection. This is a charge laid upon them by the Lord Himself (i. 8): it is the function to which Matthias is elected (i. 22): it is the position which S. Peter claims in his first speech (ii. 32; *cf.* iii. 15, x. 39-41, xiii. 31). S. Luke does not fully explain the supreme importance of this witness: he represents S. Peter as seeing in the Resurrection the confirmation of their loftiest beliefs about their Master, and the reversal of the imperfect ideas of the Jews; but there is no full theology of the Resurrection, such as we find afterwards in S. Paul. But the importance, for us, of this conspicuous feature in the presentation of the earliest stage of the Christian Church lies in the fact that there is assumed to be at the basis of the new society a fact which transcends human experience, and which, having occurred at a definite point in time, is a matter for historical testimony. The teaching of the Church, whatever it is, rests not merely upon argument and analysis like the teaching of a philosophic sect, but upon witness: it has the advantages and the disadvantages of

entering into the field of history. Membership will necessarily depend in part on the acceptance of a body of truth: the society will not be merely an accidental aggregate of persons born in one place, or combining for one object; it will be held together by unity of faith as well as practical purpose.

Once more, the Church from the first has the charge to be catholic: the witness is to be borne not only in Judæa and Jerusalem, but unto the ends of the earth. It was only by degrees that even the Apostles learned the meaning of this charge. Brought up as they had been in the atmosphere of exclusiveness which belonged to Judaism, they found it hard to realize the equal rights of Gentiles. The story of Cornelius, the anxiety of the Apostles over the movements of the new Church of Antioch, the acute controversy over the rite of circumcision, showed how hardly to be overcome was the national prejudice against foreigners. But for all this, when they had once realized the unity of the Church through varieties of nationality and experience, they seem to have felt the need of something like uniformity of practice. Paul and Silas, after the Council of Jerusalem, went round the Churches which S. Paul had visited in his first journey: these were the Churches where the question of circumcision had been most vigorously discussed, and seemed

likely to produce the most serious evils. And they delivered to these Churches to keep the decrees which had been determined by the Apostles and elders in Jerusalem. (*παρεδίδοσαν αὐτοῖς φυλάσσειν τὰ δόγματα τὰ κεκριμένα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων τῶν ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις*, xvi. 4.) It is clear from these words that there was a claim to acceptance and obedience conveyed by this *delivery*. The Apostles represented the unity of the Church, and of its principles: there was more than a transient and casual interest in the decrees; they did no less than embody the claim in the opening words of the conciliar letter:—It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us.

CHAPTER IV

THE CHURCH IN THE EPISTLES

When we come to consider the Epistles one or two noteworthy differences come to light, of which the main reason is that we have to do with the Church at a period considerably advanced as compared with the Acts. S. Luke tells us of the earliest days of several Churches, and of the questions which came into prominence. When we come to the Epistles the Church has already passed beyond the first stages, and is beginning to adapt itself to the prospect of a long history and varied activity in the world. It is not possible to say anything on this well-worn subject that can in any way claim to be original; but if we are to consider the grounds and nature of Church authority, it will be necessary to set forth with some care the facts from which alone any trustworthy inferences can be drawn.

We may, perhaps, begin by pointing out that as regards organization there are two different types of officers described in the New Testament. There are, first of all, Apostles and prophets, who

depend for their position upon the direct inspiration of God; and there are, secondly, ἐπίσκοποι or elders, and deacons whose commission is mediated in some way through the Church. In regard to these, however, we are not free from difficulties.

First, the election of Matthias was made before Pentecost, and by means of the lot. No doubt the appeal to this method was an appeal to direct Divine guidance, but still we have no evidence of the actual exercise of Apostolic functions by Matthias after his election. As we are in similar ignorance of the labours of many of the Apostles who were appointed by Christ, this fact does not so distinguish Matthias as to make him an exception to the general rule above stated.

The strongest assertion of Apostolic authority comes from S. Paul. It is noticeable, in contrast with his emphasis on his peculiar claims as an Apostle, that S. Peter describes himself as a fellow-elder (συμπρεσβύτερος) with the elders of the Churches he is addressing; and S. John, in Epistles 2 and 3, simply speaks of himself as 'the Elder.' But S. Paul is strong and decisive in asserting his Apostleship; in part, doubtless, because it had been vigorously challenged. He claims a kind of universal jurisdiction over the Churches with which he has been connected. It is true that he does not build on another's foundation (Rom. xv. 20, 21); but this does not

seem to depend on any principle of division of labour, so much as on courtesy and the desire to avoid waste of effort. He admits that S. Peter was entrusted with the Gospel of the circumcision, and that his own mission was to the Gentiles (Gal. ii. 7–9); and in pursuance of it, he writes his great letter to the Romans, though he had never visited them, and gives instructions to the Churches which owed their existence to his work. This claim to a decisive voice in the internal affairs of a Church is most noticeable at Corinth: where he asserts very clearly his true Apostleship, claims the right to be supported by the Church (1 Cor. ix.), to condemn the incestuous man (ch. v.), to decide questions of the relative value of celibacy and the married life (ch. vii.), to correct disorders (ch. xi.), to enjoin particular practices, as, for instance, the weekly collection (ch. xvi. 1). Moreover, he speaks of ordaining a certain practice in all the Churches, and having the care of all the Churches upon his mind (1 Cor. vii. 17; *cf.* xi. 16, xvi. 1; 2 Cor. xi. 28). And his authority reaches to individuals; he could command Philemon, but he prefers to entreat him (Philem. 8, 9). This universal claim is partly based upon his special relations to his own converts (1 Cor. iv. 14, 15; Philem. 19); but it rests also upon his rights as an Apostle—one who has seen the Lord (1 Cor. ix. 1).

We have said that the rights of the Apostle depended upon the immediate commission from Christ: something of the same sort must be said of the prophets. In speaking of the Acts we found it difficult to say what part the prophets played in the order of the Church. They came forward from time to time and uttered the revelation that was given them, and were certainly not restricted to any particular place for their work; they also are directly inspired. Indeed, it was this fact which caused the difficulty in their public ministrations. From the First Epistle to the Corinthians—the document from which we learn most of the working and organization of the early Church—it appears that there was apt to be confusion: a prophet to whom a revelation came rose up and gave it regardless of what might be going on. S. Paul rebukes this confusion, and orders that a limited number of prophets should speak, and that they should speak one by one. He does not regard this rule as likely to cause trouble: ye can, he says, 'all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all may be comforted, and the spirits of prophets are subject to the prophets, for God is not a God of disorder but of peace' (1 Cor. xiv. 29–33). He puts their inspiration very high in the scheme of God's purpose—next to the Apostles (1 Cor. xii. 28; Eph. iv. 11). In his

earliest Epistle, he endeavours to prevent suppression of the prophetic gift (1 Thess. v. 20); but it is plain from Rom. xii. 6 that the liberty of prophesying was apt to get beyond the measure of faith of the prophet. The reference to the prophets in the Ephesians is the latest in the New Testament: from that time forward they disappear.

When we ask how the Apostles dealt with the Churches they founded, the answer can only be given in general terms. We noticed that Barnabas and Paul elected elders in the several Churches to which they went on the first missionary journey (Acts xiv. 23). We find S. Paul exhorting Titus to establish elders in every city in Crete (Tit. i. 5). The word used is one which seems to imply authoritative establishment in office, and the elders, together with the deacons, seem to have been the usual officials in every Church. In the earliest of his Epistles (1 Thess. v. 12, 13) S. Paul shows anxiety that those who hold office should receive respect for their work's sake, and he describes at length in his latest writings the character and functions both of elders and deacons. Severe things are said of those who do not fall in with the existing order (2 Thess. iii. 14; Rom. xvi. 17; Phil. iii. 18, 19; 2 Tim. iii. 8; *cf.* 3 John 9, 10), and in two cases (Rom. xvi. 17; Phil. iii. 18, 19) S. Paul ap-

parently refers their rebellion to sensuality. It does not fall within our province to enter upon the vexed question of the precise character of the officials described in these various passages: there are, however, a few things which we think can be said about them.

First, S. Paul is as sincerely convinced as any one of the Apostolic body that the Church is to be an orderly, well-organized society. It is possible[1] that being a 'mystic' he trusted the inward voice more than others. He may have been led by his experiences at Corinth to modify his views, but there can be no question that he expected and required order in the Church. Again, he made no effort, nor is there any sign that any of the Apostles attempted, to continue their own order or that of the prophets. They did attempt so to order the Churches that they might be able to adapt themselves to the conditions involved in a long history in the world. The early anticipations of a Second Coming within the lifetime of the first disciples gave way, and it became gradually clear that arrangements must be made for the future. If Timothy and Titus were temporary officials, there is no sign that the elders and other functionaries whom they established were temporary. These were like the elders at

[1] *Cf.* Bigg, *Epp. of Peter and Jude;* Introduction, § 7.

Miletus: they had to tend the flock of God, to do the ordinary prosaic work, as we might say, of the parish or diocese; and they had to be called and appointed for the purpose. The principle of Church-order was this: that a self-chosen commission was of no value, but those only could minister who were lawfully called and sent. The Apostles and prophets received some definite personal immediate call; for the others, the call was mediated in some way through the Church—by popular election under the direction of the Apostles, as in the case of S. Stephen—by the choice of the Apostles or their delegate, as in the case of the elders of the Asiatic Churches (Acts xiv. 23), or the elders in Crete (Tit. i. 5). They were duly called and their functions were assigned to them. It is true that we cannot speak of sharp divisions and delimitations of labour: the terms used for the officials are vague in outline; but the whole drift of the history is towards accuracy of definition, and there is no sign of serious and fundamental disorder. It is the history of a society which knew itself to be under a King, from Whom all commissions descended, directly or indirectly.

In considering the Acts we noticed the comparative infrequency of moral discussions in the history. The effect on the lives of the early Christians of their acceptance of the faith, is

hardly noticed, though it is said that they lived at peace and unity together. When we turn to the Epistles we find a very considerable change in this respect. Large portions of almost all the Epistles are occupied with ethical exhortation, and this was clearly a result of the growing experience of the Church. The Epistle of S. James, probably the earliest of all, consists mainly of instructions for life. S. James emphasizes the need for sincerity in word and act: he condemns various social offences, especially the self-assertion of the rich against the poor; and the self-will which leads to strife. The early attempt at communism soon broke down; and S. James lets us see through the language of his Epistle, how soon profession of the faith came to have a commercial value, and how ready people were to make the best of both worlds. The core of his complaint against this, is its utter inconsistency with the position in which Christian men were. If the plan of Communism had broken down, this did not mean that all the strife and conventionalities that belonged to worldly life were to find a home in the Church. To accept the perfect law of liberty meant what it said: it required a course of outward action, which was new.

S. James does not give us a very direct or detailed picture of the community which he has

in view: from S. Paul we learn much more precisely the situation of the Early Church in regard to ethical questions. We learn that he, and we may add S. Peter and S. John, regarded the life before his converts accepted the Faith as a bad life, or, at least, conducted under extremely imperfect conditions. To enter the Church was to come into a new atmosphere and under a new Guide—the Holy Spirit of God. It is clear from allusions in the Epistles to the Corinthians and Ephesians and elsewhere that many of the faithful had come into the Church from lives of sin: they had worshipped idols, and the tone of their moral life had been low. S. Paul condemns without hesitation all their previous customs, and maintains that they have no place under the new conditions. It will not be necessary for our purpose to discuss in detail the vices he condemns or the virtues he commends; but we must call attention to the grounds on which he passes judgment, and bases his appeals. Of course sin is a reversion to the earlier condition of human life, and should be impossible to those who have shared in the Death and Resurrection of Christ (Rom. vi. 1–14). Those who have put on Christ have crucified the flesh, with the desires and lusts: so they ought, if they give full freedom to their new position, to live gladly and naturally the life of the Spirit (Gal. v., vi.). Thus the

change to Christianity meant a fundamental change of moral condition, and this view is expressed, in their own characteristic language, by S. John and S. Peter (1 Pet. i. 14–21, iv. 1–3, and other passages: 1 S. John iii. 4–10). But S. Paul has another ground to which he occasionally refers. Sin is not only a fundamental inconsistency with the whole position of a Christian: it also seriously affects the Church as a whole. This is the explanation of his severity at Corinth: the presence of the incestuous man is a defiling influence which percolates through the whole Church; a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump. He does not expect the Christians to condemn or interfere with those who commit these faults outside the circle of the Church; but within they must be sharply and severely punished (1 Cor. v., esp. 9–13). It is clear that in S. Paul's mind sin is not merely the concern of the individual and his risk only: it affects the Church, through the closeness of its unity, and therefore the Church has a right to interfere with the sinner. Further, S. Paul uses the method of appeal in some cases, and he bases his appeal on the mercy and the choice of God (Rom. xii. 1; Col. iii. 12; *cf.* Heb. x. 28, 29, where the peril of treading under foot the Son of Man is declared): he commends the example of the Lord (Col. iii. 13; *cf.* 1 S. Pet. ii. 21, &c.), and depicts

the joy of freedom from the old bondage (Rom. viii. 1, &c.).

It is important to notice that with all this very careful thought over moral life, very little is said of what we may call the outward discipline of the Church. The Council of Jerusalem has forbidden the consumption of idol-meats: S. Paul, though he apparently conveyed these decrees to the Churches which he had founded (Acts xvi. 4), yet discusses the question in 1 Cor. as an open one. The command to make weekly collections for the poor (1 Cor. xvi. 1) probably points to a regular weekly service: we can be certain that Baptism was held to be the necessary preliminary to Church-membership, that the Eucharist was celebrated, and that the rite of laying-on of hands was performed. But there are no exhortations to fasting, though it would seem that S. Paul himself practised it (2 Cor. vi. 5, xi. 27): except in these two passages, the word *νηστεία* is not used by S. Paul; nor is the practice enjoined in the New Testament. S. Paul leaves the question of celibacy to the individual, though in view of the shortness of the time he inclines to commend his own practice; but he affirms that he is entirely free in the matter (1 Cor. ix. 5) 'like the rest of the Apostles, the brethren of the Lord and Cephas.' While at Corinth he professes himself 'ready to eat no meat while

the world lasts, lest he make a brother to offend,' he pleads for freedom in the Epistle to the Romans, and looks with disapproval at some ascetic customs which had grown up in Asia, at Colossæ and at Ephesus (Col. i., ii.; 1 Tim. iv.).

It must be admitted that this argument from silence is not entirely decisive as to the opinion or the practice of the Church at the time. The books upon which we depend for information are all of an incidental character, so that the knowledge we have is certainly fragmentary, and there is no means of saying to what extent. If we had the Epistles of S. Paul only we should have had no reason to suppose that he ever used such an observance as the Nazaritic vow; but an incidental allusion by S. Luke (Acts xviii. 18) proves the contrary. The two passages cited above in connexion with fasting are incidental likewise: they come in lists of hardships borne for the Faith. It is always necessary, therefore, to remember that there was a large region of life, perfectly well known to the New Testament writers, and entirely lost to us. At the same time it is remarkable that no positive instructions whatever are found in the New Testament on a point like this. General exhortations to self-control are there in plenty, but, even in connexion with people whose failing seems to have been self-indulgence, no disciplinary rules.

A very different condition of things prevails in regard to doctrine. We noticed in the Acts of the Apostles the emphasis laid in their preaching upon the fact of the Resurrection: the primary function of the Apostles was to be witnesses to this. Thus a dogmatic basis for teaching necessarily implied a statement of some sort as to the nature of Christ. In the Epistles we find this very clearly marked. It is true that S. James has nothing to say on positive doctrinal teaching, nor would it be easy to gather from his words what his own view of our Lord was. S. Peter has apparently little to fear on the score of soundness of doctrine in regard to the Christians he addresses, but there is no room to doubt as to the belief he himself holds (*cf. e.g.* 1 Pet. i. 2). In S. Paul we find that difficulties and diversities of interpretation have already arisen, and that he has no hesitation in saying that some of these new doctrines are wrong. In the Epistle to the Galatians, to take one conspicuous case, he uses the most vehement language in regard to those who have endeavoured to bring Judaism back among his converts. He does not allow that circumcision is a matter of indifference, to be used or not according to individual preference. I Paul say unto you, he writes, 'that if you are circumcised Christ will avail you nothing' (v. 2), and in verse 4, 'you are annihilated from Christ, as

many as are justified in the law, you have fallen from grace.' This vehemence is not found in the Epistle to the Corinthians, where, in other circumstances, S. Paul speaks of circumcision (1 Cor. vii. 17–19): it appears in the Galatians, because there the new proposals imply a real forsaking of the Gospel; at Corinth the cases he had before him were mainly cases of survival from the past. At Corinth it is the doctrine of Resurrection which S. Paul insists upon with special emphasis: there were some who were trying to evacuate it of its historical character, and with them S. Paul will make no terms. 'If Christ has not risen, your faith is vain, ye are yet in your sins' (1 Cor. xv. 17). At Colossæ he deals in a like decisive manner with those who by systems of angelic intermediaries do away with the unique mediatorial position of Christ (Col. i. 23, ii. 7, &c.). So the Epistle to the Hebrews is one long exposition of the superiority of the new Dispensation, based upon the Divine Character of the Son (Heb. i. 3). And S. John in his first Epistle makes a belief in the Incarnation a parallel test with that of love to the brethren, of the reality of men's union with Christ (1 John iv. 2, 3; *cf.* 2 John 7, 10).

The appearance of these varieties of thought was in no way a surprise to the Apostles. We have already noticed a reference to them in the

speech to the Elders at Miletus (Acts xx.), and S. Paul in his First Epistle to Timothy definitely warns him against them, saying that their development is expressly prophesied by the Spirit (*τὸ πνεῦμα ῥητῶς λέγει*) (1 Tim. iv. 1). And S. John refers to previous teaching of the coming of anti-christ, and notes its fulfilment: many antichrists are already in the world, and their characteristic note is the denial of the Father and the Son (1 John ii. 18 and 22; and *cf.* 1 John iv. 1–3; also 2 Pet. ii. 1–3).

There are two points which we shall do well to note in regard to the polemic of the Apostles against the heresies. 1. They point out that they are innovations on a tradition. The Apostles represent themselves strictly as *witnesses*, handing on a tradition which they have themselves received, and not, in any sense, original thinkers. This fact continually appears. The doctrine delivered to the faithful is a *παράδοσις* or tradition. S. Paul, who of all men was least likely to surrender his independence, makes no claim to originality in doctrine. He claims to have received his doctrine by no human agency, but by direct revelation from Jesus Christ; but he also claims to have delivered what he received, and calls upon the faithful to hold fast by the tradition (Gal. i. 12; *cf.* 1 Cor. xi. 23, 24, xv. 3; also Phil. iv. 9; Col. ii. 6; 1 Thess. iv. 1;

2 Thess. iii. 6). So S. John bids those to whom he writes to see that what they heard from the beginning abides in them: if that abides in you which ye heard from the beginning, ye also shall abide in the Father and the Son (1 John ii. 24). There was no power existing, according to the Apostles, capable of devising innovations trustworthily.

2. The varieties of doctrine are always closely connected with practical considerations. Sometimes they arise from faulty moral conditions, as in the case of the heretics, whose work S. Paul foretells to Timothy (1 Tim. iv. 1, &c.), and probably also of those mentioned to the Philippians (Phil. iii. 18, 19). Sometimes their doctrine cuts at the root of some main principle of the Christian life, as in the case of the Judaizers in Galatia, and of those at Corinth who denied the Resurrection. There was no clear, well-marked separation between doctrine and life: the doctrines are the basis which justifies the life and makes it possible.

We must now return and consider the nature of the authority claimed and exercised in the Church. There can be little doubt as to its form. There never seems to have been a condition in which the organization of the Church was wholly chaotic. Though in early days and for some time after the beginning functionaries were

present whose authority was derived straight from God, yet a formal Church-organization began as soon as the society began to enter into relations with life. But the spiritual relations of the whole body were kept in evidence: the officials, whether elected by the whole body, or selected and established by persons commissioned for the purpose, were, in some cases certainly, in all cases probably, set apart by the rite of laying-on of hands—a rite which we have reason to suppose (Acts viii., xiii.) was associated with the gift of the Holy Ghost. Moreover, from the time of 1 Thess. they have a claim on the obedience and high estimation of the people for their work's sake: they and their work partake of the character of the Body (1 Thess. v. 12, 13; and *cf.* Heb. xiii. 1). The purely democratic idea, therefore, is not quite adequate to describe the situation in the Church: the relation to the Spirit introduces the thought of Commission, and is at the root of subsequent developments in the following centuries.

It would be natural to suppose that in a society like the Church the question of conduct would occupy a large place. This we find to be the case, as soon as we have definite information as to the machinery of Church-life. But the interest in conduct comes closer to the individual than had been customary in ancient Greek states. In

ancient Greek states as in all well-ordered communities acts which tended to the detriment of the society were punishable at law; but the concern of the State with the individual life was usually limited to this. The Christian society developed an interest in positive virtues of all kinds, and also condemned some vices which the State would leave alone. The Church was affected by sin even if it were less than criminal. This point comes out with special force in the matter of doctrine. To interfere in this region would have been strange to the pagan contemporaries of the Apostles. There were laws against illicit assemblies, but provided people kept the laws touching overt acts, they might hold what opinions they liked. This was of course impossible to a body based like the Church on *witness* to certain historic truths. Those who became members of it were necessarily held to the acceptance, and probably the proclamation on occasion, of these truths. Moreover, the liberty of innovation had to be restricted in this connexion: the witness was given to the Church to proclaim, and it was not susceptible of variation. That this was so, depended partly on the fact that the content of the witness was largely historic, partly on the fact that it was conceived as given from above.

If we now ask what relation there is between

the authority of the Church and the State, the answer would seem to be somewhat as follows: In the State we found that authority is exercised by the community as a whole over the individual in relation to its special ends, and that this exercise of authority rests upon the social nature of man: it is binding, because he is social. Further, that authority is exercised provisionally in intellectual regions, for purposes of education and division of labour, and that it is the final ground upon which we can accept facts of history, though here again analysis leads us back to the unity of the whole race as the basis of the authority. We think that the whole area of difference between the authority of the Church and the State is covered by the spiritual relations of the Church. The Church is a society which acts like other societies, but with the differences that come from its foundation and purposes. Its extended interest in conduct depends on the more positive concern which a spiritual society must have in all spiritual motions. Outward acts detrimental to the outward society are dealt with by it. Spiritual movements are of importance to the spiritual society, and are therefore brought under its discipline. The same principle explains the different attitude to doctrine. In ordinary life, as we have observed more than once, authority in intellectual matters is usually

educational: a person is told certain things which he takes on authority, knowing that in most cases he can test the authority for himself. But the authority of the Church covers rather more ground than this, because of the nature of the truths on which it rests. It has historic truths behind it no doubt, and these can never be verified fully even in ordinary history; but more even than this, the contents of its doctrine and its hopes cover the spiritual world and can only be fully made good, 'far in the spiritual city.' Are we to say, then, that at this point we reach absolute dogmatism—the bare assertion of blank unverifiable truths, which the mind, at least in this world, can only blindly accept? We think not. As in the case of historical inquiry the ultimate ground of belief is our confidence in the goodwill or unity of the whole race, so in the case of the Church the ultimate ground of our confidence is Christ. Here again, if we may say so, the basis of intellectual adhesion is moral or social; that is, underlying it is the relation in which men stand to Jesus Christ. The first and simplest ground of Christ's appeal to men is the Passion, revealing as it does the supreme love of Christ for man, and His faultless obedience to the Father. But this is not all. Christ's Life and Death are not merely an example, they are a sacrifice; full, perfect, and sufficient to free men

from the bondage of their sins. And this also has a deeper basis. The Sacrifice avails because Christ is what He is, the Son of God and the Son of Man—the first-born of creation, not ashamed to call men His brethren. He does not command our mind and will arbitrarily or merely by means of a rational demonstration, but by virtue of His unique relation to the Father and to men. It may well be that in the life to come, what we should call the rational explanation may be plain of much which is now obscure, and that in this sense the authoritative declaration of the doctrines of the Church will be capable of verification. But it seems that now they hold a somewhat similar place to those historic truths in regard to which we cannot get behind authority, and that their claim is based ultimately on the whole unity of mankind with the Son of Man.

CHAPTER V

AUTHORITY AND OUTWARD ORDER

We have now shown by a somewhat detailed presentation of the phenomena of Church-life, as we find them in the New Testament, what the ruling conceptions of authority were. If the contentions based on the passages are right, it will be clear that authority is, in the Church, a concrete effect or embodiment of the fundamental principle of its social unity. The fact that men have the tendency to unite involves the principle of authority; and the real claim of the authority to command lies in the necessary social character of men. The revelation in Christ of a still deeper unity in mankind, the admission of men through Him into the closest union with God, gives to the authority of the spiritual society a more august, more commanding power; but it is, we may say, the same in kind. It is true that when God addresses commands to men, He speaks with a force which no human authority can ever attain: no State can use the compulsive power of the Creator to His creatures. But the peculiarity of the constitution of the Church as a society of

men, is that by it men are admitted into fellowship with God. That is one of the main objects of the work of Christ: to make possible again what sin had made impossible; to open a new and living way by which the ancient longing of man for true and assured communion with God might be attained. That this is achieved only through Christ is beyond all manner of doubt the doctrine of the New Testament. Nor is there any sign of an expectation that an individual could attain this result except by becoming a member of the Body of Christ—to use the language of S. Paul;—by coming to abide in Him—to use the language of S. John. The case of the individual who calls himself a Christian but stands outside the Body is, we may safely say, entirely absent from the New Testament.

The authority of the Church, then, arises out of its peculiar relation to God through Christ. In the method of exercise of this authority, two separate courses are theoretically possible. We can conceive that God might have dealt with the Church by means of a series of special enactments; that is, He might have retained the actual government in His own hands and simply issued direct and positive commands from time to time. Or again it was possible *a priori* that on starting a society such as the Church on its mission in the world, He should have acted in accordance with

what appears to be His usual method in dealing with the world, and worked through human agents. There is no doubt that this latter course is the one actually chosen. Hence, in the society as we know it in the world, we expect to find somewhere, and in some way, the Will of God expressed. We may note, first, that there is no clear proof that Christ gave to His Apostles any precise or positive directions at all. He spoke to them during the great Forty Days about the kingdom of God, but we do not know what He said. And if we are inclined to surmise that it was almost inevitable that He should have spoken of the organization of the Church, it remains unquestionably certain that no Apostle committed these instructions to writing, and that the Canon was closed without any addition on the subject of the organization of the Church. Thus the inference is suggested that the power of administering itself was given to the Church under the direction of the Holy Spirit, and it is clear from the letter of the Council of Jerusalem that the Apostles accepted this responsibility (*ἔδοξεν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ καὶ ἡμῖν*, Acts xv. 28). We shall therefore expect to find that the effective carrying out of the commission of Christ must be studied in close connexion with the circumstances of the Early Church.

The first point to notice, in endeavouring to

characterize the method by which the Church dealt with its problem, is this. The Christian Body starts as a society of Disciples. Discipleship, as Dr. Hort has pointed out,[1] is the basis upon which everything subsequent is erected. The Apostles are a small knot of peculiarly intimate disciples, chosen for their readiness to follow Christ and submit to His teaching; also, for their capacity for certain work. So the whole Church from the first realizes itself as a society of Disciples. They are united by mutual love, and, at first, are to be found within the limits of one city. But Christ had instructed them to make disciples of all nations, and it is the enlargement of the society beyond the limits of Jerusalem which first brings forward serious problems of management. We should naturally anticipate that the appearance of converts with different social and intellectual antecedents would create difficulty and raise questions which would press very emphatically for solution.

It is conceivable, but not very likely, that so long as the Church remained in its earliest stage an extremely loose organization would have continued to be possible. But the whole idea ceases to have any plausibility as soon as it extended itself beyond the bounds of its original home. Then there must be means found for it to

[1] Hort, *The Christian Ecclesia*, pp. 17–20.

act as a whole—as a real organization. At this point we come in contact with a curious lack in the ancient mind. Men had attained the notion of acting by majorities: this must have been familiar wherever there was any knowledge of the political machinery of Greece or Rome: among the Jews it is difficult to imagine the Sanhedrin getting on without it. But though this was plainly familiar in the case of large bodies, it is maintained by Ramsay[1] that the ancients had no understanding of action by committees. They did not understand the delegation of power to a small body of men, who were to act as a whole and not as individuals. When power was thus entrusted to a board, each member expected to exercise the prerogatives of the whole. It is obvious that the Church required to learn the more modern plan. It soon became conscious of its unity, without losing the sense of its mission to all nations, and this had somehow to be expressed. A purely democratic government would have been impossible in the then condition of intercourse among ancient cities: it would probably have been intelligible, but was out of the question. At Jerusalem the rule by elders, probably taken over from the synagogue, seems to have been adopted from the first, and it cannot be denied that the Elders of Jerusalem assembled in

[1] Ramsay, *Church and Roman Empire*, p. 367 *n.*

Council claimed some sort of indefinite rights over other Churches. A similar system was established in the other Churches founded by S. Paul—as we have already seen; and it is obvious that within each city the body of Elders performed the functions of government. It does not need elaborate argument to show that the intercourse between various Churches would necessarily have brought into great prominence the governing bodies in each place. Individual Christians who knew one another would easily meet and visit one another if it befell any of them to pass from place to place; but for all official communication an official body would be necessary. And the official bodies in any two places would not be related to one another as the governments of two foreign states: they would be the organ in the two places of the members of the one Church. The Church would come to act representatively: the lesson which Prof. Ramsay says the ancients had to learn would be almost unconsciously apprehended.

This is one way, out of many, in which we can understand the appearance of a fixed and official body of governors in the several Churches. But it is obvious that a number of questions will arise which, if we are to have a clear view of the authority of the Church, we must consider briefly. The account above is partly conjectural. In the

Acts and Epistles we have, as we have already observed, allusions to Elders (also called Episcopi) without precise description of their functions. But it is not wholly conjectural: it is based on a *vera causa*, as the action of S. Paul shows on more than one occasion. From time to time (*e.g.* in Rom. xvi. 1, 2) he commends individuals to the care of a Church. That is, he certifies the membership of some particular person, who would probably not be known by face to the Church to which the Epistle is addressed; and he asks that the person recommended may be received into enjoyment of Christian privileges. This is a case which would necessarily arise as Christianity spread, and in which it would be of vital importance to have accurate and trustworthy information. By the time of the Didaché we find that trouble has already been caused and is notorious through false claims to enjoy the hospitality of the Churches. And even earlier, in 2 and 3 John, there are signs of the difficulty of managing this department of interchange between the various Churches. So that it is inevitable that here there must have arisen a need for proper official sanctions and commendations of individuals to Churches.

But it will be asked, Does not this suggest a very casual and improvident way of dealing with the problem of Church-organization? Can an official or body of officials developed in this way

lay any claim to more than temporary delegated authority? Can we think of them as being more than secular officials?

Before approaching these questions in detail, we must point out by the way that this work of certifying membership, of managing the internal intercourse between the various Churches, is one only, and not the one which ultimately proved the most important, of their functions. They had, at least we find grown up around them, other duties and powers in connexion with doctrine and practice. We have mentioned first this particular duty because it seems to be suggested by circumstances obviously present in the Church.

Passing on now to consider the questions raised on the last page, it is plain that a good deal must be said in the way of definition. It is true that the prominent need for certificate of membership arises, and must necessarily arise, when misuse of Christian privileges has occurred or is apprehended. So that the arrangement followed by the Church will necessarily appear to *us* to come as an after-thought—a way of avoiding a diseased condition of Church-life. And, of course, if that is all we can say there is some justification for this criticism. It would look as if the Church had no particular programme, but had devised from time to time

means of dealing with difficulties as they arose. But we must ask, What would have been the alternative to this? How else could the work of administration have been done? It could have been done, no doubt, if a fixed scheme of polity had been laid down from the first, to which the Apostles and all succeeding rulers of the Church were obliged to conform. And this is exactly what we have not found. What we have found is that the Spirit was given to the Church, and a promise made that He should guide the disciples in what they did and said. It cannot be doubted that the Apostles would have thought of themselves as acting under this Guidance and in accordance with the Promise in all the arrangements they made for the Church. A general gift of guidance could only take the form of action at definite occasions, adaptation to various needs and changing circumstances. As the preachers under the influence of the Spirit—conspicuously S. Paul — adapted their teaching to the capacities, especially the higher capacities, of the men to whom they preached, so the Spirit-guided governors of the Church will find a way to deal with the occasions which may arise in the course of the Church's outward life. The appearance of such adaptations may be casual: they might have seemed—much more than they do—to lack definiteness of aim and policy; but this

appearance would only justify itself upon a view of the whole Church-order from which the guidance of the Holy Spirit was left out. In ordinary secular politics we do, at times, think of the expedients of statecraft as containing a large element of contingency: a statesman does the best he can, and hopes for the best. But even in politics we are accustomed to assume the presence of a Purpose, which rationalizes what looks haphazard and makes the changes that occur in things look intelligible. And in the Church we have the definite assertion and promise of a Presence, definitely sent to guide and teach it: we cannot, therefore, lay emphasis on the *occasional* character of the earliest developments as depriving them of the right to be authoritative, and to bear with them the true spiritual authority of the Church.

If it be said, that a theory which gives spiritual force to the action of the Christians of the first age in the direction of organization has not taken the distinction between the spiritual and the material, between the religious and secular; then again we must ask what would have been the alternative plan? The answer will surely be a simple one. The alternative would have been the surrender of the brotherhood, the practical excommunication of all outward life, the reduction of the Church to an accidental aggregate of persons living a purely independent

religious life. The sharp opposition between the religious and secular can only be satisfactorily maintained upon this hypothesis. Only if a man can keep all his essential religious life to himself, can he get on without external relations to others. He will live two lives: the inner spiritual life in which he is conscious of God's presence and communion, the outer secular life in which he mixes with men. It is true, of course, that this is an ideal which has attracted many. There are many still who speak as if the silent inner process were the true method of spiritual religion. But it must be freely admitted that this ideal has as its other side the complete secularization of all outward life. We do not think that this is the real drift of Christianity. Its aim is rather to lay hold of and consecrate the outward, so that the term secular in contrast with sacred should belong of right only to that which for other reasons cannot be brought under the sway of the Spirit. It is easy to see what would have been the effect of the prevalence of such an ideal in early ages. The existence of some outward order, of some official body that could speak in the name of the Christian community in any given place, was absolutely necessary, as we have seen, when the society began to extend over numerous places. And it was this winning of men of various nations and languages into one

spiritual communion that was the most conspicuously new of all the characteristics of the Church. To have left this out for the sake of developing a purely independent 'spiritual' religion in individuals would have been to stifle Christianity at its birth. We are not then exceeding what may be gathered from the New Testament if we say that the Apostles and those who succeeded them formulated their policy for the outward Church under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

We have dwelt upon the necessity of official representatives for certain administrative functions, and we have endeavoured to show that even in this light the officials appear as really commissioned by the Holy Spirit. But it is necessary to go a little further than this before leaving the question. It might conceivably have been so ordered that the rulers of the Church would have realized the advantage of representatives, to speak in the name of the Church, but yet have given the representatives a merely temporary and accidental commission. We might conceive them as using any method of popular election that might appear natural at the time, and being content with that. The result of this would be that the principle of representation would be divinely ordered, but the representatives would have only an indirect relation to the Holy Spirit. We do not think that this would adequately

represent the facts as we have them in the New Testament. Nor, again, would it be consistent with the earliest conception of Church organization that a man should take upon himself any representative ministry. It is plain, both in the Acts and in S. Paul, (1) that men are endowed with very different gifts: (2) that those who exercise public functions are conceived as doing so under the call of the Holy Spirit. It will be a cause of disunion and chaos if men do not confine themselves to the exercise of the powers bestowed upon them: the deacon must keep to his ministering, the teacher to his teaching, and so on. Only so can the proper organization of the Body be maintained. This principle is at the root of S. Paul's discussion of the quarrels and factions at Corinth. The various parties there had set up Paul and Apollos and Cephas as rivals; they had 'become puffed up on behalf of' their favourite teacher against the other (1 Cor. iv. 6). But S. Paul knows that he and Apollos are but 'ministers through whom ye believed, and each as the Lord gave to him.' Each had different gifts, given by God, and claimed by Him for service: Paul planted, Apollos watered, God gave the increase.

It is this principle of the definite use by God of the varying gifts of the individual which helps to bring about a solution of the difficulty between

those who rest on inward light and outward order. S. Paul's summons to the unity of the faith came on the road to Damascus: that was the sign that he was wanted to serve Christ. But the special nature of his service became clear only by degrees: it was defined at last in the call at Antioch, delivered, probably, through the mouth of some prophet (*cf.* 1 Tim. i. 18, iv. 14; 2 Tim. i. 6). We cannot suppose, in S. Paul's case of all men, that there was no inward call to the ministry he afterwards performed. The Epistle to the Galatians shows how profoundly he was convinced of the Call of Christ; but all the same we find him working at Antioch till the voice of prophecy and the laying-on of hands set him forward on his special work.

In later times inward light has been held to be almost in contradiction to outward order of any sort: people have claimed to rely wholly upon it and ignore the current regulations of the Church. It is true that the New Testament, so far as we can tell by the indications just noted, does not contemplate a person's acting for the Church without some inward certainty of call; but it does not seem to have allowed the individual to be the sole test of the reality of the call. Some consentient witness would seem to have been required, or some direct revelation.

These same principles affect a question which

is beset with controversy, but which we are fortunately able to leave aside in large measure: the question of the origin of the monarchical episcopate. The links between the episcopate in the second century, and the presbytery in the time of the Pastoral Epistles, are, we may say, practically lost. We have phrases here and there which are cited but diversely interpreted: the position of S. James at Jerusalem, the office of Timothy at Ephesus, the traditional work of S. John in Asia Minor are all quoted, but are all far from being of accepted significance. Somehow, all agree, out of the college of presbyters came the monarchical bishop, with the college of presbyters around him, but on a lower level. Some conjecture is necessary to cover the gap; and we think that its general character ought not to be obscure. The account of the change which alone is consistent with the various indications in the New Testament will be based on the principle, that ministerial office rests on divine commission and election. A man may desire the office of an overseer, but his inclination to offer himself is not the last word in the matter. He must be examined, witness about him must be procured, and the office conferred by some one who has the power to do this act. If it be true that at first each member of the college was entrusted with all the powers belong-

ing to it (*cf.* Ramsay, cited above), then the change will have meant that the presbyteries conferred their whole powers, after a period, on individuals only, and with certain defined restrictions on others. This, though it may have involved considerable change in point of form, involved none in point of principle.[1]

We must now return to the question of Authority, and ask what does all this teach us as to the nature and operation of it in the Church. In the first place, we may surely say, that these facts from the history of the Church of the first days prove the polity of the Church to be a matter of primary importance. There is an opinion widely current that polity is a matter of comparative indifference, and that the whole emphasis of the faith lies on 'spiritual' religion and moral endeavour. It has been argued here that this is, at any rate, inconsistent with the New Testament, and especially with the idea of the Church as a brotherhood of men including various nationalities. As soon as it begins to pass out beyond the very narrowest limits, it must enter into the physical conditions of man's life: it must find outward expression, have defi-

[1] *Cf.* Moberly, *Ministerial Priesthood;* Gore, *The Church and the Ministry;* Lightfoot, *Philippians*, *Essay on Christian Ministry*, with the note added in *Dissertations on the Apostolic Age;* Hort, *Christian Ecclesia;* Harnack, *Dogmengeshichte*, Bd. i. ii^tes Buch, cap. 2, 3, and references.

nite signs of its presence and activity, tests to distinguish true and false members. And these requirements carry with them the necessity of outward order. Men cannot fulfil their true functions in life except by social intercourse and combination, as we have already argued. This rule lies upon the Church as truly as upon the State. But outward order is even more cogently necessary for the Church than for the State. For the Church is a selective society: it admits men as members upon conditions; and though there is no limit theoretically fixed for its population, it does not include every one. God may have much people in one city: He wills all men to be saved; but in every place there are those who refuse His offer, and who deliberately stand outside the brotherhood. Thus the society of the Church passes in and through the civil societies of men; and a body that attempts this must be held together by some bond which is recognizable in the material world. We may note, however—and it is a point which will require further consideration—that the polity depends on the unity and not *vice versâ*. Because the Church is one, and includes within it all who in various states and peoples become members of Christ, it will be natural to expect that the signs of its presence and effectual operation will be sufficiently alike everywhere to make plain its unity. This is a

point which plainly introduces questions of great controversial interest; but we are not in a position to treat them fully here.

Secondly, our investigation of the early days throws considerable light on the cogency of the authority of the Church, in regard to outward polity. In discussing the State we endeavoured to show that the real source of its authority was the social nature of man, the necessity which drives him into social existence. We pointed out also the strong antecedent improbability that individual developments against the authority of the State will be of permanent value. For one case in which the individual can justify his rebellious acts, there are vast numbers in which he is simply acting in defiance of one of the deepest principles of humanity. Something of the same sort must be said of the Church, regarded simply as an organized institution. Considering the importance of the interests it serves, the perils of offending the brother's conscience, and many other like things, it is plain that rebellion against its outward authority is antecedently unlikely to justify itself. But the case is stronger still when we take into consideration the nature of the unity between Christian men, and of the force which holds them together. They are the Body of Christ, the temple of the Holy Ghost. The indefinite and imperfect

union of individuals which constitutes the State, the real but vague affinity between fellow-citizens which we call a national spirit, are shown by the Church to be, as it were, types or foreshadowings of the true union between men. The State is, after all, formed, like the tabernacle, after the pattern in the mount: it is the image of the true. And if its authority is so venerable and sacred, still more are those who follow Christ bound to regard with reverence the authority of the society which is so closely identified with Him. And this involves no enslavement, no undue restriction of individual liberty. It is in a free state that men most revere their laws, and most naturally mould their lives on the pattern which these laws enjoin; and the fact that they do this is the great support of their freedom; the State controls them that they may be free. And the parallel holds with the Church. God is not a God of disorder but of peace, and the spirits of the prophets in His Church will be subject to the prophets. The Church is not a loose horde of wrangling, self-willed atoms, but an ordered society, within the order of which men are free. Its authority is the plain expression of this fact.

CHAPTER VI

AUTHORITY AND THE CREED

We have seen that the extension of the Church outside the limits of Jerusalem and the Jewish people revealed the necessity of an authoritative polity, transcending the boundaries of the various cities and states composing the Church, and thereby emphasizing the fundamental unity of the society as a whole. We must now proceed to consider one or two other applications of the same principle. So far we have taken into consideration the merely geographical extension of the Church: this is an important feature, and in the early days of Christianity was a somewhat novel one. It falls short, however, by a long way of the interest and importance of the intellectual extension of the Church. This will form the subject of the present chapter.

Christianity, as we have already observed, rose out of Judaism, and some of the fundamental principles of Judaism passed into it with scarcely any change. The new faith was based on a new act of God, carrying on to a further point, a point outside the horizon of man's

earthly life, the principles already declared in the religion of the Jews. The Jewish religion was not a mere matter of speculation : it contained more and reached a fuller certainty than was possible to mere speculation. Judaism looked forward to the fulfilment of a Divine purpose in the coming of the Christ : the mode in which the fulfilment was to be achieved was obscure, the fact was certain. Christianity proclaims an immense enlargement of this purpose, so that it includes the whole future history of all the peoples of the world, and leads on to a consummation beyond which we cannot clearly see. In the words of the writer to the Hebrews, God, 'who had spoken in many parts and many fashions to the fathers in the prophets, at the end of these days spoke to us in a Son.' Further, the whole of history was conceived as governed by the Will and Predestination of God: even the sufferings of Christ and those which fell upon His followers were all foreseen and capable of explanation in that light. Still more there was in the new order a possibility of new and direct relations with God : for the imperfect and ineffectual sacrifices were at an end, and a new way was open. Thus the advent of Christianity meant a clearer statement of what was already partly understood: it was an extension of a revelation already begun and developed, and its appeal was to minds already

prepared. It assumed a particular view of the Divine Nature, of His relation to the created world, and to mankind: and it decided incidentally various questions as to which the mind of man might fairly take different views. It was a religion involving a Personal God, but it had relations with many philosophical questions.

In the course of its extension, it necessarily came across persons of widely different intellectual history and education, and this contact produced conflict immediately. The main causes of difference were in the region of religion and philosophy. This was mainly due to its origin in Judaism. Judaism had grown up in an environment of paganism, and it is plain, in the light of recent investigations, that there were many points of contact between the Jewish and other religions; yet it is equally certain that there grew up a conception of God in Judaism which differed seriously from all other forms of faith. It is not to the present purpose to discuss the causes or the history of this difference; but we may summarize them in a single sentence, by saying that the tendency of nature-religions to develope into philosophy had no place in Judaism. Now philosophy concerns itself with the fundamental principles of things: it endeavours to reach some formula or rule by which all the phenomena of our experience may be held to-

gether. It is an extension, aiming at completeness, of the ordinary processes of thought; and its whole history is affected by the character of its earliest stages. It introduces system where the mind without it would contentedly acquiesce in confusion; but it does not necessarily deal with experience that is other than sensuous. Its aim is a scheme of experience as a whole, it is true; and therefore it has to deal with the facts that are classed as religious religion. But its object is to put these facts into direct relation with ordinary experience: to deduce them from it; or to show some kind of ratiocinative link between them. Thus, for instance, God may be considered philosophically under the category of Cause; then it is attempted to show that His existence is required as the logical ground of the existence of the world as we know it. Or He is conceived as the Supreme Moral Governor of the world; then philosophy endeavours to show by investigation of the facts of moral experience the necessity of such a Governor, and to agree to some of His probable Attributes. From another point of view we may say that in these cases philosophy is endeavouring to bridge over a gap—to trace in terms of intellect the link which connects the Creator with the created world. And it is this bridging over of gaps which is one of its most conspicuous endeavours, in all the various regions of its opera-

tions. So we find it trying to make articulate the relation of mind and matter, or trying to explain the part played by individual wills in a system which bears them all along to an unknown end.

At times, and in certain circumstances, religion is largely occupied with the same problems, but it approaches them less carefully and scientifically. It has an interest in explaining the world, but it takes up readily with extremely simple explanations: it explains it on the analogy of the direct experience of man's own activity; this is myth. In the region of morals it is deeply conscious of inadequacy, and appeals, fruitlessly, to sacrifice: here comes in the larger part of definite religious practice. In both cases it assumes what philosophy is attempting to prove—a real Cause or Causes, and a Moral Governor. And it is obvious how easily it might pass over into philosophy; if the existence of the Cause and the Moral Governor were in any way uncertain, if the conceptions of Cause and the Moral Governor were crude and needed purging at the hands of philosophy. We are all familiar with this course of change in the history of the great pagan religions.

We have already noted that the Jewish religion showed little or no tendency to drift into philosophy: left to themselves the Jews did not seem to have the impulse in this direction.

They were not without points of similarity to the pagan religions of their neighbours, but they thought of God as manifested rather in history than in nature. He was conceived as revealed in action, and as progressively revealed. Of course this involved philosophical questions, but the Jews were not interested in them. To say that God had chosen the Jewish people as His own: that He sent the prophets and would in time send a Deliverer, meant that He was related to the world in a particular way. It assumed personal activity and interest: it paved the way for the idea of God as Love.

It is important to dwell on these familiar facts with some emphasis, because it is only by so doing that we shall understand clearly the attitude of the Church. The Apostles inherited the Jewish position. The coming of Christ was a new act in the history of God's self-revelation: it fulfilled the old promise of a Deliverer; and it opened a new period in the relations between God and men. So far as this was treated comprehensively by the New Testament writers at all, they kept within Jewish lines. S. Paul anxiously endeavours to show the full coherence of Christ's coming and work with the law and the prophets. In his profounder treatment of the Nature of Christ he sees in Him, like S. John, the instru-

ment of Creation; and thus the two lines of Divine self-manifestation, Creation and Revelation, are drawn together in Him. But there is no trace of philosophical exposition in the strict sense of the word: there is no discussion of the relation of spirit and matter, or of the existence and attributes of God. Certain facts are asserted as historic, and no attempt made to criticize their metaphysical background.

Before passing on to the actual history of the action of the Church, so far as we need to consider it, it will be well to give one or two illustrations of what has just been said. First of all, there is the story of the Resurrection. Alike in the Acts and in the Epistles this is treated as a fact of central moment. It is not presented as an idea or a conviction that so supreme a member of the human race as Christ could not die and be extinguished. It is treated as a historic event, which is the proper subject of witness: and, of course, much is involved in the assertion of it as a historic fact. Such a statement carries with it decisions on various points which philosophy would discuss. If any given school of philosophy were to reach the conclusion that immortality is an idle dream, that no mode of existence is conceivable for the soul than that of our daily life, the Resurrection would be incredible to it, because it assumes the contrary of these

positions. Again, the Apostles held and taught that the prophet, Jesus of Nazareth, was none other than the Son of God. And this assertion carried consequences which some modes of philosophic thought would necessarily repudiate. But the consequences followed, not as from a rival philosophy, deducing them by argument, but as already implied in the witness to certain historic events. The assertion that Christ was the Son of God Incarnate contained in it a particular conception of the nature of God, and a particular view as to His dealings with the world; opposite theories of God and the world being by the same necessity repudiated. It might need skill and philosophical acumen to display the incompatibility between the doctrines and the theories, but this was still only the unrolling of that which was already implicit.

The movement of the Church through the nations necessarily implied that the questions concealed in the witness of the Church would be explicitly raised. It was obvious that the Incarnation and Resurrection, and the whole earthly life of our Lord, would not be easily brought into combination with a view of God to which all action and all contact with a material world were impossible. And this was the prevalent theory in the more speculative regions of thought at the time. From the East came the notion that

matter was inherently evil, and that the whole object of life was to learn to free oneself from its defiling touch. Among the Greeks the limitations incident to human life seemed to explain a large portion of the failure and inadequacy of human effort, and it seemed inconceivable that the perfection of humanity could be displayed in flesh. These views rested on reasoning, much of which had become almost traditional, and seemed unassailable. And in consequence the witness of the Apostles could not be received in philosophic circles without modification: some new meaning would have to be given to the Incarnation to avoid the conflict which the plain language of the Apostolic witness seemed to provoke. The flesh would be treated as an appearance, or the death as unreal, the resurrection as a series of visions; and the attempt would be made to weave into alien systems the language of the New Testament.

The temptation may well have seemed strong to enter into the field of philosophical discussion and endeavour to establish the philosophic positions implied in the Church's doctrine by the regular philosophic method. This plan was pursued by many great Church writers, such as Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria and Origen, Tertullian and Augustine. But it is noticeable that utterances of men like these, though they must have seemed in their time convincing and

conclusive, were not adopted as a whole by the Church, nor was their method. There is no instance of a philosophical *argument* or principle being enshrined in a baptismal creed: there is only one case—the Homoousion—of a philosophical term retaining its place in a creed of the widest distribution. The method pursued was that of defining and guarding the *μαρτυρία*; and so it is that the larger part of the Creeds is historical.

In the earliest days the witness had been given by word of mouth by those who had seen and heard: the test of an Apostle had been that he had seen the Risen Lord. But such witness was only possible during the lifetime of the first disciples. When they passed away, and their contemporaries, so that no one was left who had seen and heard, a new situation had developed. The witness must for the future be indirect. It is this condition of things which governs the definition of the Canon and the formulation of the Creed. We must remember that the books of the New Testament are not a body of works written for a definite place in a series, like one of the many series published in the present day. It is not easy in all cases to trace the cause and occasion of their composition at all; and where it is possible, as in the case of S. Paul's Epistles,

the occasion is always some incidental problem arising in the life of some particular individual or Church. We have every reason to believe that the Gospels stand in some relation to the preaching of various Evangelists and Apostles: they are a record, and doubtless a very incomplete record, of those parts of what was known about Christ, which proved most useful in teaching. It is true that they contain all that it is necessary for us to know, but it is unlikely that they contain all that was known. Also it is certain that the books in the Canon were by no means the only available books: there were certainly other accounts of Christ's Life and Works, though we do not know how many: other Epistles had at one time a chance of becoming canonical, as, for instance, the Epistle of Clement of Rome: there were other Apocalypses and books of exhortation. Thus the collection ultimately formed was a selection from a list of which some names and some fragments still survive. If we ask on what principle it was formed, it seems that the answer should be twofold. It is clear that the theological bearing of the books was one reason: indeed this *rule* of faith seems to have been the first meaning of *κανών*. And, secondly, the connexion assumed to exist between the book and some Apostle or Apostolic writer was, no doubt, also a point

for consideration.[1] Thus in two ways the Canon of the Sacred Books defined and limited the *μαρτυρία*: it was governed by the rule of faith, and rested on the authority of those who had seen the Lord. And here it should be remembered that there could never again be any such books written. Later writers might discuss and philosophize and draw out the inner coherence and principle of the faith of the Church; but no one again could say, We state this on the basis of our own personal experience: that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you. This is a matter of no small importance; because it explains the closing of the Canon. If the principle of accurate presentation of a doctrine had been the only one at work, it is difficult to see why important writings of the greater scholars and thinkers of the Church should not have been placed in Scriptural rank. There are, in fact, certain books which are in the hands of men of almost all the nations of Christianity: they represent the faith with less of individual limitation than is usual in dogmatic writers. But they have not been admitted into the Canon, nor are they used in the same way.

[1] An interesting case of the operation of these two lines of investigation may be found in the history of the Epistle to the Hebrews; *cf.* Westcott, *Ep. to the Hebrews*, pp. lxii., &c.

True as they may be to the norm, they have not in them the element of personal witness, or immediate contact with personal witness. Thus the Canon is primarily historical in its significance. The Apostles had the Commission to be witnesses to certain things: the books of the New Testament determine what these things were, and, in some limited and special degree, what was involved in the assertion of them.

The same principle is at work with the Creeds. They are intended, as we have seen, to preserve the witness intact; and their special aim is not so much to add as to prevent additions. From one or another point of view the temptation to make new developments was very strong: many people wished, as in the present day, to call themselves Christians without accepting the teaching of Christ. The appeal against them was perpetually to the continuity of teaching from the time of the Apostles;[1] and in this connexion another and most important function was found for the Bishops. They were the natural preservers of the tradition: they knew the fixed outlines of the witness for which the Church was responsible, and were supposed to be alive to the possibilities and the dangers of change. Their verdict, especially the combined verdict of a number of them, was held to be binding,

[1] *Cf.* Iren., *Adv. Hœr.*, iii. 2–3.

because to them in an especial degree fell the task of preserving the tradition pure. As men who have to administer a trust must know the trust-deed in all its bearings, so those on whom the guidance of the Body of Christ is laid are expected before all things to be intelligent and tenacious of the dogmatic tradition. This principle in no way affects the freedom of others to study and write on dogmatic subjects; but the rule of division of labour puts in the hands of those who administer the society, whose function it is to strengthen its inward life, and extend its borders, a special right to be heard in matters which so nearly touch the existence of the faith. Here again we may notice that the order in doctrinal matters, which follows from the general principle of the Church's constitution, is not a merely casual and indifferent thing, but must be taken in close connexion with the spiritual character of the Church as a whole. The Spirit gives to some and not to others the gift of knowledge, and, we may infer from S. Paul's words, indicates thereby the service which is expected from those to whom the gift is given: so that the wisdom which the Spirit gives, used by the individual faithfully and in love, comes with the authority of the Body. If the condition of the Church were perfect, such a man would teach not primarily or mainly because he

held a particular office, even the highest office in the Church. It may be doubted whether there is any recognition of the mere claims of a particular official dignity anywhere in the New Testament; but the possession by an individual of gifts which are deserving of obedience, should secure that they are not wasted, but that he is placed in the position in which the Church will derive most gain from the use of his gifts. It is not maintained that this ideal condition is attained or is easily attainable; but it is urged that this is the condition which the New Testament language suggests.

We are now in a position to consider the nature and limits of the authority of the Church in matters of doctrine and reason. It is plain that from the first the whole position turns upon the idea of *witness*, and that the contents of the Gospel consisted mainly of historic assertions, together with some primary inferences from these historic assertions. Thus the fact of the Resurrection was expressed, of necessity, in historic form: the Apostles claimed to be witnesses of its reality. In the region of metaphysic we do not find them drawing inferences at all; but in the region of theology they do not limit themselves quite so strictly, and it is plain that their experiences of Christ, and probably His teaching, had led to a considerable development in their idea of God.

It is true, of course, that the doctrine of God as we find it even in the Acts, and still more in the Epistles, was not matter for historic statement. Except so far as we may suppose Christ Himself to have assisted their intelligence in this respect, it was the result of inference and reflexion, which must have operated very early indeed. The Threefold Name and the salient facts of the Life of Christ seem to have been very early, if not in the very first days, included in the doctrine which they taught. Further, there are signs that the Lord Himself connected His death with the salvation of the world; and it is clear from the Gospels that this was part of the teaching which the Apostles had received. Very little is said in the early speeches in the Acts which bears upon this point; but there cannot be much doubt that the belief in Christ's death as an atonement for sin had currency in the earliest days. This also is a theological rather than a historical belief; but one which lay very close to the whole Jewish system of theological thought. We have already considered at some length the attitude of the Apostles and their immediate followers to the idea of the Christian society.

In view of all this, we shall probably not be wrong if we maintain that the fundamental teaching of the Church includes: (1) certain historical assertions concerning the Life of the

Lord, especially His Resurrection: (2) a peculiar view resulting from these of the Nature of God: (3) a doctrine of the relation of Christ's Life and Death to man here and hereafter: (4) a conception of a Society intimately connected with Christ, and through Him with the Father. Without the historical events all the rest would have been in the strictest sense speculation and conjecture of more or less persuasiveness: with the events behind them the doctrines acquire a wholly different value and certainty. They are of the nature of an interpretation of the history: they involve implicitly, as has been already remarked, certain answers to philosophical questioning. But they are vital, for it is the effect of the Resurrection upon the doctrine of God and upon the position of man that gives it its supreme importance. It is impossible without serious confusion to separate the theology and the facts upon which it is based.

It can hardly be disputed that the whole authority of the Church lies behind this body of witness and doctrine: indeed, those who assail it recognize that they are bound in some way to explain its origin and prevalence. We have to inquire, therefore, how this authoritative declaration stands to our theory of authority stated above. We may note, in the first place, that the fact of the Resurrection belongs to the region of

history, and therefore there must always be in our belief of it an element of pure acceptance of a statement only partially demonstrable. In this it does not differ from any other historic fact which we accept; but it does differ widely from other historic facts in its associations. These, as we have just seen, are of a theological sort, and we must therefore consider next what is to be said of them. It is clear that these theological doctrines are not directly verifiable in ordinary experience; and therefore if they are required of men to be believed, it must be in virtue of the exercise of some authority; and for members of the Church there is no doubt what this authority is. The Apostles speak in the name of Christ, and under the inspiration of His Spirit; and it is difficult to see how such authority can be resisted, at any rate by Christian men. But this is not quite all. It is plain that the exercise of the authority is in part educational. It relates to a world that is in many respects different from the world of philosophy. Philosophy deals with and tries to systematize the world of experience, and has to depend, for everything beyond it, upon precarious inferences from the knowledge gained through sense. The view of things which is involved in the Church's witness implies the presence of a spiritual world. It asserts by implication the direct interest of

God in human history, and the controlling influence of His will; and it subsumes the whole order of sensuous things within His Purpose. Much of this cannot be matter of direct verification in this life. We cannot maintain that a materialistic, or at least an agnostic, explanation of our experience is theoretically impossible. But we can see lines on which the theological view of the world can be made to seem probable; and we are sure that when we see face to face, the uncertainties of our present condition will be finally cleared up. Thus while the theological associations of the fundamental historic fact of our religion must partly depend on authority, it is not an unreasoning and arbitrary authority, but one of which the utterances are not yet verifiable directly, but will be verifiable to a fuller experience than ours, on lines which we can already partly trace. It is essential in all discussion of the authority of the Church in matters of faith, that it assumes the existence of a new world, which includes and permeates the world of sensuous experience.

But though it is true to say that the doctrinal affirmations of the Church are not directly verifiable, it is not true that they have not very important indirect verification. The original teaching of the Gospel not only affirms a past fact, but promises future effects continually

realizable in the world of daily experience. It promises not only that men shall have the *ideas* of Immortality and Forgiveness of Sin, and assured Communion with God, but the experience of them. Here an indirect verification has been possible in the past, and is possible still. Men have been promised that through faith in Christ they shall have power to overcome tendencies which seemed invincible, and live in newness of life. From the first days of the Church until now this has been found true. And to those in whom this change has been worked the acceptance on authority of those forces which have effected it seems the most rational thing they ever did. They believe no longer by reason of the speech of the Church : they themselves have heard, and know that this is truly the Saviour of the world (*cf.* S. John iv. 42).

We have not to do, therefore, with an authority which is mere arbitrary command: we have doctrines presented to us, which in the present condition of our knowledge we cannot wholly prove; but they rationalize and co-ordinate our higher spiritual life, and we gain through faith in Christ the power that makes them effective. This is an important point in regard to the limits of Church authority. If we have been right so far, the Church asserts certain things, and has always done so, authoritatively, and cannot

fail to continue doing so. These facts and doctrines explain its existence in the world: it is placed here to proclaim them. And we have seen also that in contact with varieties of religious and intellectual history it was necessary that questions would be asked and new theories set abroad. We cannot doubt that the Church would be justified in combating or repudiating such theories as implicitly contravene its central faith; and on these lines it would have to be constantly *developing*, preserving this and that fragment of its whole truth from the assaults of men of various degrees of knowledge and devotion. It would necessarily clear up the doctrine of God, the doctrine of the Incarnation, of the Atonement, of man's freedom, and the like, and would forbid the proclamation in its name of views which are inconsistent with its doctrines. And its authority would cover these expositions just because they are not innovations or additions, but interpretations of what has been already stated. Thus the doctrine of the Two Natures of our Lord, though in its form it seems new and strange as compared with the direct statements of historic fact which we find in the Gospels, is in fact a summary of all these passages. It supplies a formula by which the truth of them all can be asserted simultaneously, instead of being distorted and curtailed by undue emphasis on one set of

passages rather than another, or by attempts at remodelling them all in the light of some theory of what was probable. And thus it is reasonable to claim that those who profess to hold to the Church shall accept this teaching. If they refuse this, it is difficult to see what standing they can profess to have. They are in many cases laboriously seeking after holiness, but they certainly miss the unity of life and thought which comes of the apprehension of Catholic truth.

On the other hand, there are regions into which this authority cannot be supposed to stretch. The Church does not profess to teach men dogmatically all possible truth, so as to save them the effort of acquiring it for themselves: in fact, in regard to truth it follows the example of Christ. It will be transgressing its limits, for instance, if it developes philosophically any particular position and then inculcates the philosophical argument as its own. The Creeds, as we have noticed, elaborately avoid doing this. The facts upon which the whole structure is based are stated, and certain inferences of a theological kind erected upon them; but there is no condemnation of materialism, for instance, no definition of substance or person, or of any other of the words which have philosophical associations. The advantage of this plan is that the formulæ are capable of various expression as the course of philosophic thought changes,

and are not tied down absolutely to the meaning in which many of those who drew up the Creed would have used them. The one substance in the Godhead is the phrase by which the Unity of God and the complete Divinity of the Son and Holy Spirit are protected: the triplicity of Persons is the phrase by which the new revelation of Christianity is secured. But there was no note appended stating in which of the current senses the phrase was used. Every one knew that all were not equally valid, and a man like S. Augustine would have been eager to assert that the words were only partially adequate to their subject, in whatever sense they were used.

A strong contrast to this is afforded by the history of the Doctrine of Transubstantiation. In this case a departure was made from the principle of abstaining from the imposition of philosophical doctrines. The philosophical distinction of substance and accident, which was current in the early Middle Ages and had a certain history, is applied to explain the words of Institution of the Eucharist. There is no reason to quarrel with this. The explanation was valuable in its day and, no doubt, helped to preserve truth. But it was after a time made *de fide*. That is, a person is not at liberty to take the words of Christ, and leave alone the question of fitting them into some theory of reality: he is obliged to take them

with a particular explanation. This is where the difficulty begins. For the explanation itself comes under criticism in two ways. First the distinction itself, and then the conception of reality upon which it rests were assailed. To the philosophers who devised this formula, substance meant what was permanent and fundamentally real, accident meant what was changeable and had no reality save through its inherence in a substance. In the particular case this meant that the colour and taste of the elements were delusive: they suggested the presence of the substance of bread, though this had been miraculously changed and had disappeared. But this doctrine conflicts with the impressions of the senses; it was impossible to avoid giving some sort of reality of their own to the accidents; and thus they tend to take on continually more of the character of substances. It is clear that these efforts to bring the accidents back into the region of reality led to a continual modification of the distinction of substance and accident; but it exists throughout and justifies the whole discussion; if there were no ultimate difference between substance and accident, the distinction is entirely meaningless. Those who drew this distinction had the true philosophical desire to discern truth from falsity; and they thought that they could satisfy this desire by sorting out the true from the false elements in

their experience as it came to them from without. But they took no account of the element of mental activity in the process of acquiring knowledge of reality. The mind itself contributes to make the reality of what we perceive and know; and any inquiry into the difference between the true and the false must take this into account. This is the point upon which the change to modern philosophy hinges, and it renders what went before obsolete. It is not merely a different point of view: it implies the recognition of an undeniable factor which had been ignored before. If the Church had confined itself to asserting that the Body of the Lord was really present in the consecrated Bread, this change might conceivably have passed without precipitating schism: just as the changes in the meaning of reality have not disturbed the formula of Nicæa. But the old phraseology of substance and accident cannot be made to express the newer analysis of reality; and hence it may be doubted whether it is politic to retain it. It certainly was impolitic to impose the formula, as well as beyond the proper limits of Church authority.

The question of additions to the contents of the Church's message to the world on the historical side is much more serious in one way, and much simpler in another. It is hard to see how any additions could conceivably be made, and it would therefore seem simple to rule them all

out as *ultra vires*. The facts which are of vital religious importance to the Church are those which are concerned with the Life of Christ, and to add to them at all would seem to imply a much more comprehensive claim to the propagation of truth than can ever be justified. It remains, however, that in spite of this presumption against the whole process of extension in this direction, certain additions to the general body of teaching have been made in some parts of the Church, and claim universal acceptance. The Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin affirms a historical fact: it lies, it is true, very far from the region of possible observation, but at the same time, if true at all, it is historical. The doctrine of the Assumption has never been declared *de fide*, and, therefore, technically remains a pious opinion: though we may wonder what would be the fate of any Bishop or Priest in the Roman Church who decided to exercise his Christian liberty and deny it. This again, if true at all, is a historical affirmation: it declares the occurrence of certain events in time. It seems clear that these affirmations have no right whatever to the name Catholic in any intelligible sense of the term. There is not a vestige of evidence which connects them with the Apostles, or even with their time: from the historical side they are valueless. And it is

probable that the real ground for asserting them is theoretical and not historical at all. They represent the tendency to model the life of the Blessed Virgin on that of her Son, and in the case of the Immaculate Conception it is easy to feel that the difficulties which lie round original sin, and the interruption of the sinful heritage, go far to account for it. With these doctrines immense tracts of hagiology must go, for which no tangible evidence can be alleged, and which by no means make up for their evidential defects by coming forward under the more or less avowed sanction of the Church. It has tended seriously to confuse the conception of Church authority that the disposition to produce stories such as these has not been more carefully watched and checked.

It may be well, for clearness' sake, to sum up shortly the view of authority here put forward. It is maintained (1) that the norm or type of Church authority in matters of truth is found in the New Testament and depends upon the Commission given to the Church by our Lord: (2) that the body of truth thus authoritatively entrusted to the Church consists of certain historical affirmations concerning the Lord Himself, with their theological consequences in regard to the Nature of God, and the life and hopes of man: (3) that this authority, which is perhaps the most important of all the functions of the

Church, is rightly exercised through the officers of the Society, who are concerned with its extension and administration: (4) that the Church has no charge to propagate other truth as such, or to supersede by its authority ordinary methods of investigation.

With this idea before us, we can go forward and examine some of the casuistical questions which the contact of authority with other methods of approaching intellectual questions constantly produces. What is the true relation between the authority of the Church and Science, critical and physical? If we are to answer this question reasonably we must be sure that we are comparing the two processes accurately, and in the same connexion. We note, therefore, that in the first place science has, which the Church has not, a definite responsibility for truth in its various fields. It is the business of historical criticism to weigh carefully statements which are handed down in regard to the past: to deal with them according to principles derived from observation: to examine their self-consistency, their positive evidence, their relation to the whole scheme of things. When all this has been done, it may be in a position to say whether or not the evidence for the alleged fact is sufficient, and, perhaps, to reconstruct out of a mass of inaccurate statements the truth which they imperfectly ex-

press. In like manner physical science makes collections of accurately observed facts, and weaves them into principles and laws, which by their truth and universality give it a command over nature. From this basis, it usually tends to extend over the field of philosophy and attempt a scheme of the whole natural order, which will not only declare what is actual, but what is possible.

It will usually be found that when theology comes into conflict with these other methods of attaining truth, the conflict lies really and essentially in the region of theory. It is rarely that it can be to the purpose to assert or deny a fact in the teeth of scientific method, except when this assertion or denial involves an attitude towards some theoretical question. Thus, to take concrete instances—if criticism had finally demonstrated that S. Luke had made a mistake about the taxing under Quirinius, it would not necessarily follow that theology must hold to it at all costs. It would mean that an inaccuracy on a point of date had crept into S. Luke's book, and that is all. But the inaccuracy would be of serious importance if theology assumed that the operation of the Spirit in an inspired writer is such as absolutely to exclude such inaccuracies: because the presence of one would be sufficient to raise the whole question of inspiration. And this is a matter of theory—an *a priori* question which

if settled in one way would carry consequences: the maintenance of the fact against the critical arguments would follow if this particular premiss were assumed. Still more obviously is this the case with physical science. Theology can have no objection whatever to the facts on which, for instance, the theory of evolution is based; but conflict will arise if it be asserted or implied that the method of evolution excludes the operation of a Personal God; and this is a matter of theory, of the *a priori* notion of what evolution must imply on the one side, and the working of a Personal God on the other. The facts are just the facts of the natural world: evolution is a theory or principle, an intellectual formula connecting vast numbers of them together. The conflict is not over the facts — though it is sometimes said to be so—but over the theories interpreting them. It is true, of course, that different facts stand in different degrees of closeness and significance to theological or scientific theories; and we must admit that a fact once demonstrated must be accepted by theology, whatever its consequences may be. But this does not imply accepting a given critic's estimate of the value and conclusiveness of his own researches.

When, therefore, there is a real conflict between theology and one of the other methods of reaching truth, what is authority to do? Of course

it will not deal in prohibitions and anathemas: nothing has ever been gained by this plan. It will not, in other words, try to extend its range over a region which does not properly belong to it. But this does not mean that it is without all claim to be heard in the matter. And one part of its action is quite simple. Theology must enter into the arena of conflict; it must carefully test from its own point of view the statements which are made on the opposite side: it must pay special attention to the philosophical and other assumptions which are hidden in them. These are often, as we have said, at the real heart of the conflict, and the discussion of them lies close to theology. For theology necessarily carries with it a comprehensive view of the world, from which it is possible to bring serious criticism to bear upon the less comprehensive views arising from special research. All this is, of course, the work of theological science, and its value is extremely high. But it is not popular, nor does it carry the persuasiveness it deserves: because it is largely held by the 'educated' of the present day, that there is no room for science in the theological province, and that the defence of theological positions is rarely sincere. Here again we stray into the territory of *a priori* theory.

The case of those who are able and willing to follow scientific theology is comparatively easy:

the difficulty arises when the conflict reaches those whose education admittedly disqualifies them for scientific discussions. This is the problem which meets almost every clergyman in some part of his work, and it is almost always an individual question. Some individual or small knot of individuals has become perplexed, sometimes by actual study of attacks or criticisms upon the Faith; more often by indirect rumours of such attacks that filter through magazines and newspapers. It is in cases like these that the temptation is strong to invoke authority and condemn certain books and points of view, prohibiting them to faithful Churchmen. In itself there would be nothing wrong in such prohibitions. Every parent with a sense of responsibility would forbid his children to read certain books while they were in a really immature condition of mind. And this would be a movement in the direction of the attainment of truth, rather than away from it. But the case of the child and the imperfectly educated man are not parallel: the man is left to determine by his own action his belief and his relation to life, and he cannot be arbitrarily restricted in the use of his freedom, even for his own advantage. There is therefore no general rule for the treatment of such cases: each must be dealt with on its own merits.

There are, however, certain things which may

be said in more or less general terms, which it is well to keep in view. 1. It is of the greatest importance that any one who is likely to have to deal with a position such as has been described, should know fully and accurately what the Bible says. It has been argued that much of the conflict arises in the region of theory, and, as we have seen, there is very little pure theory either in the Bible or the Creeds. No man in ordinary work can have time to keep himself abreast of all the various developments of criticism; but it is in every man's power to know the Bible accurately and well. This will prevent indulgence in facile apologetic, and the use of slight and untrustworthy arguments. For the presentation of the truth in Scripture is conspicuously concrete and full; and it is only by continual reference to it that men can preserve anything like the same fulness and variety in their own view of their faith. The inveterate tendency is—and it has been the source of many heresies—to develope some favourite aspect of the truth abnormally and leave all the others untouched. A conspicuous modern instance is the emphatic prominence given to the Christian doctrine of love, and the obscuration of all the severer side of Christ's teaching. But the man who has not time or the gifts for scientific criticism will be most likely to attain proportion by

the comprehensive study of Scripture. Criticism has often done a service by recalling forgotten aspects of, and restoring proportion to the preaching of the Church.

2. It will often be found that statement, for which the accurate study of Scripture will have paved the way, is often more to the point than argument. There is a curious uncertainty in the use of arguments: people are very variously affected by them. Arguments which to some seem convincing have no influence upon other minds; and probably the least exaggerated, most scientifically formulated argument would seem disappointing and inconclusive to any but trained minds. Also, argumentation, except in the case of trained minds, is a process of an extremely complex character. Part of it goes on, so to say, in the full light of man's consciousness, while round this brilliantly lighted part there lies a half-conscious region of dim presuppositions and prejudices which certainly have considerable effect on the whole result of the argumentation, but of which the actual force cannot be exactly estimated. A careful statement of what the Church does actually teach will often bring to light some of the semi-conscious antagonisms which are really causing perplexity, and enable the man to test for himself with greater critical power the theories which are perplexing his faith.

3. It is of the greatest importance to emphasize the close relation which subsists between the promises and the teaching of Christ and practical moral life. It is true, of course, that this fact may be misused, and made a ground for really irrelevant appeals to consequences. But this is no reason for abstaining from the assertion of what is a profoundly important truth, that the doctrines of the Church correspond to very practical principles of life. There is no more valuable result of Christianity than the manifestation of the unity of the intellectual, moral, and religious impulses: nor any more paradoxical outcome of speculation about parts of it than 'undogmatic Christianity.' The true strength of the Christian case is obscured unless it is seen that no element in it is otiose, but that it is directly adapted to the complex nature of man. Without this the religious side of man's life tends to be reduced to an inarticulate emotion; the intellect comes to be an independent and self-contained instrument for dealing with sensuous experience; and morality a pursuit of lofty but earthly ideals. The full purpose of life requires that the various capacities of man's nature shall be subordinated to a conception of things that goes out beyond this world. This is partly attained by any view of life in which the spiritual world is included; but it is most completely

achieved by Christianity, because this informs the intellect and quickens the practical power of the will, and makes both converge upon a spiritual end.

Perhaps it will seem disappointing to give such suggestions as these as instances of the exercise of authority. And it is certain that a prevalent view of authority would by no means be satisfied by them. But if our previous arguments have been valid, the authority of the Church in matters of truth is paternal rather than judicial: it is exercised rather by persuasion and explanation and individual instruction than by quasi-legal judgments. It is true that the conditions of Baptism have been and ought to be defined; and it is also true that the whole conception of Church authority, and even of the very existence of religious truth, is impaired by the great laxity which prevails on this point; so that a popular suggestion for the problems of these times is that we should surrender every characteristic doctrine of the Church and satisfy ourselves with a slightly emotional morality. But still it remains that the authority of the Church is best declared by the vindication of its truth to the reason and consciences of men; and this is best carried on by individual work amongst them, which is, after all, the method by which Christ and His Apostles laid the foundations of Christianity.

CHAPTER VII

AUTHORITY AND CUSTOM

We now pass on to consider a matter of considerable importance and interest, which is productive of almost as much excited controversy as doctrine, and that is the relation of Church authority to matters of practice and custom. What is the ideal relation of authority to the outward side of Church life? What right has authority to command certain observances? What power may it legitimately exercise over the private lives of its members? What degree of independence may be fairly claimed by churches and individuals? It is plain that there are some difficult questions here.

It is well to point out that in almost the whole of this subject we are dealing with matters in which the Church may be said to have a perfectly free hand. This was not the case with the doctrine. In that region the Church is governed by the Commission originally given, and neither adds nor takes away: its function is merely to deliver and to interpret its message. But it is not quite the same with questions of practice. In this region we have something of the nature of by-laws rather than laws, positive rather than

moral commands. We may divide our subject according to the varieties of the conditions in which the practical decisions of the Society take place.

In the first and highest place come the two Sacraments, of universal obligation. These were founded and commanded to be repeated by Christ Himself; and their matter was defined. Water is to be the medium of the one, bread and wine of the other. Moreover, the New Testament defines in a general way the effect of these Sacraments. The one admits to the Society of the Church, and grafts the believer into the Body of Christ, thereby making the Sacrifice of Christ available for his individual soul. The other is a communion of the Body and Blood of Christ, and is the means of sustaining the Divine Life in the believer.

It is noticeable that Scripture contains comparatively little precise doctrine concerning the Sacraments. Certain effects are undoubtedly attached to them, but there is little if any indication of the way in which they were supposed to work them. The same is true of the ecclesiastical writers. They are more certain of the effects than of the mode in which they are produced, and there is no general controversy in the early ages as to the meaning of either Sacrament. What is a serious question in regard to the Sacraments is the question of validity; that is to say, it is of the greatest practical importance to be able to say for certain when the effects well known and

understood may be certainly believed to accrue. This is the reason for the close connexion of the Sacraments with the certified representative officials of the Church. It will be found that this principle, applied in response to various circumstances, really accounts for almost all the course of the historical discussion, until the stiffening of the idea of an ordained person from that of a representative, to that of an almost distinct class of Churchman introduced confusion into the matter.

The command to continue the sacramental ordinances comes from Christ, and is addressed to the whole Church; and there are no acts in which the social basis of Church membership is so conspicuous. They are essentially acts in which Christ is agent through the Body, and the particular minister is only a secondary cause. The view according to which the priest acts as a mere intermediary, as an interpreter might stand between two foreigners, is neither in Scripture nor is consistent with the social conception of the Church as the Body of the Lord. Such hard mediation is not required within Christ: we might vary S. Paul's language, and say a mediator is not a mediator of one, but Christ is One; mediation assumes a condition of alienation imperfectly overcome. On the other hand, there is a real event transacted in the sacramental ordinances: they are not empty forms, but

carry spiritual results, for the achievement of which the whole Church is responsible. It is, therefore, only reasonable that the Church should define the external conditions under which it will carry out the Lord's commands. When defined, these conditions will be authoritative.

The authority in such cases is partly the result of the necessary limitations imposed on a body of people acting as one; such a body can only act, if confusion is to be avoided, by means of accredited representatives: and partly depends upon the spiritual character of the society, and the special guidance under which all its action is taken. The claim of the ministers to speak and act in the name of the Church is spiritual, and the determination to appoint them comes, as we have already seen, within the purview of the ruling activity of the Holy Spirit. Their spiritual claims, in fact, are simply a consequence of the spiritual character of the whole society. They involve no limitation or infringement of the rights of other members not ordained for these purposes, any more than the possession of the gifts which should be the ground of their appointment involves injustice upon those who have them not. It is sometimes said that every layman has an inherent right to perform sacramental acts in the name of the Church, and that this is implied in the representative character of the ordained. This is really a confusion of thought. Every

layman has an inherent right to be ordained, if he can get the Church to sanction his ordination; somewhat as every Englishman has an inherent right to sit in Parliament, if he can get a constituency to send him there. But no man, either in Church or State, has any right to speak or act in the name of either unless he has fulfilled the conditions which are required of representatives. The very fact that the ordained are representative, and are required to perform acts of grave significance and of the highest spiritual value, excludes the idea that casual members of the Church should take upon themselves to exercise the functions of the Body.

In this connexion, however, it is important to remember that the Church has pursued a different policy in regard to the two Sacraments. The Eucharist has been reserved to the accredited ministers, but Baptism has not. The Church will recognize and accept Baptism administered by a layman. It is perhaps not easy to discover a theoretical difference between the two Sacraments sufficient to explain this difference in practice; and it is probably impossible to explain it on any theory of the priesthood which makes the ministry a Church within the Church. But it is not difficult to explain practically how the divergent customs may be justified. To begin with, the use of lay Baptism is not conceived to be normal: it happens, as is the English custom,

in case of emergency. And, secondly, Baptism is supposed to lead on to Christian training: even if it has been administered rashly and without sufficient preparation, or perhaps in connexion with inaccurate teaching, the candidate when received by the Church may be expected to remedy the defects of his entry, if any have occurred. In this confidence the Church may well sanction the exercise of the powers of the society by persons not commissioned as representatives; while it does not extend this allowance to the other rite, in regard to which there must necessarily be fewer cases of emergency, and a much greater necessity of careful spiritual preparation. Desirable as it may be that a Christian at the point of death should receive the Sacrament of the Body and Blood, it could never be maintained that the soul of a faithful Christian was in peril if external circumstances made reception difficult or impossible. But it has been held that to die without Baptism placed a soul in peril, and this was part of the reason why the pressure of emergency seemed so much stronger in the one case than the other. The difference of procedure is, therefore, of a practical rather than a theoretical kind. The case of lay Baptism is not to be considered an instance in which the Church gives up the principle of representation in its acts, but an instance in which the right to act in its name is adapted to conditions of a peculiar and pressing nature.

The principle that the first concern of the Church was for validity rather than with the doctrine of the Sacraments, bears on another interesting feature in the history of the rites, viz. the comparative freedom allowed in the ritual of the Sacraments. No variation was allowed in the matter: in this respect the command of Christ was considered absolute.[1] Further, there was a certain general outline which seems to underlie all the varieties of ritual, and of this it is almost impossible to trace the origin. At the same time, on this basis a considerable number of variations was erected, which are classified by liturgical scholars under four separate heads. The problem for authority is to account both for the fixity and the variability. There can be little doubt that the result is due to the extension of the Church, and the increase of administrative responsibility thrown upon its officers. The accounts of the Eucharist in the New Testament imply the use of extempore prayer, and some irregularity in the way of preaching, but the celebration of the Eucharist is soon associated with the work of the Bishops.[2] The custom of local councils in which

[1] It ought to be said that several condemnations on the use of other substances than wine in the Eucharist were based not on this ground, but on the heresies which led to the suggested changes. Those who wished to consecrate water instead of wine were usually Manichæan in tendency. It is said also that in extreme emergency the use of sand in place of water was permitted for Baptism.

[2] See the Epistles of Ignatius, esp. *Smyrn.*, c. 8.

Bishops of places connected by civil or geographical tie met together and discussed matters that concerned the Church, must soon have led to the development of local uses. We must imagine the Bishops exercising a gradually increasing control over the Eucharistic worship, and developing in the various provinces provincial varieties of the one fundamental form of service referred to above. We have here another case in which the authority of the Church was exercised by the general administrative officers of the various Churches. Limitations were gradually imposed on variations, and the ritual gradually tended to become uniform; but in the absence of dogmatic discussion and of a strongly centralized unity, there was the possibility of a variety of forms of rite, each authoritative in its own area. This is the result, so far as we can state it shortly, of the exercise of the *jus liturgicum* said to inhere in the episcopal office: it is not an arbitrary exercise of authority, but an adjustment of certain principles, assumed rather than defined, to the needs and temperament of various provinces. According to liturgical scholars, there are four main types of Eucharistic rite. These not only differ verbally, but they are not agreed on such a point as the precise moment of Consecration—the moment at which the sacramental act is consummated. The Roman Church seems to make the recital of Words of Institution the critical act;

the Eastern Church lays greater emphasis upon the Invocation of the Holy Spirit upon the elements, and treats the service as a whole, of which the whole effect is certain. It is probable that the restriction of the supreme action to a particular moment and the recital of particular words must be associated with the interest in technical Eucharistic doctrine. It would be paradoxical to assert that any one of these four types was invalid; and that means that they derive their validity from their relation to the authority of the Church, and not from their actual form. This does not mean that all forms are equally good, or that the action of authority may be arbitrary. It means that the Church accepts the responsibility of affirming definitely when it is claiming to fulfil the Master's commands: the form and the authority work together.

The Sacraments are the most vital point in the outward ministrations of the Church, because they are so definitely related to the promises of Christ. We must now pass to the consideration of certain elements in life in regard to which the Church may claim a freer hand.

A society which proposes to live as one indivisible body in spite of its extent over various geographical regions will necessarily tend to adopt certain distinctive customs. It will be an object of desire that persons travelling from one centre to another should be able to feel them-

selves at home in the Churches of the places to which they go. If a man passing from Jerusalem to Rome were to find all the external circumstances of Christianity different, and to him unintelligible, a serious blow would have been dealt to the sense of union. It is certain that this desire for unity of practice was an operative motive in the early Church, to a greater extent than is readily intelligible to us. It explains the vehemence with which certain controversies were conducted; the Quartodeciman, for instance, a controversy in which it is hard for us to take a serious interest. To the ancient mind it would seem an outrage, that one set of Churchmen should be keeping the Feast of the Resurrection while others were still under the gloom of the Lenten fast. It would, therefore, be clearly desirable that the great Feasts should be kept throughout the Church on the same day. The whole Church should fast and feast together. A similar argument might be used in regard to external ritual: it would be antecedently desirable that a stranger passing into a foreign church, and finding the Eucharist being celebrated in a strange tongue, should be able to recognize by means of the ritual action the course of the service. Thus, for instance, the use of incense, if familiar in one Church, might seem desirable in others: always provided that there was some recognized principle in the use of it at all. In like manner, it might

be desirable that the moral claim on the Christian for self-control should be emphasized by some general rule of fasting, and by definitions of the proper methods. On the other hand, there would necessarily arise local uses of various sorts. If it were generally considered desirable to commemorate the death of martyrs, every place would probably have its own list. The saints whom the people of a given locality knew of and revered would naturally form the list in the local calendar. Here the general tendency to uniformity would not operate so certainly or quickly. It would not be until a great confusion had arisen through the variety of local calendars, that it would seem necessary to enforce rigorous conditions of canonization, and a central calendar. In each of these cases action of a general kind has been taken. The dates of the great days are fixed on a uniform principle: ritual, though by no means finally determined for the whole Church, has tended to follow certain general lines; the use of incense, after some discussion, has been ruled to be legitimate and convenient in the largest number of Churches: the indefinitely varying calendars have been, especially under the influence of Rome, reduced to order and uniformity. The rule of fasting is definitely affirmed, and, in the Roman Church at any rate, the method of it is very precisely defined.

These are all instances affecting outward order,

but it is clear that their importance varies considerably. It may fairly seem desirable that the greater seasons should synchronize throughout the whole Church; and this is antecedently likely to happen because of the relation which many of them bear to Easter. When the method of fixing this date is determined the others would mostly fall into line. But there is less need for uniformity in regard to the dates of other holy-days: their claim to observance would rest rather on the fact that it is easier to take the date fixed by authority than to find another, or on the sense of historical continuity and fellowship which uniformity fosters, than on any reason inherent in the matter. The same might be said of rules for fasting. They may be found convenient: it may be more natural to follow them than the reverse. But they cannot claim any special sanctity; and are apt to become somewhat ridiculous if this is claimed for them. Wise rules on such a subject must be relative to temperament and health and climate, all of them variable factors, for which no general rules can provide. The authority of the Church is seriously defied by lack of self-control in its members; but it is difficult to attach importance to precise rules as to the manner of fasting—especially in the light of Rom. xiv. It is true that such rules, and certain other practices, such as the use of incense, have an almost universal prevalence outside the Church of

England and are enjoined in rubrics. This gives them great interest, but no real authority: it is surely impossible to turn things which are really indifferent into matters of obligation. Authority loses in the end by claiming too much.

A much more serious question is raised by another widely prevalent practice, the Invocation of Saints. There can be no doubt that this practice has a very large measure of external authority. Though there is no sign of it in Scripture, nor any language suggestive of it, and though it cannot be traced in the earlier centuries of the Church, yet it has the sanction of Councils, and is in vogue both in the Roman and Eastern Churches with the full approval of the authorities there. It is a practice for which there is antecedently much to be said: as we feel no hesitation in asking the prayers of friends still on the earth, so there is nothing antecedently wrong in asking for the intercessions of those who are already passed into the unseen world. It is true that we do not know enough of their condition to be certain that they hear us, and there is therefore an uncertainty about such invocations which does not attach to prayer to God. It is probable that if the Invocation of the Saints had been confined within some such narrow limits as these, very little would have been said about it. But this has not been the case, and there is good reason to think that the practice grew, as it were, from

below, and was legitimatized by authority when it had got past restraint. It is a somewhat suspicious circumstance that, in spite of the absence of Scriptural and early authority, it is very difficult to trace exactly the beginning of the practice. This fact at once suggests that it arose and grew on the fringe of Christianity among people who were not very fully instructed and of whom there is very little information in extant literature. There are various elements present in these ages which may have assisted in the development of the practice. First, we may notice the natural veneration felt for the relics and the scene of the death of martyrs. This we find so far back as the middle of the second century. Then, as time goes on, we find an increasing veneration for the martyrs and confessors themselves. This also is a natural state of feeling, but it cannot be doubted that it led to serious mischief at times. Some of the chief difficulties of Cyprian at Carthage were closely connected with the exaggerated claims of the martyrs, and exaggerated veneration for them on the part of the uneducated Christian populace. They tended to become a separate caste in the Church, over-riding in virtue of their sanctity the ordinary discipline of the Church. They were expected to work miracles and to absolve, and were appealed to accordingly. In like manner the increasing veneration for the ascetic life tends to place those who embraced it on an

abnormal level: they were held to be superior to ordinary Christians, and to have especial weight with God. It would not involve much change to transfer to them after their death some of the exaggerated estimation and reverence which had been bestowed upon them in life.

Besides these tendencies which develope within Christian lines, there are others which are less dignified in origin. The disposition to venerate relics and places, and celebrate anniversaries, which is harmless in itself, has close relations with pagan practices. It is impossible to deny that the growing tendency to the veneration of Saints allied itself with a variety of pagan survivals which were less than half-Christianized in the process. Old anniversaries received a new association, but were in many cases very far from losing their pagan character; and the mere Invocation of Saints passed with hardly any delay into a cult.[1] It is probable that the great writers and thinkers were entirely free from any pagan associations, though their utterances on the subject were very far from being clear; but the controversy between Vigilantius and Jerome shows how far the practice had gone in the polytheistic direction quite early. And it is not too much to say that the conciliar sanctions, and the subtle

[1] An instance may be found in the cult of Felix at Nola celebrated in the poems of Paulinus. Carm. xx. describes what is hardly distinguishable from a sacrifice.

theoretic defence devised by theologians for the practice, are subsequent authorizations of a practice which was too firmly established to be changed.

It is important to draw attention to these facts because they seriously alter the complexion of the whole question. It is true that there is a great show of authority behind the practice, and there is no doubt that it prevailed virtually over the whole Church from the end of the third to the sixteenth century. It would not, however, follow from this that the use of Invocation was binding, and could not be legitimately discontinued. The significance and value of it are extremely precarious at the best; and it is very hard to separate the extremely limited use of it which is unobjectionable from more seductive practices which are definitely pagan, and not of the highest type of paganism.

It is necessary to glance here at an argument in favour of the practice which is sometimes used, and has a superficial attractiveness. The fourth century is the age in which Invocation became firmly established, and it was the same century which gave us the Creed, and won for us the full doctrine of the Incarnation. Hence it is argued that there must be something of the glamour of that great age upon the practice of Invocation. This contention will not hold. The Creed was the work of theologians, who are notoriously hesitating and uncertain about Invocation: the

practice came from a different region of Church life altogether, and was with difficulty adjusted later to the requirements of theology. Moreover, it has to be admitted that the fourth century saw both the end of persecutions by the State and the beginning of the secularization of the Church. The cessation of open hostility between Christianity and paganism led to a considerable intrusion of pagan practices into the Church, and it is difficult to avoid the belief that a large part of the associations of this practice came from this source. There is no *a priori* reason why we should not accept the theology of the great thinkers of this century, and reject a practice which had grown up in subterranean regions, and became firmly fixed at that time.

We must now pass to the consideration of the influence of the Church upon moral life. There is no doubt that the followers of Christ were intended to practise a very high morality, and that the faith in the risen Life was the principle which made such a morality possible. Ancient theorists had developed their views as to the nature of the true moral ideal: there is but little said on this point in the documents of Christianity, but it is clearly asserted that a power exists which can make the attainment of the ideal possible. Further, it is certain that the action of members of the Society was not allowed to be purely private action. What one man did

affected all the others in the Church: a sin, even a private sin, was regarded as impairing the vitality of the Body, and, so far, as a matter of public concern. Again, there is no doubt that the central act and interest of Christian men was Communion—in the Body and Blood of Christ; and that the most serious thing that could happen to any one would be to be separated from this. At the same time it would be stoutly maintained that no man has an inherent right to Communion; but only is made worthy of it, if he corresponds with the requirements of the Society in which and through which Communion is realized. A man who was living in grievous sin had no right to claim Communion. Sin, according to the ancient view, impaired the action of the Church: it made the response which the Sacrament demanded weaker and more uncertain, and it was necessary in its own interest for the Church to exclude the sinner unless he had taken meaures to purge his contempt and free himself from the burden of his sin. No man had a right to come and claim participation in the Sacrament while he had the stain of unforgiven sin upon him.

It is obvious that the sins which most conspicuously unfit a man for Communion are those which are most heinous; that is, those which imply the most reckless self-will, the most cynical disloyalty to the Faith of Christ, the most unbridled defiance of the principle of love.

But there are also crimes which are not in such unmodified antagonism to ordinary morality as these, but which cause serious disturbance to a society like the Church. These are all the small acts of rebellion which make the smooth working of the Body difficult or impossible. It may be a small matter intrinsically to claim the right of free speech in Church—the liberty of prophesying: it may make the harmonious order of Church-worship impossible. To condemn a man as sinful because he will not accede to the regulations of Church-order may seem an exaggeration: it is called an ecclesiastical censure: but it may come very near the condemnation of a moral or spiritual sin. For the readiness to commit ecclesiastical offences tends to be a moral delinquency: it tends to imply a cruel disregard of the feelings of others, and a confidence in personal infallibility which others do not readily share; and thus the distinction between moral and ecclesiastical censures tends to disappear. The ideal condition of a Church is attained when its members not only abstain from grievous sins, but also enter with enthusiasm into the life of the society and fulfil all the requirements which the unity of the Body requires. The Church expects that in things indifferent men will sacrifice their private notions to the good of the whole.

It is obvious that the demand for this kind of self-abnegation is most pressing on the members

of a local Church. It is within a circle that is almost or quite a circle of acquaintances that restiveness takes on an immoral colour. There is less obvious need that the customs of the Church should be uniform everywhere. The more serious crimes will exclude from Communion in every Church; but the authorities in particular districts will deal with local difficulties and impose penalties and restrictions where it may seem necessary. The literature of Penitentials shows that this was the case. In various places Bishops put out a series of isolated decisions often dealing in a special way with the difficulties of a particular place. It is conceivable, it is even probable, that a man would meet with different treatment according as his delinquency occurred in one province or another. Hence there was in early time, and indeed till about the ninth century, a complete lack of any centralized system of Church-law. Distinguished Bishops would give decisions which others would follow and confirm, but there was no fixed code like that of the Civil Law. The deficiency was met by the gradual evolution and authoritative promulgation of the Canon Law. The claims of the Church of Rome to universal sovereignty were expressed most forcibly in the assertion of Canon Law as the code by which all questions of discipline were to be settled. It was not a carefully elaborated scheme of Law, but a codification of a number of decisions, with the

premiss asserted or implied that the Roman Bishop had the right to require all Churches to submit to it.

It will have been noticed that in dealing with the various questions recently considered we have admitted that there is a large body of external authority in their favour, but denied that this confers a binding claim to obedience. The situation has been similar in a number of cases. We have seen the necessity for authoritative decision of certain questions, raised of necessity by the need for common life; and they have been settled by the local authority. This is true no less of discipline than of external practice; the form which certain actions should take has been thus simply and inevitably determined. But we have seen that as time went on, the decisions of local authorities have become stereotyped and fixed; actions in regard to which a considerable amount of local variety would once have been permitted, have become, at any rate in the light of certain claims, invariable. There arises a fixed rule which claims to govern the whole Church, with an authority from which there is no appeal. Moreover, customs which have become prevalent and have received direct or indirect sanction from the central authority now claim to receive unexceptional obedience, in virtue of their prevalence and sanction. It is obvious that this implies a very serious change

upon the earlier condition of things, and the question is whether the change is justifiable. This question is a form of certain further questions, What is the authority of Canon Law? and, What authority has Catholic custom, so-called, over local and national Churches? How far can a local or national Church vary without formal sanction from practices which are virtually universal?

It would seem clear that the *onus probandi* is with the central authority. Unless the right to change the former condition of things is fully sustained, there can be no binding force in the rules based upon the change. Customs varied with different Churches, and were primarily determined within certain lines by the local authorities. The unity of the Roman Empire, and the prevalence of approximately similar conditions throughout it, made the development of similar fashions probable. But the famous letter of Gregory the Great to Augustine of Canterbury shows that there was no *a priori* reason against variations in correspondence with different local or racial conditions. But it is contended in the West, and the contention is pressed upon the Church of England, that this flexibility has departed from the hands of individual Bishops, or Provinces, and that a national or provincial Church can only vary a 'Catholic custom' by permission from a representative body of the

whole Church. Ultimately this claim conveys the demand of the Pope to supremacy. For if the rights of other Bishops and Churches have passed away in any direction, it is into the hands of the Pope. It is the Papal authority which imposes the Canon Law upon the Churches, and, unless this authority be accepted, there is no further reason for denying the rights of national Churches.

This is not the place to review in detail the historical basis of the Papal claims. The course of their development is well known, as well as the failure to command acceptance of documents like the Isidorian Decretals, by which they have been supported. We can understand also the great value in the early Middle Ages of a strong Papacy. But we do not think that even on the most plausible historic ground, viz. that the Papal definitions merely embodied custom gradually accepted over the whole Western Church, the authority of the Pope can be regarded as binding; nor does the utility of the centralized government at a particular time justify its extension under other conditions. It must be remembered that when we speak of customs gradually prevailing over the whole Church, we refer only to a very limited part of the world. The idea of imperial unity, as we have observed, largely accounts for the unity of practice; but cannot be said to give any practice universal validity, or absolve ecclesiastical authorities from

the duty of adapting their practices sanely to the conditions in which they find themselves. There may be reasons of policy for adhering to certain customs, for instance, to that of receiving Communion fasting; but no uniformity of practice, or authoritative statements embodying such uniformity, can give such a thing as this a force binding on conscience. Still less is it reasonable to claim to enforce such rules in the Church of England, which does not impose them on its own account, or recognize the codes by which they are imposed on others.

Again, the advantage of central administration soon disappears when circumstances change. Custom, as we have already observed, should be flexible and have relation to conditions of various kinds. But it is, necessarily, very hard to get a central authority to move: its line of least resistance will always be to maintain the existing state of things. This policy makes it unnecessary to institute inquiries or to consider on their merits questions upon which there will almost certainly be conflicting evidence. Customs resting on central authority will generally tend to be less flexible than they should. And there is a touch of absurdity about invoking a central authority to decide questions of this sort; it gives them an importance that is out of all proportion to their real value. The full significance of custom is preserved to it, if the general outlines of it only

are fixed, and all details, so far as these require authoritative definition, left to the authorities of the national or local Church. Practical convenience will decide the limits of the operation of these authorities. It may seem desirable, for instance, to be extremely precise in regard to the ritual of the Eucharist: this is the prevalent view in England now, and reluctant rubrics are pressed into its service. But one may be permitted to hope that if the Church of England recovered any real power of internal self-government, its authorities would not be expected to spend time in defining the amount and nature of the food permissible on fast-days, or the number of hours that must elapse after a meal, before the reception of the Eucharist can be regarded as regular. The authority may insist on self-control in all matters connected with the bodily life, but it probably will leave details very largely alone. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is easier to keep a series of precise rules however complicated, than to apply a general principle. And it is the business of the authority of the Church to promote the principles, rather than to encourage the perilous tendency to rely on precise and detailed guidance.

So far we have considered the nature and limits of authority as it is exercised within the limits of the Church. We have seen that the Church is a society charged with a message which it cannot alter, but that having a mission

to all races and all ages it must inevitably endeavour to express its message in terms that will be intelligible under the various conditions that arise in the course of history. On the other hand, it has become clear that a very different state of things obtains in regard to custom. The Church lies under the command of Christ to continue certain ordinances, and to administer through them certain spiritual gifts. In regard to these it will tend to vary only within fixed limits: in other respects, in connexion with the many legitimate but variable modes of action which belong to it, customs should be relative to the character and temperament of different nations and periods. There is thus a certain limited range in which the Church acts with the direct command and authority of God behind it: over another and wider region it acts, and acts authoritatively, but still with a wider range of possible variation, and greater freedom to consider the question of mere expediency. It remains to consider very briefly what is the relation of such authority to the civil government—to the authority of the State.

We have said that the Church is bound to interpret its changeless message in the language of various nations and periods: the attempt to define this duty more precisely will lead up to the more familiar question of the relation of Church and State.

It is notorious, of course, that nations vary in character and temperament like individuals; that is, that, on the average, men of one nation are interested in different things and behave differently to the objects of their interest from the average men of another. The truth of this has been shown on a large scale both in the history of Christian thought and Christian devotion. Every one is familiar with the difference of tones predominating in Greek and Latin theology: the one is metaphysical, and deals freely with the abstruse questions that lie on the borderland between religion and philosophy; the other has a strong practical interest, and concerns itself mainly with the questions which belong to the will. Thus the doctrine of the Incarnation is formulated among the Greeks, while the Pelagian controversy raged mainly in the West. Yet, as soon as the distinction is drawn, one begins to wish to modify it. S. Chrysostom was a Greek theologian, but he is very unlike Cyril of Alexandria: Augustine was a Latin theologian, with an imperfect knowledge of Greek, and yet no one can deny that he was both representative of the Western Church and had a keen interest in metaphysical questions. And this all means that the same beliefs underlie both treatments of theology: both groups of theologians hold the same creed, but in dwelling on it and interpreting it to themselves they use

the forms of thought that come most naturally to them, and catch the points which their own tendency of thought make the most obvious to them. The interest of the Greeks is not metaphysical to the exclusion of everything else; but they see the one faith with a special degree of alertness to its metaphysical side, while the Latins have a different interest.

Something of the same sort may be said of the devotional side of Christianity. We are accustomed to distinguish sharply between the Latin and the Teutonic attitude towards religious ideas. The Latin loves precise distinctions and certainty; the Teuton is satisfied with vaguer conceptions and less definite outlines. But both have produced types of mysticism, and though there is much external difference, the dominant impulse is the same.[1] Both also have produced sentimental types of devotion. On the one side are the impassioned sacramental devotions, and all those hymns which seem to us sensuous; on the other are the sentimental reflexions which we find, for instance, in the meditative songs in Bach's *Passion*, and in many

[1] Even the exaggerations seem to reproduce themselves in both regions: the Romans have the cult of the Virgin, which is pursued in what seems to us a mood of exaggerated sentimentality; and Dr. Hort pointed out that the 'Jesus-worship' of many Protestant devotional writers has much in common with Mary-worship in its causes and results.—*Life and Letters*, vol. ii. p. 50.

Protestant hymns. There is a difference; but the underlying psychological conditions are the same.

These truths have, we think, consequences both positive and negative. They mean that the facts embodied in the Creed strike different temperaments in different ways, but in all cases appeal to reason and emotion and will. The facts are the same; the human powers to which they appeal are similar; but the principle by which the factors of human nature are combined differs in various places. A national Church, a national conception of Christianity, is, therefore, in no sense a vague and residual result of abstraction: it is the same faith expressed in different psychological language. A review of past history makes this clear enough; but the pressure of modern controversies, especially within the area of home politics, lends attractiveness to a different point of view. In the light of modern discussions, and especially in view of the difficulties caused by the divisions in Christendom, an attempt is made to take refuge in a kind of residual Christianity, the 'fundamental' truths upon which all are agreed, and which are supposed to underlie all sectarian differences. There is no more pitiful caricature of Christianity than this. In the present day, within our own borders, with the practical difficulties before us which are created by the question of Education and other like problems, there may seem to be hope in such a

residual religion. But the hope vanishes when we look back and see the position that has been occupied before by this method of solving problems. No one now has much to say for the eighteenth-century ideal of Natural Religion. It has collapsed under the assaults delivered upon it from the side of history and philosophy. But the modern chimera—non-sectarian Christianity, or Undenominationalism—is merely the galvanized corpse of the old Natural Religion. The idea of it is reached intellectually in the same way, by abstraction, and by analysis till a residuum is attained; and it is made persuasive emotionally by pressing the true instinct for toleration of different opinions to the paradoxical point of indifference to religious truth. It will not be in this direction that we shall look for a really national type of Christianity: it can only serve, at best, the temporary requirements of current politics. In other words, there is a region of truth in which the Church of Christ is supreme, and in which no political exigencies are relevant. The authorities of modern states have no more moral right to interfere with the truth which the Church proclaims and the graces which it administers than Caiaphas or Pilate or the earlier Roman Emperors. These all found practical objections to the teaching of the followers of Christ, and would have been more comfortable if they could

have suppressed it; but they had no real right to interfere with it, and are now typical cases of authorities who have interfered infelicitously.

It is probable that difficulty would not arise, so far as action is concerned, so long as the State is neutral or hostile. No Christian would feel bound by the decision of a neutral or hostile State upon a point of doctrine, or upon the efficacy of the Sacraments. The value of a decision depends upon the expert knowledge of those who make it, and the validity of the grounds on which it is made, and not on the bare authority of its authors; and a neutral or hostile State can only give such decisions in theological matters as one would get from an uninstructed person on the problems of a special science. In the region of custom it would be rather different. A State might forbid, and Christians might easily accept the prohibition of, such acts as ringing bells or organizing public processions in the open street. They could not undertake to cease 'assembling themselves together,' or celebrating the Sacraments. But in all these points, if the State were neutral or hostile, action would be comparatively simple. Two codes of rules for the action of the Church would be in existence, and there would be no doubt which to prefer when they clashed.

A more delicate diplomacy and a more watchful self-examination are required when the State professes itself Christian. For in this case each

power is inclined to use the other's sanctions for its own purposes, and to decide the other's problems with regard to its own interests. There have been times when the Church has thought it right to hand over heretics to the secular arm: there have been times when, in reaction against this method, the State has tended to declare on its own account that there is no such thing as heresy, and that every one born in a certain geographical area has unconditional rights to Communion. Both these lines of action are mistaken; both are *ultra vires*. And they lead to moral and spiritual mischief besides. The sense of truth becomes blunted: the great realities of the spiritual world lose their certainty and firmness of outline and tend to vanish away. There is a sound instinct in the human mind, that an opinion which can only be propagated by force is not worth much; and that if a number of conflicting views are all equally true, none of them can matter much, or convey much knowledge.

But even apart from the question of a false interchange of powers and its effects, it cannot be denied that there are many causes of friction between the Church and the State, after the State has accepted in general the Christian profession. It is not satisfactory that it should be so, but it is very readily explicable. It depends mainly on the difference in the primary purposes of State and Church, and the difference in the relation of

the two to humanity at large. The State aims at making the best life possible for all its members in regard to earthly things: its relations with any individual close abruptly on his death. It is true that it is concerned with the regulation of marriage, and that it deals also with the property a man leaves behind when he dies, having, rather oddly, given him power to exert control over what belonged to him in life, throughout the whole of time. But apart from these exceptions, the State's interest in man affects his relation to this life. It promotes or forbids what tends to or impedes his material advancement, and endeavours to secure that all its citizens are equipped with powers that are most advantageous in the struggle for existence. The periods when it has definitely concerned itself with the world to come have usually been marked by the use of civil sanctions to enforce particular religious opinions. And it can hardly be denied that the present tendency is increasingly in the direction of restricting the operations of the State, and the motives on which it acts, to the secular region. Nor can we suppose that this tendency will come to an end. As States become more democratic, and the value of the popular vote increases, it is probable that it may be increasingly difficult for the State to maintain a permanent and unpalatable ideal of life. The average convictions and practices will probably tend to prevail.

Now the Church, when it is true to itself, is concerned primarily with the eternal interests of man, and estimates all things from this point of view. Its judgments will tend to cut across conventions of every kind: class distinctions, average views of morality, and even popular votes. And this will be the case, not because it is at heart anti-democratic, but because its views of all men, high and low, many or few, are governed by certain permanent convictions which it cannot change. Even in its secularized days, this tendency of Church-thought has emerged; and one reason why there is always a somewhat suspicious relation between the civil and ecclesiastical powers, is that the Church cannot be counted upon as an absolutely certain supporter of any one government or type of government. Churches have gone a long way and agreed to much that contradicts their principles at times, but the union with the State is never a safe one, and the State if it tries to force purely secular ideals can never feel sure that scruples will not at last arise.

Further, there is a difference between the Church and the State in regard to their relation to humanity at large. The State is always national and self-contained. It looks upon other States as certain rivals and possible foes, and it is therefore always preparing for contingencies of a hostile sort. The Church is from the first independent of nationality, and has a mission to the

whole world irrespective of all political associations. From this position it cannot depart without failing to fulfil its primary function. But it is obvious that its extra-national interests may lay it open, at times, to the charge of bad citizenship. At the same time, while it is thus wider than any given State, it is also narrower. Without surrendering its distinctive basis in doctrine and life, it cannot submit to modification in the direction of mere nationalism; and here again there is the opportunity for a conflict of authority. In this and in all such cases there are many stages short of overt conflict. When that last stage is reached there is no course for Churchmen but to maintain their creed and their moral ideal, regardless of all incitements to the contrary; but in such cases it may be that they will have to forgo the protection of the State for any property or other rights they may hold. The State may make civil disabilities the price for loyalty to the Church, but it cannot claim to control the formulæ of the Church.

It is not necessary, however, that such extreme situations should arise, especially in a nation with imperialist instincts. The influence of the Church in developing the English nation has often been pointed out: it is hardly too much to say that it has had the largest share in bringing national units out of confused hordes of quarrelsome tribes. We can hardly suppose that suspicious and often

hostile nationalities represent the final stage of human evolution; we may well hope that the Church will have a powerful influence in leading on to the new order that is to come. But it will certainly fail in this if its attention becomes concentrated on its internal differences, and if these are treated with parochial narrowness. To a considerable extent we must regretfully admit that this is the case. We have never fully emerged from the circumscribed arena in which the battles of the Reformation were fought; and much modern controversy seems to assume that history has stood still since the days of the assertion of liberty against the claims of Rome. The No-Popery cry is in many quarters scarcely more enlightened than it was in the days of the Puritans: controversies over vestments and outward indifferent things are now, as they were then, confused with serious discussions over fundamental truths. And so the whole position of the Church is complicated. If we have been right in our discussion here, the way out will not be found in the surrender of distinctive truth under the name of Undenominationalism, but in a more scientific spirit in our study of history, a fuller understanding of the completeness and coherence of the Creed, a return to Scripture as it is, and not as sixteenth-century controversy has represented it, and, above all, a more burning missionary zeal.

It has been impossible, in the space at our dis-

posal, to consider all the questions which naturally arise in connexion with so complex a subject as authority. We venture to hope, however, that enough has been said to indicate generally the principles which should govern the decision of practical issues. It remains to sum up shortly our view of the character and method of working of the authority of the Church. There would seem to be three regions in which the Church may legitimately claim to exercise authority: doctrine, life, and custom. Unless we have completely misread the Scriptural evidence, we should draw from the examples given in Scripture certain fairly clear rules for the exercise of authority. It is clear that there is a body of doctrine to which the Church ought to require assent, as a condition of full membership: a Church which fails in this respect diverges very widely from the New Testament ideal. Secondly, it is clear that the Church in the New Testament is an organized body, capable of corporate action by means of representatives, duly elected and accredited. This principle would apply with special force to the Sacraments which are the most fully characteristic acts of the Church. Thirdly, it is clear that sin, open or concealed, will certainly exclude from the privileges of Church membership, especially from Communion, and that in some cases rebellious breach of order will have some of the character of sin. Fourthly, there

will be a large area over which there will indeed be rules, but rules which the local authorities will determine in view of local conditions and convenience. The special character of these principles depends upon the special character of the Church as a spiritual body existing in the world under a definite commission for certain spiritual ends. The fact of the existence of these principles is but a special case of the need which all societies feel, that claim to act corporately. The authority of the Church is not in any degree more irksome and intrusive than the authority of the State; nor is it less necessary to the well-being of the society.

It is notorious, of course, that most of the main positions of the Church are vigorously contested at the present time, and that problems connected with its authority are necessarily implied in the controversy. Let us see in what way the authority of the Church is exercised. At the present moment, it would not be hard to purchase the appearance of peace in all the controversial fields. If we surrendered the belief in a real Resurrection, we should win the approval of a number of the critics of the New Testament story. If we withdrew from the position which the Church adopted at the Reformation in regard to Holy Orders, we should again please some of our critics, and perhaps produce the semblance of reunion on a large scale. And it is probable that

if the questions were discussed quite apart from the idea of a Body which has a definite message and constitution, it would be the natural thing to follow lines of thought so powerfully recommended. As things are, the authority of the Church exercises a retarding influence upon many even of those who do not formally acknowledge it: they shrink from the breach with Scripture and the intervening history of the Church which such changes would imply. This influence is, of course, indirect. It does not take the form of definite pronouncements, but it is sufficiently real to be felt by all parties in the conflict. On some minds it will certainly have a deadening effect: they will object, from the first, to the discussion of questions which have been closed in earlier days. Such cases will always be the main support of those who would get rid of authority altogether. It is, however, a hasty and thoughtless solution of the difficulty to treat all questions as unreservedly open. The reluctance to change which is the outward sign of the influence of authority is not all blind and irrational. It preserves the rights of the whole society against any given knot of thinkers, and it preserves the universality of the truth against exaggerations of particular aspects of it; and both these are necessary functions, for a Body which is continuous through many ages, and claims to hand

on to each the same truth. Perhaps an instance will make our point clearer. It is loudly affirmed that the doctrine of the Resurrection has become so difficult to minds trained in modern notions that it should no longer be required to be believed as a condition of Communion. Then we find the late Mr. Myers writing as follows in his book on "Human Personality," vol. ii. p. 288, "I predict that, in consequence of the new evidence, all reasonable men, a century hence, will believe the Resurrection of Christ, whereas, in default of the new evidence, no reasonable men, a century hence, would have believed it." It is too soon to say whether Mr. Myers' new evidence will bear all that he rests upon it; but if we in the last few years had followed advice loudly given, and then had been proved wrong, it is difficult to find words to express the futility of our position or the wrong done to the whole society of Christians. A similar instance has been provided by the Tübingen school of criticism. In the year 1850 or thereabouts, the books of the New Testament were widely discredited in critical circles. If more recent methods had prevailed at that date, the Bishops would have been pressed to exercise a wise discretion in the relaxation of formularies for the benefit of Candidates for Holy Orders and others. Yet the history of the past fifty years —largely in consequence of the work of three

Cambridge scholars—has shown that such relaxation would have been both premature and foolish. The Tübingen theories have broken down one after another: and if the authorities of the Church had adopted them, they would have forfeited their right to be heard on any question of theology; because they would have failed to distinguish between the solid nucleus which is the witness of the Church, and the floating clouds of speculation that surround it. The reluctance to change of which we have spoken with all its disadvantages preserves us from such blunders as this, and it is in this way that we shall most often feel the influence of authority. It will not often promulgate new formulæ or intervene abruptly with the clear-cut definitions which many people desire from it: it will always shrink from imposing unnecessary burdens. But so long as the Church continues to be a spiritual society, proclaiming truth, and administering spiritual gifts, it will be tenacious of its doctrine, and careful to certify the validity of its sacramental acts. To dispense and secure the grace and truth which came by Jesus Christ will be the function of Church authority.

Printed by Ballantyne, Hanson & Co.
Edinburgh & London

Handbooks for the Clergy

EDITED BY

THE REV. ARTHUR W. ROBINSON, B.D.

VICAR OF ALLHALLOWS BARKING BY THE TOWER

Price 2s. 6d. each net.

The purpose of the writers of the Volumes in this Series will be to present in a clear and attractive way the responsibilities and opportunities of the Clergy of to-day, and to offer such practical guidance, in regard both to aims and to methods, as experience may have shown to be valuable. It is hoped that the Series, while primarily intended for those who are already face to face with the duties and problems of the ministerial office, may be of interest and assistance also to others who are considering the question of entering into Holy Orders; and, indeed, to all who have the welfare of the Church at heart.

THE PERSONAL LIFE OF THE CLERGY. By the EDITOR. *Third Impression.*

PATRISTIC STUDY. By the Rev. H. B. SWETE, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. *Second Edition.*

THE MINISTRY OF CONVERSION. By the Rev. A. J. MASON, D.D., Master of Pembroke College, Cambridge. *Second Impression.*

FOREIGN MISSIONS. By the Right Rev. H. H. MONTGOMERY, D.D., formerly Bishop of Tasmania, Secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts. *Third Impression.*

THE STUDY OF THE GOSPELS. By the Very Rev. J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, D.D., Dean of Westminster. *Third Impression.*

A CHRISTIAN APOLOGETIC. By the Very Rev. WILFORD L. ROBBINS, Dean of Albany, U.S., Author of "An Essay toward Faith."

PASTORAL VISITATION. By the Rev. H. E. SAVAGE, M.A., Vicar of South Shields, and Hon. Canon of Durham.

AUTHORITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF OBEDIENCE. By the Very Rev. T. B. STRONG, D.D., Dean of Christ Church.

THE STUDY OF CHURCH HISTORY. By the Rev. W. E. COLLINS, M.A., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in King's College, London, and Chairman of the Church Historical Society. *[In Preparation.*

SCIENCE AND RELIGION. By the Rev. P. N. WAGGETT, M.A., of the Society of St. John the Evangelist, Cowley. *[In Preparation.*

CHURCH MUSIC. By A. MADELEY RICHARDSON, Mus. Doc., Organist of St. Saviour's Collegiate Church, Southwark. *[In Preparation.*

LAY WORK. By the Right Rev. HUYSHE YEATMAN-BIGGS, D.D., Lord Bishop of Southwark. *[In Preparation.*

INTEMPERANCE. By the Rev. H. H. PEREIRA, M.A., Vicar of Croydon, and Hon. Canon of Canterbury. *[In Preparation.*

SCHOOLS. By the Rev. W. FOXLEY NORRIS, M.A., Rector of Barnsley, and Hon. Canon of Wakefield. *[In Preparation.*

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

LONDON, NEW YORK, AND BOMBAY

The Oxford Library of Practical Theology

Edited by the Rev. W. C. E. NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of St. Paul's; and the Rev. DARWELL STONE, M.A., Principal of the Missionary College, Dorchester.

Price 5s. per Volume.

RELIGION. By the Rev. W. C. E. NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of St. Paul's. *Fifth Impression.*

HOLY BAPTISM. By the Rev. DARWELL STONE, M.A., Principal of the Missionary College, Dorchester. *Third Edition.*

CONFIRMATION. By the Right Rev. A. C. A. HALL, D.D., Bishop of Vermont. *Third Impression.*

THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER. By the Rev. LEIGHTON PULLAN, M.A., Fellow of St. John Baptist's College, Oxford. *Third Edition.*

HOLY MATRIMONY. By the Rev. W. J. KNOX LITTLE, M.A., Canon of Worcester. *Second Edition.*

THE INCARNATION. By the Rev. H. V. S. ECK, M.A., Rector of Bethnal Green. *Second Edition.*

FOREIGN MISSIONS. By the Right Rev. E. T. CHURTON, D.D., formerly Bishop of Nassau.

PRAYER. By the Rev. ARTHUR JOHN WORLLEDGE, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of Truro. *Second Edition.*

SUNDAY. By the Rev. W. B. TREVELYAN, M.A., Vicar of St. Matthew's, Westminster. *Second Edition.*

THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION. By the Rev. LEIGHTON PULLAN, M.A., Fellow of St. John Baptist's College, Oxford.

BOOKS OF DEVOTION. By the Rev. CHARLES BODINGTON, Canon and Treasurer of Lichfield.

HOLY ORDERS. By the Rev. A. R. WHITHAM, M.A., Principal of Culham College, Abingdon.

THE CHURCH CATECHISM THE CHRISTIAN'S MANUAL. By the Rev. W. C. E. NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of St. Paul's. [*In the Press.*

IN PREPARATION.

THE BIBLE. By the Rev. DARWELL STONE, M.A., Principal of the Missionary College, Dorchester.

RELIGIOUS CEREMONIAL. By the Rev. WALTER HOWARD FRERE, M.A., of the Community of the Resurrection, Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Rochester.

VISITATION OF THE SICK. By the Rev. E. F. RUSSELL, M.A., of St. Alban's, Holborn.

CHURCH WORK. By the Rev. BERNARD REYNOLDS, M.A., Prebendary of St. Paul's.

THE HOLY COMMUNION. By the Rev. D. STONE, M.A., Principal of the Missionary College, Dorchester.

OLD TESTAMENT CRITICISM. By the Very Rev. HENRY WACE, D.D., Dean of Canterbury.

NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM. By the Rev. R. J. KNOWLING, D.D., Professor of New Testament Exegesis at King's College, London.

CHURCH HISTORY. By the Rev. H. N. BATE, M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford. 2 vols.

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

LONDON, NEW YORK, AND BOMBAY

A Selection of Works

IN

THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

PUBLISHED BY

MESSRS. LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO.

London: 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C.

New York: 91 and 93 FIFTH AVENUE.

Bombay: 32 HORNBY ROAD.

Abbey and Overton.—THE ENGLISH CHURCH IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. By CHARLES J. ABBEY, M.A., Rector of Checkendon, Reading, and JOHN H. OVERTON, D.D., Canon of Lincoln. *Crown 8vo.* *7s. 6d.*

Adams.—SACRED ALLEGORIES. The Shadow of the Cross—The Distant Hills—The Old Man's Home—The King's Messengers. By the Rev. WILLIAM ADAMS, M.A. 16*mo.* 3*s. net.*

The four Allegories may be had separately, with Illustrations. 16*mo.* 1*s. each.*

Aids to the Inner Life.

Edited by the Venble. W. H. HUTCHINGS, M.A., Archdeacon of Cleveland, Canon of York, Rector of Kirby Misperton, and Rural Dean of Malton. *Five Vols.* 32*mo, cloth limp,* 6*d. each; or cloth extra,* 1*s. each.*

OF THE IMITATION OF CHRIST. By THOMAS À KEMPIS.
THE CHRISTIAN YEAR.
THE DEVOUT LIFE. By ST. FRANCIS DE SALES.
THE HIDDEN LIFE OF THE SOUL. By JEAN NICOLAS GROU.
THE SPIRITUAL COMBAT. By LAURENCE SCUPOLI.

Arbuthnot.—SHAKESPEARE SERMONS. Preached in the Collegiate Church of Stratford-on-Avon on the Sundays following the Poet's Birthday, 1894-1900. Collected by the Rev. GEORGE ARBUTHNOT, M.A., Vicar of Stratford-on-Avon. *Crown 8vo.* 2*s. 6d. net.*

Baily-Browne.—A HELP TO THE SPIRITUAL INTERPRETATION OF THE PENITENTIAL PSALMS, consisting of Brief Notes from The Fathers, gathered from Neale and Littledale's Commentary. By A. B. BAILY-BROWN, Editor of 'The Songs of Degrees; or, Gradual Psalms.' With Preface by the Rev. GEORGE BODY, D.D., Canon of Durham. *Crown 8vo.* 1*s. net.*

Bathe.—Works by the Rev. ANTHONY BATHE, M.A.

A LENT WITH JESUS. A Plain Guide for Churchmen. Containing Readings for Lent and Easter Week, and on the Holy Eucharist. 32*mo*, 1*s*.; *or in paper cover*, 6*d*.

AN ADVENT WITH JESUS. 32*mo*, 1*s*., *or in paper cover*, 6*d*.

WHAT I SHOULD BELIEVE. A Simple Manual of Self-Instruction for Church People. *Small* 8*vo*, *limp*, 1*s*. ; *cloth gilt*, 2*s*.

Bathe and Buckham.—THE CHRISTIAN'S ROAD BOOK. 2 Parts. By the Rev. ANTHONY BATHE and Rev. F. H. BUCKHAM.
Part I. DEVOTIONS. *Sewed*, 6*d*. ; *limp cloth*, 1*s*. ; *cloth extra*, 1*s*. 6*d*.
Part II. READINGS. *Sewed*, 1*s*. ; *limp cloth*, 2*s*. ; *cloth extra*, 3*s*. ; *or complete in one volume*, *sewed*, 1*s*. 6*d*. *limp cloth*, 2*s*. 6*d*. ; *cloth extra*, 3*s*. 6*d*.

Benson.—Works by the Rev. R. M. BENSON, M.A., Student of Christ Church, Oxford.

THE FOLLOWERS OF THE LAMB : a Series of Meditations, especially intended for Persons living under Religious Vows, and for Seasons of Retreat, etc. *Crown* 8*vo*. 4*s*. 6*d*.

THE FINAL PASSOVER : A Series of Meditations upon the Passion of our Lord Jesus Christ. *Small* 8*vo*.

Vol. I.—THE REJECTION. 5*s*.
Vol. II.—THE UPPER CHAMBER.
Part I. 5*s*.
Part II. 5*s*.
Vol. III.—THE DIVINE EXODUS.
Parts I. and II. 5*s*. each.
Vol. IV.—THE LIFE BEYOND THE GRAVE. 5*s*.

THE MAGNIFICAT; a Series of Meditations upon the Song of the Blessed Virgin Mary. *Small* 8*vo*. 2*s*.

SPIRITUAL READINGS FOR EVERY DAY. 3 *vols*. *Small* 8*vo*. 3*s*. 6*d*. *each*.
I. ADVENT. II. CHRISTMAS. III. EPIPHANY.

BENEDICTUS DOMINUS : A Course of Meditations for Every Day of the Year. Vol. I.—ADVENT TO TRINITY. Vol. II.—TRINITY, SAINTS' DAYS, etc. *Small* 8*vo*. 3*s*. 6*d*. *each* ; *or in One Volume*, 7*s*.

BIBLE TEACHINGS : The Discourse at Capernaum.—St. John vi. *Small* 8*vo*. 1*s*. ; *or with Notes*. 3*s*. 6*d*.

THE WISDOM OF THE SON OF DAVID : An Exposition of the First Nine Chapters of the Book of Proverbs. *Small* 8*vo*. 3*s*. 6*d*.

THE MANUAL OF INTERCESSORY PRAYER. *Royal* 32*mo* ; *cloth boards*, 1*s*. 3*d*. ; *cloth limp*, 9*d*.

THE EVANGELIST LIBRARY CATECHISM. Part I. *Small* 8*vo*. 3*s*.

PAROCHIAL MISSIONS. *Small* 8*vo*. 2*s*. 6*d*.

Bigg.—UNITY IN DIVERSITY: Five Addresses delivered in the Cathedral Church of Christ, Oxford, during Lent 1899, with Introduction. By the Rev. CHARLES BIGG, D.D., Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oxford. *Crown 8vo.* 2*s*. 6*d*.

Bickersteth.—YESTERDAY, TO-DAY, AND FOR EVER: a Poem in Twelve Books. By EDWARD HENRY BICKERSTETH, D.D., late Lord Bishop of Exeter. 18*mo*. 1*s*. *net*. *With red borders*, 16*mo*, 2*s*. *net*.

The Crown 8vo Edition (5*s*.) *may still be had.*

Blunt.—Works by the Rev. JOHN HENRY BLUNT, D.D.

THE ANNOTATED BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER: Being an Historical, Ritual, and Theological Commentary on the Devotional System of the Church of England. 4*to*. 21*s*.

THE COMPENDIOUS EDITION OF THE ANNOTATED BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER: Forming a concise Commentary on the Devotional System of the Church of England. *Crown 8vo*. 10*s*. 6*d*.

DICTIONARY OF DOCTRINAL AND HISTORICAL THEOLOGY. By various Writers. *Imperial 8vo*. 21*s*.

DICTIONARY OF SECTS, HERESIES, ECCLESIASTICAL PARTIES AND SCHOOLS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT. By various Writers. *Imperial 8vo*. 21*s*.

THE REFORMATION OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND: its History, Principles, and Results. 1574-1662. *Two Vols*. 8*vo*. 34*s*.

THE BOOK OF CHURCH LAW. Being an Exposition of the Legal Rights and Duties of the Parochial Clergy and the Laity of the Church of England. Revised by the Right Hon. Sir WALTER G. F. PHILLIMORE, Bart., D.C.L., and G. EDWARDES JONES, Barrister-at-Law. *Crown 8vo*. 8*s*. *net*.

A COMPANION TO THE BIBLE: Being a Plain Commentary on Scripture History, to the end of the Apostolic Age. *Two Vols. small 8vo*. *Sold separately*. OLD TESTAMEMT. 3*s*. 6*d*. NEW TESTAMENT. 3*s*. 6*d*.

HOUSEHOLD THEOLOGY: a Handbook of Religious Information respecting the Holy Bible, the Prayer Book, the Church, etc., etc. *Paper cover*, 16*mo*. 1*s*. *Also the Larger Edition*, 3*s*. 6*d*.

Body.—Works by the Rev. GEORGE BODY, D.D., Canon of Durham.

THE LIFE OF LOVE. A Course of Lent Lectures. 16*mo*. 2*s*. *net*.

THE SCHOOL OF CALVARY; or, Laws of Christian Life revealed from the Cross. 16*mo*. 2*s*. *net*.

THE LIFE OF JUSTIFICATION. 16*mo*. 2*s*. *net*.

THE LIFE OF TEMPTATION. 16*mo*. 2*s*. *net*.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE FAITHFUL DEPARTED. *Small 8vo*. *sewed*, 6*d*. 32*mo*. *cloth*, 1*s*.

Book of Private Prayer, The. For use Twice Daily ; together with the Order for the Administration of the Lord's Supper or Holy Communion. 18*mo.* *Limp cloth*, 2*s.*; *Cloth boards*, 2*s.* 6*d.*

Book of Prayer and Daily Texts for English Churchmen. 32*mo.* 1*s.* *net.*

Boultbee.—A COMMENTARY ON THE THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. By the Rev. T. P. BOULTBEE. *Crown* 8*vo.* 6*s.*

Brent.—WITH GOD IN THE WORLD. By the Very Rev. CHARLES H. BRENT, Bishop of the Philippine Islands. *Fcp.* 8*vo.* 3*s.*

Bright.—Works by WILLIAM BRIGHT, D.D., late Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oxford.

THE AGE OF THE FATHERS. *Two Vols.* 8*vo.* [*In the Press.*

MORALITY IN DOCTRINE. *Crown* 8*vo.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

SOME ASPECTS OF PRIMITIVE CHURCH LIFE. *Crown* 8*vo.* 6*s.*

THE ROMAN SEE IN THE EARLY CHURCH : And other Studies in Church History. *Crown* 8*vo.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

WAYMARKS IN CHURCH HISTORY. *Crown* 8*vo.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

LESSONS FROM THE LIVES OF THREE GREAT FATHERS. St. Athanasius, St. Chrysostom, and St. Augustine. *Crown* 8*vo.* 6*s.*

THE INCARNATION AS A MOTIVE POWER. *Crown* 8*vo.* 6*s.*

Bright and Medd.—LIBER PRECUM PUBLICARUM ECCLESIÆ ANGLICANÆ. A GULIELMO BRIGHT, S.T.P., et PETRO GOLDSMITH MEDD, A.M., Latine redditus. *Small* 8*vo.* 5*s.* *net.*

Browne.—AN EXPOSITION OF THE THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES, Historical and Doctrinal. By E. H. BROWNE, D.D., sometime Bishop of Winchester. 8*vo.* 16*s.*

Campion and Beamont.—THE PRAYER BOOK INTERLEAVED. With Historical Illustrations and Explanatory Notes arranged parallel to the Text. By W. M. CAMPION, D.D., and W. J. BEAMONT, M.A. *Small* 8*vo.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

Carpenter and Harford-Battersby.—THE HEXATEUCH ACCORDING TO THE REVISED VERSION ARRANGED IN ITS CONSTITUENT DOCUMENTS BY MEMBERS OF THE SOCIETY OF HISTORICAL THEOLOGY, OXFORD. Edited with Introduction, Notes, Marginal References, and Synoptical Tables. By J. ESTLIN CARPENTER, M.A. (Lond.) and G. HARFORD-BATTERSBY, M.A. (Oxon). *Two vols.* 4*to.* (*Vol. I. Introduction and Appendices : Vol. II. Text and Notes*). 36*s.* *net.*

Carter.—Works by, and edited by the Rev. T. T. CARTER, M.A., late Hon. Canon of Christ Church, Oxford.

UNDERCURRENTS OF CHURCH LIFE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. *Crown 8vo.* 5*s.*

NICHOLAS FERRAR: his Household and his Friends. With Portrait. *Crown 8vo.* 6*s.*

THE SPIRIT OF WATCHFULNESS AND OTHER SERMONS. *Crown 8vo.* 5*s.*

THE TREASURY OF DEVOTION: a Manual of Prayer for General and Daily Use. Compiled by a Priest.
18*mo.* 2*s.* 6*d.*; *cloth limp*, 2*s.* Bound with the Book of Common Prayer, 3*s.* 6*d.* Red-Line Edition. *Cloth extra, gilt top.* 18*mo.* 2*s.* 6*d.* *net.* Large-Type Edition. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

THE WAY OF LIFE: A Book of Prayers and Instruction for the Young at School, with a Preparation for Confirmation. 18*mo.* 1*s.* 6*d.*

THE PATH OF HOLINESS: a First Book of Prayers, with the Service of the Holy Communion, for the Young. Compiled by a Priest. With Illustrations. 16*mo.* 1*s.* 6*d.*; *cloth limp*, 1*s.*

THE GUIDE TO HEAVEN: a Book of Prayers for every Want. (For the Working Classes.) Compiled by a Priest. 18*mo.* 1*s.* 6*d.*; *cloth limp*, 1*s.* *Large-Type Edition.* *Crown 8vo.* 1*s.* 6*d.*; *cloth limp*, 1*s.*

THE STAR OF CHILDHOOD: a First Book of Prayers and Instruction for Children. Compiled by a Priest. With Illustrations. 16*mo.* 2*s.* 6*d.*

SIMPLE LESSONS; or, Words Easy to be Understood. A Manual of Teaching. I. On the Creed. II. The Ten Commandments. III. The Sacrament. 18*mo.* 3*s.*

MANUAL OF DEVOTION FOR SISTERS OF MERCY. 8 parts in 2 vols. 32mo. 10*s.* Or separately:—Part I. 1*s.* 6*d.* Part II. 1*s.* Part III. 1*s.* Part IV. 2*s.* Part V. 1*s.* Part VI. 1*s.* Part VII. Part VIII. 1*s.* 6*d.*

SPIRITUAL INSTRUCTIONS. *Crown 8vo.*

THE HOLY EUCHARIST. 3*s.* 6*d.*
THE DIVINE DISPENSATIONS. 3*s.* 6*d.*
THE LIFE OF GRACE. 3*s.* 6*d.*
OUR LORD'S EARLY LIFE. 3*s.* 6*d.*
OUR LORD'S ENTRANCE ON HIS MINISTRY. 3*s.* 6*d.*
THE RELIGIOUS LIFE. 3*s.* 6*d.*

A BOOK OF PRIVATE PRAYER FOR MORNING, MID-DAY, AND OTHER TIMES. 18*mo*, *limp cloth*, 1*s.*; *cloth, red edges*, 1*s.* 3*d.*

THE DOCTRINE OF THE PRIESTHOOD IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. *Crown 8vo.* 4*s.*

THE DOCTRINE OF CONFESSION IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. *Crown 8vo.* 5*s.*

Coles.—Works by the Rev. V. S. S. COLES, M.A., Principal of the Pusey House, Oxford.

LENTEN MEDITATIONS. 18*mo.* 2*s.* 6*d.*

ADVENT MEDITATIONS ON ISAIAH I.-XII. : together with Outlines of Christmas Meditations on St. John i. 1-12. 18*mo.* 2*s.*

Company, The, of Heaven : Daily Links with the Household of God. Being Selections in Prose and Verse from various Authors. With Autotype Frontispiece. *Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s.* 6*d. net.*

Conybeare and Howson.—THE LIFE AND EPISTLES OF ST. PAUL. By the Rev. W. J. CONYBEARE, M.A., and the Very Rev. J. S. HOWSON, D.D. With numerous Maps and Illustrations.

LIBRARY EDITION. *Two Vols.* 8*vo.* 21*s.* STUDENTS' EDITION. *One Vol. Crown* 8*vo.* 6*s.* POPULAR EDITION. *One Vol. Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

Creighton.—Works by the Right Hon. and Right Rev. MANDELL CREIGHTON, D.D., late Lord Bishop of London.

A HISTORY OF THE PAPACY FROM THE GREAT SCHISM TO THE SACK OF ROME (1378-1527). *Six Volumes. Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s. each net.*

THE CHURCH AND THE NATION : Charges and Addresses. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s. net.*

THOUGHTS ON EDUCATION : Speeches and Sermons. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s. net.*

Day-Hours of the Church of England, The. Newly Revised according to the Prayer Book and the Authorised Translation of the Bible. *Crown* 8*vo, sewed,* 3*s.* ; *cloth,* 3*s.* 6*d.*

SUPPLEMENT TO THE DAY-HOURS OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, being the Service for certain Holy Days. *Crown* 8*vo, sewed,* 3*s.* ; *cloth,* 3*s.* 6*d.*

Edersheim.—Works by ALFRED EDERSHEIM, M.A., D.D., Ph.D.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JESUS THE MESSIAH. *Two Vols.* 8*vo.* 12*s. net.*

JESUS THE MESSIAH : being an Abridged Edition of 'The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah.' *Crown* 8*vo.* 6*s. net.*

Ellicott.—Works by C. J. ELLICOTT, D.D., Bishop of Gloucester.

A CRITICAL AND GRAMMATICAL COMMENTARY ON ST. PAUL'S EPISTLES. Greek Text, with a Critical and Grammatical Commentary, and a Revised English Translation. 8*vo.*

GALATIANS. 8*s.* 6*d.*
EPHESIANS. 8*s.* 6*d.*
PASTORAL EPISTLES. 10*s.* 6*d.*
PHILIPPIANS, COLOSSIANS, AND PHILEMON. 10*s.* 6*d.*
THESSALONIANS. 7*s.* 6*d.*

HISTORICAL LECTURES ON THE LIFE OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST. 8*vo.* 12*s.*

English (The) Catholic's Vade Mecum: a Short Manual of General Devotion. Compiled by a PRIEST. 32*mo. limp,* 1*s.* ; *cloth,* 2*s.*

PRIEST'S Edition. 32*mo.* 1*s.* 6*d.*

Epochs of Church History.—Edited by Right Hon. and Right Rev. MANDELL CREIGHTON, D.D., late Lord Bishop of London. *Small 8vo. 2s. 6d. each.*

THE ENGLISH CHURCH IN OTHER LANDS. By the Rev. H. W. TUCKER, M.A.

THE HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION IN ENGLAND. By the Rev. GEO. G. PERRY, M.A.

THE CHURCH OF THE EARLY FATHERS. By the Rev. ALFRED PLUMMER, D.D.

THE EVANGELICAL REVIVAL IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. By the Rev. J. H. OVERTON, D.D.

THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. By the Hon. G. C. BRODRICK, D.C.L.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE. By J. BASS MULLINGER, M.A.

THE ENGLISH CHURCH IN THE MIDDLE AGES. By the Rev. W. HUNT, M.A.

THE CHURCH AND THE EASTERN EMPIRE. By the Rev. H. F. TOZER, M.A.

THE CHURCH AND THE ROMAN EMPIRE. By the Rev. A. CARR, M.A.

THE CHURCH AND THE PURITANS, 1570-1660. By HENRY OFFLEY WAKEMAN, M.A.

HILDEBRAND AND HIS TIMES. By the Very Rev. W. R. W. STEPHENS, B.D.

THE POPES AND THE HOHENSTAUFEN. By UGO BALZANI.

THE COUNTER REFORMATION. By ADOLPHUS WILLIAM WARD, Litt. D.

WYCLIFFE AND MOVEMENTS FOR REFORM. By REGINALD L. POOLE, M.A.

THE ARIAN CONTROVERSY. By the Rev. Professor H. M. GWATKIN, M.A.

Eucharistic Manual (The). Consisting of Instructions and Devotions for the Holy Sacrament of the Altar. From various sources. *32mo. cloth gilt, red edges.* 1s. *Cheap Edition, limp cloth.* 9d.

Farrar.—Works by FREDERIC W. FARRAR, D.D., Dean of Canterbury.

TEXTS EXPLAINED; or, Helps to Understand the New Testament. *Crown 8vo.* 5s. *net.*

THE BIBLE: Its Meaning and Supremacy. *8vo.* 6s. *net.*

ALLEGORIES. With 25 Illustrations by AMELIA BAUERLE. *Crown 8vo. gilt edges.* 2s. 6d. *net.*

Fosbery.—VOICES OF COMFORT. Edited by the Rev. THOMAS VINCENT FOSBERY, M.A., sometime Vicar of St. Giles's, Reading. *Cheap Edition. Small 8vo.* 3s. *net.*

The Larger Edition (7s. 6d.) may still be had.

Fuller.—IN TERRÂ PAX; or, The Primary Sayings of Our Lord during the Great Forty Days in their Relation to the Church. Sermons preached at St. Mark's, Marylebone Road. By MORRIS FULLER, B.D. *Crown 8vo.* 6s. *net.*

Gardner.—A CATECHISM OF CHURCH HISTORY, from the Day of Pentecost until the Present Day. By the Rev. C. E. GARDNER, of the Society of St. John the Evangelist, Cowley. *Crown 8vo, sewed,* 1s.; *cloth,* 1s. 6d.

Geikie.—Works by J. CUNNINGHAM GEIKIE, D.D., LL.D., late Vicar of St. Martin-at-Palace, Norwich.

THE VICAR AND HIS FRIENDS. *Crown 8vo.* 5*s. net.*

HOURS WITH THE BIBLE: the Scriptures in the Light of Modern Discovery and Knowledge. *Complete in Twelve Volumes. Crown 8vo.*

OLD TESTAMENT.

CREATION TO THE PATRIARCHS. *With a Map and Illustrations.* 5*s.*

MOSES TO JUDGES. *With a Map and Illustrations.* 5*s.*

SAMSON TO SOLOMON. *With a Map and Illustrations.* 5*s*

REHOBOAM TO HEZEKIAH. *With Illustrations.* 5*s.*

MANASSEH TO ZEDEKIAH. With the Contemporary Prophets. *With a Map and Illustrations.* 5*s.*

EXILE TO MALACHI. With the Contemporary Prophets. *With Illustrations.* 5*s.*

NEW TESTAMENT.

THE GOSPELS. *With a Map and Illustrations.* 5*s.*

LIFE AND WORDS OF CHRIST. *With Map.* 2 *vols.* 10*s.*

LIFE AND EPISTLES OF ST. PAUL. *With Maps and Illustrations.* 2 *vols.* 10*s.*

ST. PETER TO REVELATION. *With* 29 *Illustrations.* 5*s.*

LIFE AND WORDS OF CHRIST.
Cabinet Edition. With Map. 2 *vols. Post* 8*vo.* 10*s.*
Cheap Edition, without the Notes. 1 *vol.* 8*vo.* 6*s.*

A SHORT LIFE OF CHRIST. *With* 34 *Illustrations. Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*; *gilt edges,* 4*s.* 6*d.*

Gold Dust: a Collection of Golden Counsels for the Sanctification of Daily Life. Translated and abridged from the French by E.L.E.E. Edited by CHARLOTTE M. YONGE. Parts I. II. III. Small Pocket Volumes. *Cloth, gilt, each* 1*s.* Parts I. and II. in One Volume. 1*s.* 6*d.* Parts I., II., and III. in One Volume. 2*s. net.*

*** The two first parts in One Volume, *large type,* 18*mo. cloth, gilt.* 2*s. net.* Parts I. II. and III. are also supplied, bound in white cloth, with red edges, in box, price 2*s.* 6*d. net.*

Gore.—Works by the Right Rev. CHARLES GORE, D.D., Lord Bishop of Worcester.

THE CHURCH AND THE MINISTRY. *Fifth Edition, Revised. Crown* 8*vo.* 6*s., net.*

ROMAN CATHOLIC CLAIMS. *Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s. net.*

Goreh.—THE LIFE OF FATHER GOREH. By C. E. GARDNER, S.S.J.E. Edited, with Preface, by RICHARD MEUX BENSON, M.A., S.S.J.E., Student of Christ Church, Oxford. With Portrait. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.*

Great Truths of the Christian Religion. Edited by the Rev. W. U. RICHARDS. *Small* 8*vo.* 2*s.*

Hall.—Works by the Right Rev. A. C. A. HALL, D.D., Bishop of Vermont.

CONFIRMATION. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.* (The Oxford Library of Practical Theology.)

THE VIRGIN MOTHER: Retreat Addresses on the Life of the Blessed Virgin Mary as told in the Gospels. With an appended Essay on the Virgin Birth of our Lord. *Crown* 8*vo.* 4*s.* 6*d.*

CHRIST'S TEMPTATION AND OURS. *Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

Hallowing of Sorrow. By E. R. With a Preface by H. S. HOLLAND, M.A., Canon and Precentor of St. Paul's. *Small* 8*vo.* 2*s.*

Hanbury-Tracy.—FAITH AND PROGRESS. Sermons Preached at the Dedication Festival of St. Barnabas' Church, Pimlico, June 10-17, 1900. Edited by the Rev. the Hon. A. HANBURY-TRACY, Vicar of St. Barnabas', Pimlico. With an Introduction by the Rev. T. T. CARTER, M.A. *Crown* 8*vo.* 4*s.* 6*d. net.*

Handbooks for the Clergy. Edited by the Rev. ARTHUR W. ROBINSON, B.D., Vicar of Allhallows Barking by the Tower. *Crown* 8*vo.* 2*s.* 6*d. net each Volume.*

THE PERSONAL LIFE OF THE CLERGY. By the Rev. ARTHUR W. ROBINSON, B.D., Vicar of Allhallows Barking by the Tower.

THE MINISTRY OF CONVERSION. By the Rev. A. J. MASON, D.D., Lady Margaret's Reader in Divinity in the University of Cambridge and Canon of Canterbury.

PATRISTIC STUDY. By the Rev. H. B. SWETE, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge.

FOREIGN MISSIONS. By the Right Rev. H. H. MONTGOMERY, D.D., formerly Bishop of Tasmania, Secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts.

THE STUDY OF THE GOSPELS. By the Rev. J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, D.D., Canon of Westminster and Chaplain in Ordinary to the King.

*** *Other Volumes are in preparation.*

Harrison.—PROBLEMS OF CHRISTIANITY AND SCEPTICISM. By the Rev. ALEXANDER J. HARRISON, B.D. Incumbent of St. Thomas the Martyr, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. *Crown* 8*vo.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

Hatch.—THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EARLY CHRISTIAN CHURCHES. Being the Bampton Lectures for 1880. By EDWIN HATCH, M.A., D.D., late Reader in Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oxford. 8*vo.* 5*s.*

Holland.—Works by the Rev. HENRY SCOTT HOLLAND, M.A., Canon and Precentor of St. Paul's.

GOD'S CITY AND THE COMING OF THE KINGDOM. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

PLEAS AND CLAIMS FOR CHRIST. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

CREED AND CHARACTER: Sermons. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

ON BEHALF OF BELIEF. Sermons. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

CHRIST OR ECCLESIASTES. Sermons. *Crown 8vo.* 2*s.* 6*d.*

LOGIC AND LIFE, with other Sermons. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

GOOD FRIDAY. Being Addresses on the Seven Last Words. *Small 8vo.* 2*s.*

Hollings.—Works by the Rev. G. S. HOLLINGS, Mission Priest of the Society of St. John the Evangelist, Cowley, Oxford.

THE HEAVENLY STAIR; or, A Ladder of the Love of God for Sinners. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

PORTA REGALIS; or, Considerations on Prayer. *Crown 8vo. limp cloth,* 1*s.* 6*d. net*; *cloth boards,* 2*s. net.*

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE WISDOM OF GOD. *Crown 8vo.* 4*s.*

PARADOXES OF THE LOVE OF GOD, especially as they are seen in the way of the Evangelical Counsels. *Crown 8vo.* 4*s.*

ONE BORN OF THE SPIRIT; or, the Unification of our Life in God. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

Hutchings.—Works by the Ven. W. H. HUTCHINGS, M.A. Archdeacon of Cleveland, Canon of York, Rector of Kirby Misperton, and Rural Dean of Malton.

SERMON SKETCHES from some of the Sunday Lessons throughout the Church's Year. *Vols. I and II. Crown 8vo.* 5*s. each.*

THE LIFE OF PRAYER: a Course of Lectures delivered in All Saints' Church, Margaret Street, during Lent. *Crown 8vo.* 4*s.* 6*d.*

THE PERSON AND WORK OF THE HOLY GHOST: a Doctrinal and Devotional Treatise. *Crown 8vo.* 4*s.* 6*d.*

SOME ASPECTS OF THE CROSS. *Crown 8vo.* 4*s.* 6*d.*

THE MYSTERY OF THE TEMPTATION. Lent Lectures delivered at St. Mary Magdalene, Paddington. *Crown 8vo.* 4*s.* 6*d.*

Hutton.—THE SOUL HERE AND HEREAFTER. By the Rev. R. E. HUTTON, Chaplain of St. Margaret's, East Grinstead. *Crown 8vo.* 6*s.*

Inheritance of the Saints; or, Thoughts on the Communion of Saints and the Life of the World to come. Collected chiefly from English Writers by L. P. With a Preface by the Rev. HENRY SCOTT HOLLAND, M.A. *Ninth Edition. Crown* 8*vo.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

James.—THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A Study in Human Nature. Being the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-1902. By WILLIAM JAMES, LL.D., etc., Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. 8*vo.* 12*s. net.*

Jameson.—Works by Mrs. JAMESON.

SACRED AND LEGENDARY ART, containing Legends of the Angels and Archangels, the Evangelists, the Apostles. With 19 Etchings and 187 Woodcuts. 2 *vols.* 8*vo.* 20*s. net.*

LEGENDS OF THE MONASTIC ORDERS, as represented in the Fine Arts. With 11 Etchings and 88 Woodcuts. 8*vo.* 10*s. net.*

LEGENDS OF THE MADONNA, OR BLESSED VIRGIN MARY. With 27 Etchings and 165 Woodcuts. 8*vo.* 10*s. net.*

THE HISTORY OF OUR LORD, as exemplified in Works of Art. Commenced by the late Mrs. JAMESON; continued and completed by LADY EASTLAKE. With 31 Etchings and 281 Woodcuts. 2 *Vols.* 8*vo.* 20*s. net.*

Jennings.—ECCLESIA ANGLICANA. A History of the Church of Christ in England from the Earliest to the Present Times. By the Rev. ARTHUR CHARLES JENNINGS, M.A. *Crown* 8*vo.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

Johnstone.—SONSHIP: Six Lenten Addresses. By the Rev VERNEY LOVETT JOHNSTONE, M.A., late Assistant Curate of Ilfracombe. With an Introduction by the Rev. V. S. S. COLES, M.A., Principal of the Pusey House, Oxford. *Crown* 8*vo.* 2*s.*

Jones.—ENGLAND AND THE HOLY SEE: An Essay towards Reunion. By SPENCER JONES, M.A., Rector of Moreton in-Marsh. With a Preface by the Right Hon. VISCOUNT HALIFAX. *Crown* 8*vo.* 6*s. net.*

Joy and Strength for the Pilgrim's Day: Selections in Prose and Verse. By the Editor of 'Daily Strength for Daily Needs,' etc. *Small* 8*vo.* 3*s.* 6*d. net.*

Jukes.—Works by ANDREW JUKES.

THE NEW MAN AND THE ETERNAL LIFE. Notes on the Reiterated Amens of the Son of God. *Crown* 8*vo.* 6*s.*

THE NAMES OF GOD IN HOLY SCRIPTURE: a Revelation of His Nature and Relationships. *Crown* 8*vo.* 4*s.* 6*d.*

THE TYPES OF GENESIS. *Crown* 8*vo.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

THE SECOND DEATH AND THE RESTITUTION OF ALL THINGS. *Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

Kelly.—A HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF CHRIST. By the Rev. HERBERT H. KELLY, M.A., Director of the Society of the Sacred Mission, Mildenhall, Suffolk. Vol. I. A.D. 29-342. *Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s.* 6*d. net.* [*Vol.* 2 *in the press.*

Knox.—PASTORS AND TEACHERS: Six Lectures on Pastoral Theology. By the Right Rev. EDMUND ARBUTHNOTT KNOX, D.D., Bishop of Coventry. With an Introduction by the Right Rev. CHARLES GORE, D.D., Bishop of Worcester. *Crown* 8*vo*. 5*s. net.*

Knox Little.—Works by W. J. KNOX LITTLE, M.A., Canon Residentiary of Worcester, and Vicar of Hoar Cross.

HOLY MATRIMONY. *Crown* 8*vo*. 5*s*. [The Oxford Library of Practical Theology.]

THE PERFECT LIFE: Sermons. *Crown* 8*vo*. 7*s*. 6*d*.

THE CHRISTIAN HOME. *Crown* 8*vo*. 3*s*. 6*d*.

CHARACTERISTICS AND MOTIVES OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE. Ten Sermons preached in Manchester Cathedral, in Lent and Advent. *Crown* 8*vo*. 2*s*. 6*d*.

THE MYSTERY OF THE PASSION OF OUR MOST HOLY REDEEMER. *Crown* 8*vo*. 2*s*. 6*d*.

THE LIGHT OF LIFE. Sermons preached on Various Occasions. *Crown* 8*vo*. 3*s*. 6*d*.

SUNLIGHT AND SHADOW IN THE CHRISTIAN LIFE. Sermons preached for the most part in America. *Crown* 8*vo*. 3*s*. 6*d*.

Law.—A PRACTICAL TREATISE UPON CHRISTIAN PERFECTION. By WILLIAM LAW, M.A. Edited by L. H. M. SOULSBY. 16*mo, red borders*, 2*s. net.*

Lear.—Works by, and Edited by, H. L. SIDNEY LEAR.

FOR DAYS AND YEARS. A book containing a Text, Short Reading, and Hymn for Every Day in the Church's Year. 16*mo*. 2*s. net. Also a Cheap Edition*, 32*mo*, 1*s*.; *or cloth gilt*, 1*s*. 6*d*.; *or with red borders*, 2*s. net.*

FIVE MINUTES. Daily Readings of Poetry. 16*mo*. 3*s*. 6*d*. *Also a Cheap Edition*, 32*mo*. 1*s*.; *or cloth gilt*, 1*s*. 6*d*.

WEARINESS. A Book for the Languid and Lonely. *Large Type. Small* 8*vo*. 5*s*.

CHRISTIAN BIOGRAPHIES. *Nine Vols. Crown* 8*vo*. 3*s*. 6*d. each.*

MADAME LOUISE DE FRANCE, Daughter of Louis XV., known also as the Mother Térèse de St. Augustin.

A DOMINICAN ARTIST: a Sketch of the Life of the Rev. Père Besson, of the Order of St. Dominic.

HENRI PERREYVE. By PÈRE GRATRY.

ST. FRANCIS DE SALES, Bishop and Prince of Geneva.

THE REVIVAL OF PRIESTLY LIFE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY IN FRANCE.

A CHRISTIAN PAINTER OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

BOSSUET AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES.

FÉNELON, ARCHBISHOP OF CAMBRAI.

HENRI DOMINIQUE LACORDAIRE.

[*continued.*

Lear. — Works by, and Edited by, H. L. SIDNEY LEAR.—*continued.*

DEVOTIONAL WORKS. Edited by H. L. SIDNEY LEAR. *New and Uniform Editions. Nine Vols.* 16*mo.* 2*s. net each.*

FÉNELON'S SPIRITUAL LETTERS TO MEN.

FÉNELON'S SPIRITUAL LETTERS TO WOMEN.

A SELECTION FROM THE SPIRITUAL LETTERS OF ST. FRANCIS DE SALES. Also *Cheap Edition,* 32*mo,* 6*d. cloth limp ;* 1*s. cloth boards.*

THE SPIRIT OF ST. FRANCIS DE SALES.

THE HIDDEN LIFE OF THE SOUL.

THE LIGHT OF THE CONSCIENCE. Also *Cheap Edition,* 32*mo,* 6*d. cloth limp ;* 1*s. cloth boards.*

SELF-RENUNCIATION. From the French.

ST. FRANCIS DE SALES' OF THE LOVE OF GOD.

SELECTIONS FROM PASCAL'S 'THOUGHTS.'

Lepine.—THE MINISTERS OF JESUS CHRIST. By J. FOSTER LEPINE, Vicar of Lamorbey, Kent. Parts I. and II. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s. each.*

Liddon.—Works by HENRY PARRY LIDDON, D.D., D.C.L., LL.D.

SERMONS ON SOME WORDS OF ST. PAUL. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.*

SERMONS PREACHED ON SPECIAL OCCASIONS, 1860-1889. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.*

CLERICAL LIFE AND WORK : Sermons. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.*

ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES : Lectures on Buddhism—Lectures on the Life of St. Paul—Papers on Dante. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.*

EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS OF PAUL'S EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS. 8*vo.* 14*s.*

EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS OF ST. PAUL'S FIRST EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY. 8*vo.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

SERMONS ON OLD TESTAMENT SUBJECTS. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.*

SERMONS ON SOME WORDS OF CHRIST. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.*

THE DIVINITY OF OUR LORD AND SAVIOUR JESUS CHRIST. Being the Bampton Lectures for 1866. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.*

ADVENT IN ST. PAUL'S. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.*

CHRISTMASTIDE IN ST. PAUL'S. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.*

PASSIONTIDE SERMONS. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.*

EASTER IN ST. PAUL'S. Sermons bearing chiefly on the Resurrection of our Lord. *Two Vols. Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s.* 6*d. each. Cheap Edition in one Volume. Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.*

[*continued.*

Liddon.—Works by HENRY PARRY LIDDON, D.D., D.C.L., LL.D.—*continued.*

SERMONS PREACHED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. *Two Vols. Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s.* 6*d. each. Cheap Edition in one Volume. Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.*

THE MAGNIFICAT. Sermons in St. Paul's. *Crown* 8*vo.* 2*s. net.*

SOME ELEMENTS OF RELIGION. Lent Lectures. *Small* 8*vo.* 2*s. net.* [*The Crown* 8*vo Edition* (5*s.*) *may still be had.*]

SELECTIONS FROM THE WRITINGS OF. *Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

Luckock.—Works by HERBERT MORTIMER LUCKOCK, D.D., Dean of Lichfield.

THE SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOUR GOSPELS. *Crown* 8*vo.* 6*s.*

AFTER DEATH. An Examination of the Testimony of Primitive Times respecting the State of the Faithful Dead, and their Relationship to the Living. *Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s. net.*

THE INTERMEDIATE STATE BETWEEN DEATH AND JUDGMENT. Being a Sequel to *After Death. Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s. net.*

FOOTPRINTS OF THE SON OF MAN, as traced by St. Mark. Being Eighty Portions for Private Study, Family Reading, and Instruction in Church. *Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s. net.*

FOOTPRINTS OF THE APOSTLES, as traced by St. Luke in the Acts. Being Sixty Portions for Private Study, and Instruction in Church. A Sequel to 'Footprints of the Son of Man, as traced by St. Mark.' *Two Vols. Crown* 8*vo.* 12*s.*

THE DIVINE LITURGY. Being the Order for Holy Communion, Historically, Doctrinally, and Devotionally set forth, in Fifty Portions. *Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s. net.*

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER. The Anglican Reform—The Puritan Innovations—The Elizabethan Reaction—The Caroline Settlement. With Appendices. *Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s. net.*

THE BISHOPS IN THE TOWER. A Record of Stirring Events affecting the Church and Nonconformists from the Restoration to the Revolution. *Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s. net.*

Lyra Germanica: Hymns for the Sundays and Chief Festivals of the Christian Year. *First Series. 16mo, with red borders, 2s. net.*

MacColl.—Works by the Rev. MALCOLM MACCOLL, D.D., Canon Residentiary of Ripon.

THE REFORMATION SETTLEMENT: Examined in the Light of History and Law. Tenth Edition, Revised, with a new Preface. *Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. net.*

CHRISTIANITY IN RELATION TO SCIENCE AND MORALS. *Crown 8vo. 6s.*

LIFE HERE AND HEREAFTER: Sermons. *Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.*

Marriage Addresses and Marriage Hymns. By the BISHOP OF LONDON, the BISHOP OF ROCHESTER, the BISHOP OF TRURO, the DEAN OF ROCHESTER, the DEAN OF NORWICH, ARCHDEACON SINCLAIR, CANON DUCKWORTH, CANON NEWBOLT, CANON KNOX LITTLE, CANON RAWNSLEY, the Rev. J. LLEWELLYN DAVIES, D.D., the Rev. W. ALLEN WHITWORTH, etc. Edited by the Rev. O. P. WARDELL-YERBURGH, M.A., Vicar of the Abbey Church of St. Mary, Tewkesbury. *Crown 8vo. 5s.*

Mason.—Works by A. J. MASON, D.D., Lady Margaret's Reader in Divinity in the University of Cambridge and Canon of Canterbury.

PURGATORY; THE STATE OF THE FAITHFUL DEAD; INVOCATION OF SAINTS. Three Lectures. *Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. net.*

THE FAITH OF THE GOSPEL. A Manual of Christian Doctrine. *Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d. Cheap Edition. Crown 8vo. 3s. net.*

THE RELATION OF CONFIRMATION TO BAPTISM. As taught in Holy Scripture and the Fathers. *Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.*

Maturin.—Works by the Rev. B. W. MATURIN.

SOME PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE. *Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d.*

PRACTICAL STUDIES ON THE PARABLES OF OUR LORD. *Crown 8vo. 5s.*

Medd.—THE PRIEST TO THE ALTAR; or, Aids to the Devout Celebration of Holy Communion, chiefly after the Ancient English Use of Sarum. By PETER GOLDSMITH MEDD, M.A., Canon of St. Alban's. Fourth Edition, revised and enlarged. *Royal 8vo. 15s.*

Meyrick.—THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH OF England on the Holy Communion Restated as a Guide at the Present Time. By the Rev. F. MEYRICK, M.A. *Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d.*

Monro.—SACRED ALLEGORIES. By Rev. EDWARD MONRO. *Complete Edition in one Volume, with Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. net.*

Mortimer.—Works by the Rev. A. G. MORTIMER, D.D., Rector of St. Mark's, Philadelphia.

THE EUCHARISTIC SACRIFICE: An Historical and Theological Investigation of the Sacrificial Conception of the Holy Eucharist in the Christian Church. *Crown 8vo.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

CATHOLIC FAITH AND PRACTICE: A Manual of Theology. Two Parts. *Crown 8vo.* Sold Separately. Part I. 7*s.* 6*d.* Part II. 9*s.*

JESUS AND THE RESURRECTION: Thirty Addresses for Good Friday and Easter. *Crown 8vo.* 5*s.*

HELPS TO MEDITATION: Sketches for Every Day in the Year.
Vol. I. ADVENT TO TRINITY. *8vo.* 7*s.* 6*d.*
Vol. II. TRINITY TO ADVENT. *8vo.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

STORIES FROM GENESIS: Sermons for Children. *Crown 8vo.* 4*s.*

THE LAWS OF HAPPINESS; or, The Beatitudes as teaching our Duty to God, Self, and our Neighbour. 18*mo.* 2*s.*

THE LAWS OF PENITENCE: Addresses on the Words of our Lord from the Cross. 16*mo.* 1*s.* 6*d.*

SERMONS IN MINIATURE FOR EXTEMPORE PREACHERS: Sketches for Every Sunday and Holy Day of the Christian Year. *Crown 8vo.* 6*s.*

NOTES ON THE SEVEN PENITENTIAL PSALMS, chiefly from Patristic Sources. *Small 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

THE SEVEN LAST WORDS OF OUR MOST HOLY REDEEMER: with Meditations on some Scenes in His Passion. *Crown 8vo.* 5*s.*

LEARN OF JESUS CHRIST TO DIE: Addresses on the Words of our Lord from the Cross, taken as teaching the way of Preparation for Death. 16*mo.* 2*s.*

Mozley.—Works by J. B. MOZLEY, D.D., late Canon of Christ Church, and Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford.

ESSAYS, HISTORICAL AND THEOLOGICAL. *Two Vols. 8vo.* 24*s.*

EIGHT LECTURES ON MIRACLES. Being the Bampton Lectures for 1865. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s. net.*

RULING IDEAS IN EARLY AGES AND THEIR RELATION TO OLD TESTAMENT FAITH. *8vo.* 6*s.*

SERMONS PREACHED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, and on Various Occasions. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s. net.*

SERMONS, PAROCHIAL AND OCCASIONAL. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s. net.*

A REVIEW OF THE BAPTISMAL CONTROVERSY. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s. net.*

Newbolt.—Works by the Rev. W. C. E. NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of St. Paul's Cathedral.

APOSTLES OF THE LORD: being Six Lectures on Pastoral Theology, delivered in the Divinity School, Cambridge, Lent Term, 1901. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d. net.*

RELIGION. *Crown 8vo.* 5*s.* (The Oxford Library of Practical Theology.)

THE DIAL OF PRAYER: being Devotions for Every Hour. *Small 8vo.* 2*s.*

WORDS OF EXHORTATION. Sermons Preached at St. Paul's and elsewhere. *Crown 8vo.* 5*s. net.*

PENITENCE AND PEACE: being Addresses on the 51st and 23rd Psalms. *Crown 8vo.* 2*s. net.*

PRIESTLY IDEALS; being a Course of Practical Lectures delivered in St. Paul's Cathedral to 'Our Society' and other Clergy, in Lent, 1898. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

THE GOSPEL OF EXPERIENCE; or, the Witness of Human Life to the truth of Revelation. Being the Boyle Lectures for 1895. *Crown 8vo.* 5*s.*

COUNSELS OF FAITH AND PRACTICE: being Sermons preached on various occasions. *Crown 8vo.* 5*s.*

SPECULUM SACERDOTUM; or, the Divine Model of the Priestly Life. *Crown 8vo.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

THE FRUIT OF THE SPIRIT. Being Ten Addresses bearing on the Spiritual Life. *Crown 8vo.* 2*s. net.*

THE MAN OF GOD. *Small 8vo.* 1*s.* 6*d.*

THE PRAYER BOOK: Its Voice and Teaching. *Crown 8vo.* 2*s. net.*

Newman.—Works by JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, B.D., sometime Vicar of St. Mary's, Oxford.

LETTERS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN DURING HIS LIFE IN THE ENGLISH CHURCH. With a brief Autobiography. Edited, at Cardinal Newman's request, by ANNE MOZLEY. 2 *vols.* *Crown 8vo.* 7*s.*

PAROCHIAL AND PLAIN SERMONS. *Eight Vols.* *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d. each.*

SELECTION, ADAPTED TO THE SEASONS OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL YEAR, from the 'Parochial and Plain Sermons.' *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

FIFTEEN SERMONS PREACHED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

SERMONS BEARING UPON SUBJECTS OF THE DAY. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

LECTURES ON THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

*** *A Complete List of Cardinal Newman's Works can be had on Application.*

Osborne.—Works by EDWARD OSBORNE, Mission Priest of the Society of St. John the Evangelist, Cowley, Oxford.

THE CHILDREN'S SAVIOUR. Instructions to Children on the Life of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. *Illustrated.* 16*mo.* 2*s. net.*

THE SAVIOUR KING. Instructions to Children on Old Testament Types and Illustrations of the Life of Christ. *Illustrated.* 16*mo.* 2*s. net.*

THE CHILDREN'S FAITH. Instructions to Children on the Apostles' Creed. *Illustrated.* 16*mo.* 2*s. net.*

Ottley.—ASPECTS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT: being the Bampton Lectures for 1897. By ROBERT LAWRENCE OTTLEY, M.A., Vicar of Winterbourne Bassett, Wilts; sometime Principal of the Pusey House. 8*vo.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

Oxford (The) Library of Practical Theology.—Edited by the Rev. W. C. E. NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of St. Paul's, and the Rev. DARWELL STONE, M.A., Principal of the Missionary College, Dorchester. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s. each.*

RELIGION. By the Rev. W. C. E. NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of St. Paul's. [*Ready.*

HOLY BAPTISM. By the Rev. DARWELL STONE, M.A., Principal of the Missionary College, Dorchester. [*Ready.*

CONFIRMATION. By the Right Rev. A. C. A. HALL, D.D., Bishop of Vermont. [*Ready.*

THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER. By the Rev. LEIGHTON PULLAN, M.A., Fellow of St. John Baptist's Oxford. [*Ready.*

HOLY MATRIMONY. By the Rev. W. J. KNOX LITTLE, M.A., Canon of Worcester. [*Ready.*

THE INCARNATION. By the Rev. H. V. S. ECK, M.A., St. Andrew's, Bethnal Green. [*Ready.*

FOREIGN MISSIONS. By the Right Rev. E. T. CHURTON, D.D., formerly Bishop of Nassau. [*Ready.*

PRAYER. By the Rev. ARTHUR JOHN WORLLEDGE, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of Truro. [*Ready.*

THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION. By the Rev. LEIGHTON PULLAN, M.A., Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford. [*In the press.*

SUNDAY. By the Rev. W. B. TREVELYAN, M.A., Vicar of St. Matthew's, Westminster. [*In preparation.*

THE BIBLE. By the Rev. DARWELL STONE, M.A., Joint Editor of the Series. [*In preparation.*

THE CREEDS. By the Rev. A. G. MORTIMER, D.D., Rector of St. Mark's, Philadelphia. [*In preparation.*

THE CHURCH CATECHISM THE CHRISTIAN'S MANUAL. By the Rev. W. C. E. NEWBOLT, M.A., Joint Editor of the Series. [*In preparation.*

[*continued.*

Oxford (The) Library of Practical Theology.—*continued.*

RELIGIOUS CEREMONIAL. By the Rev. WALTER HOWARD FRERE, M.A., Superior of the Community of the Resurrection, Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Rochester. [*In preparation.*

HOLY ORDERS. By the Rev. A. R. WHITHAM, M.A., Principal of Culham College, Abingdon. [*In preparation.*

VISITATION OF THE SICK. By the Rev. E. F. RUSSELL, M.A., St. Alban's, Holborn. [*In preparation.*

CHURCH WORK. By the Rev. BERNARD REYNOLDS, M.A., Prebendary of St. Paul's. [*In preparation.*

DEVOTIONAL BOOKS. By the Rev. CHARLES BODINGTON, Canon and Treasurer of Lichfield. [*In preparation.*

Paget.—Works by FRANCIS PAGET, D.D., Lord Bishop of Oxford.

CHRIST THE WAY: Four Addresses given at a Meeting of Schoolmasters and others at Haileybury. *Crown* 8*vo.* 1*s.* 6*d. net.*

STUDIES IN THE CHRISTIAN CHARACTER: Sermons. With an Introductory Essay. *Crown* 8*vo.* 4*s. net.*

THE SPIRIT OF DISCIPLINE: Sermons. *Crown* 8*vo.* 4*s. net.*

FACULTIES AND DIFFICULTIES FOR BELIEF AND DISBELIEF. *Crown* 8*vo.* 4*s. net.*

THE HALLOWING OF WORK. Addresses given at Eton, January 16-18, 1888. *Small* 8*vo.* 2*s.*

THE REDEMPTION OF WAR: Sermons. *Crown* 8*vo.* 2*s. net.*

Passmore.—Works by the Rev. T. H. PASSMORE, M.A.

THE THINGS BEYOND THE TOMB IN A CATHOLIC LIGHT. *Crown* 8*vo.* 2*s.* 6*d. net.*

LEISURABLE STUDIES. *Crown* 8*vo.* 4*s. net.*

CONTENTS.—The 'Religious Woman'—Preachments—Silly Ritual—The Tyranny of the Word—The Lectern—The Functions of Ceremonial—Homo Creator—Concerning the Pun—Proverbia.

Percival.—THE INVOCATION OF SAINTS. Treated Theologically and Historically. By HENRY R. PERCIVAL, M.A., D.D. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.*

Pocket Manual of Prayers for the Hours, Etc. With the Collects from the Prayer Book. *Royal* 32*mo.* 1*s.*

Powell.—CHORALIA: a Handy-Book for Parochial Precentors and Choirmasters. By the Rev. JAMES BADEN POWELL, M.A., Precentor of St. Paul's, Knightsbridge. *Crown* 8*vo.* 4*s.* 6*d. net.*

Practical Reflections. By a CLERGYMAN. With Preface by H. P. LIDDON, D.D., D.C.L., and the LORD BISHOP OF LINCOLN. *Crown* 8*vo.*

THE BOOK OF GENESIS. 4*s.* 6*d.*
THE PSALMS. 5*s.*
ISAIAH. 4*s.* 6*d.*
THE MINOR PROPHETS. 4*s.* 6*d.*
THE HOLY GOSPELS. 4*s.* 6*d.*
ACTS TO REVELATION. 6*s.*

Preparatio; or, Notes of Preparation for Holy Communion, founded on the Collect, Epistle, and Gospel for Every Sunday in the Year. With Preface by the Rev. GEORGE CONGREVE, S.S.J.E. *Crown 8vo.* 6*s. net.*

Priest's Prayer Book (The). Containing Private Prayers and Intercessions; Occasional, School, and Parochial Offices; Offices for the Visitation of the Sick, with Notes, Readings, Collects, Hymns, Litanies, etc. With a brief Pontifical. By the late Rev. R. F. LITTLEDALE, LL.D., D.C.L., and Rev. J. EDWARD VAUX, M.A., F.S.A. *Post 8vo.* 6*s.* 6*d.*

Pullan.—Works by the Rev. LEIGHTON PULLAN, M.A., Fellow of St. John Baptist's College.

LECTURES ON RELIGION. *Crown 8vo.* 6*s.*

THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER. *Crown 8vo.* 5*s.* (The Oxford Library of Practical Theology.)

Puller.—THE PRIMITIVE SAINTS AND THE SEE OF ROME. By F. W. PULLER, of the Society of St. John the Evangelist, Cowley. With an Introduction by EDWARD, LORD BISHOP OF LINCOLN. Third Edition, Revised and Enlarged. *8vo.* 16*s. net.*

Pusey.—Works by the Rev. E. B. PUSEY, D.D.

PRIVATE PRAYERS. With Preface by H. P. LIDDON, D.D., late Chancellor and Canon of St. Paul's. *Royal 32mo.* 1*s.*

SPIRITUAL LETTERS OF EDWARD BOUVERIE PUSEY, D.D. Edited and prepared for publication by the Rev. J. O. JOHNSTON, M.A., Principal of the Theological College, Cuddesdon; and the Rev. W. C. E. NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of St. Paul's. New and cheaper Edition. With Index. *Crown 8vo.* 5*s. net.*

Pusey.—THE STORY OF THE LIFE OF DR. PUSEY. By the Author of 'Charles Lowder.' With Frontispiece. *Crown 8vo.* 7*s.* 6*d. net.*

Randolph.—Works by B. W. RANDOLPH, D.D., Principal of the Theological College and Hon. Canon of Ely.

THE EXAMPLE OF THE PASSION: being Addresses given in St. Paul's Cathedral at the Mid-Day Service on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday in Holy Week, and at the Three Hours' Service on Good Friday, 1897. *Small 8vo.* 2*s. net.*

MEDITATIONS ON THE OLD TESTAMENT for Every Day in the Year. *Crown 8vo.* 6*s.*

THE THRESHOLD OF THE SANCTUARY: being Short Chapters on the Inner Preparation for the Priesthood. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

Rede.—THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS: A Lost Link in the Chain of the Church's Creed. By WYLLYS REDE, D.D., Canon of the Cathedral, Atalanta, Georgia. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

RIVINGTON'S DEVOTIONAL SERIES.

16*mo, Red Borders and gilt edges. Each* 2*s. net.*

BICKERSTETH'S YESTERDAY, TO-DAY, AND FOR EVER. *Gilt edges.*
CHILCOT'S TREATISE ON EVIL THOUGHTS. *Red edges.*
THE CHRISTIAN YEAR. *Gilt edges.*
HERBERT'S POEMS AND PROVERBS. *Gilt edges.*
KEMPIS' OF THE IMITATION OF CHRIST. *Gilt edges.*
LEAR'S (H. L. SIDNEY) FOR DAYS AND YEARS. *Gilt edges.*
LYRA APOSTOLICA. POEMS BY J. W. BOWDEN, R. H. FROUDE, J. KEBLE, J. H. NEWMAN, R. I. WILBERFORCE, AND I. WILLIAMS; and a Preface by CARDINAL NEWMAN. *Gilt edges.*
FRANCIS DE SALES' (ST.) THE DEVOUT LIFE. *Gilt edges.*
WILSON'S THE LORD'S SUPPER. *Red edges.*
*TAYLOR'S (JEREMY) HOLY LIVING. *Red edges.*
*——— ——— HOLY DYING. *Red edges.*
SCUDAMORE'S STEPS TO THE ALTAR.. *Gilt edges*
LYRA GERMANICA: HYMNS FOR THE SUNDAYS AND CHIEF FESTIVALS OF THE CHRISTIAN YEAR. *First Series. Gilt edges.*
LAW'S TREATISE ON CHRISTIAN PERFECTION. Edited by L. H. M. SOULSBY. *Gilt edges.*
CHRIST AND HIS CROSS: SELECTIONS FROM SAMUEL RUTHERFORD'S LETTERS. Edited by L. H. M. SOULSBY. *Gilt edges.*

* *These two in one Volume.* 5*s.*

18*mo, without Red Borders. Each* 1*s. net.*

BICKERSTETH'S YESTERDAY, TO-DAY, AND FOR EVER.
THE CHRISTIAN YEAR.
KEMPIS' OF THE IMITATION OF CHRIST.
HERBERT'S POEMS AND PROVERBS.
SCUDAMORE'S STEPS TO THE ALTAR.
WILSON'S THE LORD'S SUPPER.
FRANCIS DE SALES' (ST.) THE DEVOUT LIFE.
*TAYLOR'S (JEREMY) HOLY LIVING.
*——— ——— HOLY DYING.

* *These two in one Volume.* 2*s.* 6*d.*

Robbins.—AN ESSAY TOWARD FAITH. By WILFORD L ROBBINS, D.D., Dean of the Cathedral of All Saints', Albany, U.S. *Small* 8*vo.* 3*s. net.*

Robinson.—Works by the Rev. C. H. ROBINSON, M.A., Editorial Secretary to the S.P.G. and Canon of Ripon.

STUDIES IN THE CHARACTER OF CHRIST. *Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

HUMAN NATURE A REVELATION OF THE DIVINE: a Sequel to 'Studies in the Character of Christ.' *Crown* 8*vo.* 6*s. net.*

Romanes.—THOUGHTS ON THE COLLECTS FOR THE TRINITY SEASON. By ETHEL ROMANES, Author of 'The Life and Letters of George John Romanes.' With a Preface by the Right Rev. the LORD BISHOP OF LONDON. 18*mo.* 2*s.* 6*d.*; *gilt edges.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

Sanday.—Works by W. SANDAY, D.D., LL.D., Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford.

DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF PRIESTHOOD AND SACRIFICE: a Report of a Conference held at Oxford, December 13 and 14, 1899. Edited by W. SANDAY, D.D. *8vo.* *7s. 6d.*

THE CONCEPTION OF PRIESTHOOD IN THE EARLY CHURCH AND IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND: Four Sermons. *Crown 8vo.* *3s. 6d.*

INSPIRATION: Eight Lectures on the Early History and Origin of the Doctrine of Biblical Inspiration. Being the Bampton Lectures for 1893. *8vo.* *7s. 6d.*

Sanders.—FÉNELON: HIS FRIENDS AND HIS ENEMIES, 1651-1715. By E. K. SANDERS. With Portrait. *8vo.* 10*s.* 6*d. net.*

Scudamore.—STEPS TO THE ALTAR: a Manual of Devotion for the Blessed Eucharist. By the Rev. W. E. SCUDAMORE, M.A. *Royal 32mo.* 1*s.*

On toned paper, and rubricated, 2*s.*: *The same, with Collects, Epistles, and Gospels,* 2*s.* 6*d.*; 18*mo,* 1*s. net*; *Demy* 18*mo, cloth, large type,* 1*s.* 3*d.*; 16*mo, with red borders,* 2*s. net*; *Imperial* 32*mo, limp cloth,* 6*d.*

Simpson.—Works by the Rev. W. J. SPARROW SIMPSON, M.A., Vicar of St. Mark's, Regent's Park.

THE CHURCH AND THE BIBLE. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

THE CLAIMS OF JESUS CHRIST: Lent Lectures. *Crown 8vo.* 3*s.*

Skrine.—PASTOR AGNORUM: a Schoolmaster's Afterthoughts. By JOHN HUNTLEY SKRINE, Warden of Glenalmond, Author of 'A Memory of Edward Thring, etc. Crown 8vo. 5*s. net.*

Songs, The, of Degrees; or, Gradual Psalms. Interleaved with Notes from Neale and Littledale's Commentary on the Psalms. By A. B. B. *Crown 8vo.* 1*s. net.*

Soulsby.—SUGGESTIONS ON PRAYER. By LUCY H. M. SOULSBY. 18*mo, sewed,* 1*s. net.*; *cloth,* 1*s.* 6*d. net.*

Stone.—Works by the Rev. DARWELL STONE, M.A., Principal of Dorchester Missionary College.

OUTLINES OF MEDITATIONS FOR USE IN RETREAT. *Crown 8vo.* 2*s.* 6*d. net.*

CHRIST AND HUMAN LIFE: Lectures delivered in St. Paul's Cathedral in January 1901; together with a Sermon on 'The Fatherhood of God.' *Crown 8vo.* 2*s.* 6*d. net.*

OUTLINES OF CHRISTIAN DOGMA. *Crown 8vo.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

HOLY BAPTISM. *Crown 8vo.* 5*s.* (The Oxford Library of Practical Theology.)

Strange.—INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVELATION OF ST. JOHN THE DIVINE: Being an attempt to make this book more intelligible to the ordinary reader and so to encourage the study of it. By Rev. CRESSWELL STRANGE, M.A., Vicar of Edgbaston, and Honorary Canon of Worcester. *Crown* 8*vo.* 6*s.*

Strong.—CHRISTIAN ETHICS: being the Bampton Lectures for 1895. By THOMAS B. STRONG, D.D., Dean of Christ Church, Oxford. 8*vo.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

Stubbs.—ORDINATION ADDRESSES. By the Right Rev. W. STUBBS, D.D., late Lord Bishop of Oxford. Edited by the Rev. E. E. HOLMES, formerly Domestic Chaplain to the Bishop; Hon. Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. With Photogravure Portrait *Crown* 8*vo.* 6*s. net.*

Tee.—THE SANCTUARY OF SUFFERING. By ELEANOR TEE, Author of 'This Everyday Life,' etc. With a Preface by the Rev. J. P. F. DAVIDSON, M.A., late Vicar of St. Matthias', Earl's Court. *Crown* 8*vo.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

Waggett.—THE AGE OF DECISION. By P. N. WAGGETT, M.A., of the Society of St. John the Evangelist, Cowley St. John, Oxford. *Crown* 8*vo.* 2*s.* 6*d. net.*

Williams.—Works by the Rev. ISAAC WILLIAMS, B.D.

A DEVOTIONAL COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL NARRATIVE. *Eight Vols. Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s. each.*

THOUGHTS ON THE STUDY OF THE HOLY GOSPELS.
A HARMONY OF THE FOUR EVANGELISTS.
OUR LORD'S NATIVITY.
OUR LORD'S MINISTRY (Second Year).
OUR LORD'S MINISTRY (Third Year).
THE HOLY WEEK.
OUR LORD'S PASSION.
OUR LORD'S RESURRECTION.

FEMALE CHARACTERS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE. A Series of Sermons. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.*

THE CHARACTERS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.*

THE APOCALYPSE. With Notes and Reflections. *Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s.*

SERMONS ON THE EPISTLES AND GOSPELS FOR THE SUNDAYS AND HOLY DAYS. *Two Vols. Crown* 8*vo.* 5*s. each.*

PLAIN SERMONS ON CATECHISM. *Two Vols. Cr.* 8*vo.* 5*s. each.*

Wirgman.—Works by A. THEODORE WIRGMAN, D.D., D.C.L., Canon of Grahamstown, and Vice-Provost of St. Mary's Collegiate Church, Port Elizabeth, South Africa.

THE DOCTRINE OF CONFIRMATION. *Crown* 8*vo.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF BISHOPS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. *Crown* 8*vo.* 6*s.*

Wordsworth.—Works by CHRISTOPHER WORDSWORTH, D.D., sometime Bishop of Lincoln.

THE HOLY BIBLE (the Old Testament). With Notes, Introductions, and Index. *Imperial* 8vo.

Vol. I. THE PENTATEUCH. 25*s.* Vol. II. JOSHUA TO SAMUEL. 15*s.* Vol. III. KINGS to ESTHER. 15*s.* Vol. IV. JOB TO SONG OF SOLOMON. 25*s.* Vol. V. ISAIAH TO EZEKIEL. 25*s.* Vol. VI. DANIEL, MINOR PROPHETS, and Index. 15*s.*

Also supplied in 13 *Parts. Sold separately.*

THE NEW TESTAMENT, in the Original Greek. With Notes, Introductions, and Indices. *Imperial* 8vo.

Vol. I. GOSPELS AND ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. 23*s.* Vol. II. EPISTLES, APOCALYPSE, and Indices. 37*s.*

Also supplied in 4 *Parts. Sold separately.*

A CHURCH HISTORY TO A.D. 451. *Four Vols. Crown* 8vo.

Vol. I. TO THE COUNCIL OF NICÆA, A.D. 325. 8*s.* 6*d.* Vol. II. FROM THE COUNCIL OF NICÆA TO THAT OF CONSTANTINOPLE. 6*s.* Vol. III. CONTINUATION. 6*s.* Vol. IV. CONCLUSION, TO THE COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON, A.D. 451. 6*s.*

THEOPHILUS ANGLICANUS: a Manual of Instruction on the Church and the Anglican Branch of it. 12*mo.* 2*s.* 6*d.*

ELEMENTS OF INSTRUCTION ON THE CHURCH. 16*mo.* 1*s. cloth.* 6*d. sewed.*

THE HOLY YEAR: Original Hymns. 16*mo.* 2*s.* 6*d. and* 1*s. Limp,* 6*d.*

,, ,, With Music. Edited by W. H. MONK. *Square* 8vo. 4*s.* 6*d.*

ON THE INTERMEDIATE STATE OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH. 32*mo.* 1*s.*

Wordsworth.—Works by JOHN WORDSWORTH, D.D., Lord Bishop of Salisbury.

THE MINISTRY OF GRACE: Studies in Early Church History, with reference to Present Problems. 8vo. 12*s.* 6*d. net.*

THE HOLY COMMUNION: Four Visitation Addresses. 1891. *Crown* 8vo. 3*s.* 6*d.*

THE ONE RELIGION: Truth, Holiness, and Peace desired by the Nations, and revealed by Jesus Christ. Eight Lectures delivered before the University of Oxford in 1881. *Crown* 8vo. 7*s.* 6*d.*

UNIVERSITY SERMONS ON GOSPEL SUBJECTS. *Sm.* 8vo. 2*s.* 6*d.*

PRAYERS FOR USE IN COLLEGE. 16*mo.* 1*s.*

5000/8/02.

Printed by T. and A. CONSTABLE, (late) Printers to Her Majesty
at the Edinburgh University Press.


Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library

1 1012 01146 9006

Date Due

My 19 '41
JE 24 '48
OC 27 '49
NO 15 '49
NO 29 '49
APR 3 0 '6[illegible]
JAN [illegible]

HANDBOOKS FOR THE CLERGY

EDITED BY A. W. ROBINSON B.D.